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Abstract. 
MOSI developing countries Cfeale a central banking institution, either individually or 
jointly. as part of a monetary union. The islands in lhe East Caribbean were no 
c)(ception. They opted for a joint institution, the East Caribbean Currency Authority, 
which was subsequently convened into a fully fledged central bank, the East Caribbean 
Central Bank (ECCB). This dissertation analyses the effects of the ECeB on the 
member economies of the ECMU. with special emphasis on the Grenadian economy. 
Because a monetary union involves the adoption of a single currency by a group 
of countries, a number of benefits and costs can be expected. The small volume of 
intra-union trade relative to the total trade of the member countries, the high and 
common degree of concentration of expons by product and destination. and the 
common concentration of impons in tenns of product and geographic origin, have 
meant that benefils to the ECMU countties from the elimination of the costs of money 
conversion for intra-union transactions, from the elimination of the costs of foreign 
exchange forward cover on transactions among members, and from the need to hold a 
smaller pool of foreign reserves, are extremely small. However, benefits arising from 
the reduced costs of having only one common cenrral bank are substantial. 
It is sometimes feared that the jointly controlled monetary and exchange rate 
policies which may SCJVe a majority interest, may not be suitable for particular countries 
and may create costs. Although the ECMU has restricted central bank credit to finance 
fiscal deficits, credit use in Dominica and Grenada in particular, was much higher than 
the limits imposed by the cenrra1 bank agreement. It seems reaso~able to postulate that 
in the absence of restrictions, higher fiscal deficits would have been financed by central 
bank credit. Given the likely adverse effects of fiscal deficits financed by centnli bank 
credit, the restrictive monetary policy seems to have been eAtremely beneficial 10 
Grenada. 
Analysis of money supply changes indicated thai Ihe ECCB can not exen 
independent control over Ihe money supply. Tn addition, the very openness of the 
economies and the high impon content of domestic consumption mean that inflation is 
to a large extent imported, thus eliminating the usefulness of the exchange rate as a 
policy instrument for improving external payments imbalances. 
A macroeconometric model was constructed to study the effects of alternative 
policies on the Grenadian economy. Simulation of the model with monetary and 
exchange rate shocks suggests that Grenada's loss of autonomy in monetary and 
exchange rate policies does not seem to be costly. The only costs appear to have been 
the inability of the Grenadian authorities to revalue the currency 10 offset imponed 
inflation. The benefits from monetary union thus seem unambiguously 10 outweigh the 
vi 
Glossary 
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I 
CHAPTERl 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
After achieving political independence. most developing countries establish a central 
bank to enhance financial infrastructure, to extend the monetisation of the economy. 10 
faciliUlte the mobilisation and productive use of domestic savings, to promote stable 
economic growth and prices. and to earn revenue for the government. The central bank 
may be endowed with various functions. These normally include the issue of currency, 
the management of foreign reserves, serving as banker 10 the government and domestic 
commercial banks, the regulation of domestic fmanciaJ institutions and the management 
of monetary and exchange rate policies. 
However, a central bank in a very small developing country faces a number of 
constraints: there is usually a shortage of I::!'3ined personnel 10 operate the bank; the per 
capita costs are usually relatively high because of lack of economies of scale, and there 
may be a limited role for effective monetary and exchange rate policies because of the 
openness of the economy and the rudimentary nature of financial and capital markets. 
Also, there is linle likelihood that central banks in small developing countries can 
remain independent of the govemment. If the monetary authorities resist the 
government's wishes, the government can easily dismiss the governor and appoint a 
more sympathetic one. This point has been brought out by Lewis (1965) with regard 10 
the small West Indian countries. He wrote: 
"In a sfTUlll island 0/50,000 to 100,000 people domifUJted by a single 
political parry, it is \lery diffiCUlt to prevent political abuse. Everybody 
depends on the go~·ernment for something, /ww/!ver .ffTUllI, so mo.n are 
reluctant to offend it. The civil servants live in/ear, the police avoid the 
unpleasantness. the trOlk unions are tied to the party. the newspapers 
depend on govertll7U'!nJ advenisements; and so on. In places lfhere they 
ore also corrupt a1ll1 playing with public funds the situation becomes 
intolerable" (Lewis 1965: 15). 
Under such circumstances, a domestic central bank is certain 10 lose its 
independence. lis policies are likely to do more hann than good. To avoid such 
outcomes, small developing countries may use the currency of a large country as legal 
tender. Panama and Liberia thus use the US dollar. Or they may fonn a monetary 
union with a supra.national central bank which issues a common currency such as the 
monetary unions in Africa (Central African Monetary Union and the West African 
Monetary Union) and the East Caribbean Monetary Union (ECMU) formed by 
Anguilla, Antigua. Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St KillS and Nevis, St. Lucia and 
St. Vincenti 
1.2 The question of monetary unions 
A substantial body of literature, dating from the 19605 and 19705 discusses optimum 
currency azeas and the question of whether or nOI countries should form monetary 
unions. See for example Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969), Tower and 
Willett (1976), Corden (1972) and Hirsch (19713, 1972b). More recently, interest in 
optimum cum:ncy areas and monetary unions has been revived by the establishment of 
the European Monetary System and the creation of the European Currency Unit (ECU). 
See for example Masera (1987), Allen (1989), Frenkel and Gold.stein (1990), Casella 
(1990), and Bovenberg. Kremcn and Masson (1990). 
t The Central African Monetary Unioll consists of Cameroon. the Centroll African Republic;, Chad. Congo 
and Gabon. The west African MOfICflIC)' Union consists of Benin, Ivory Coast. Niger, Senegal. Togo 
Upper VoIla and Burkina Fasa. These two groups of countries are sometimes referred \0 as Commullautc 
Finallaicre Africairoc (CFA) countries because of the established monelaT)' arrangements with France. 
I 
Several advantages and disadvantages can be ClI:pected as a resuh of monetary 
union. Because a monetary union involves the adoption of a single currency by a group 
of countries. it implies the loss of monetary sovereignty by each member. Since the 
issue and management of a common currency must be undertaken by some institution, 
the establishment of a supra-national monetary authority is implied; and since exchange 
conttols involve restrictions on the right to caoven one money info other monies, a 
monetary union rules out exchange conlrois among member counuies (see also The 
Ecorwmisr, November 17, 1990: 89). 
A monetary union in contrast to separate currencies eliminates the cost of money 
conversion for transactions among the members (Mundell 1961. Mladek 1966, Tower 
and Willett 1976, IShiyama 1975. Balassa 1975). It also eliminates the need for foreign 
exchange forward cover on intta-union transactions among member countries because a 
monetary union eliminates exchange risks and reduces uncenainty in trade and 
investment. A currency union eliminates the misallocation of resources through 
specUlative capital flows among the member countries because permanendy fixed 
exchange rales encourage capital to move to where it is most productive. 
II has also been argued, particularly by Mladek: (1966), Kafka (1969), Mundell 
(1973a, 1973b), and Ishiyama (1975), that the saving of exchange reserves is another 
advantage of a monetary union because the need for foreign exchange for intta-union 
transactions is eliminated. MundeU (1961) extended this argument by suggesling that 
because member countries may no! go into deficit with the rest of the world at the same 
time, a smaller pool of reserves will be required by countries fonning a monetary union 
than would otherwise be the case with individual central banks. 
The operation of a central bank in a tiny country involves diseconomies of scale 
in financial management. Managerial acrivities and infonnation systems usually require 
a minimum level of expenditure in order to be of sufficient quality_ Below that level of 
expendilure a sub-standard level of operation may be obtained (Helleiner 1982). 
I. 
Because of the lumpy nature of the services. it is not possible 10 obtain small units of 
these services in proportion to me small size of tiny economies. .Certain functions 
cannot be subdivided below a certain level Montserrat for example, with just over 
12,000 people may require the same number of central banking officials and equipment 
as a country of one million people. Therefore, the per capita cost of operating a central 
bank increases as the size of the counay decreases. Also, because of the small amounts 
of foreign reserves, there may be greater difficulty and increased costs in obtaining a 
diversified portfolio. Thus, exchange risks are likely to be increased especially if 
economic transactions are diversified in leons of the currencies in which they are 
conducted. 
Fonning a monetary union can therefore be expected to lead to a reduction of 
the costs of financial management for the individual countries through the spread of 
overhead costs (Mundell 1961). Resources would be released for more productive uses. 
Other benefits which are sometimes cited are that a monetary union would result 
in lower inflation rates and higher growth rates of GOP In an evaluation of African 
Monetary Unions, Devarajan and DeMelo (1987) observed that the inflation rates in 
member countries were low in comparison with other African developing countries. 
They argued that this was due to the constraints imposed by the union in the use of 
monetary and exchange rate policies. 
When the countries of the African monetary unions were treated as a single 
country, their growth rate was found to be higher than that of other developing 
countries. The relatively strong perfonnance of even the lower income members of the 
monetary unions appeared to be the resuh of the discipline forced on them by the 
monetary arrangements (Devarajan and DeMelo 1987). 
The limitations of financing government expenditures by the centra! bank are 
well known. In addition to creating strong inflationary pressures, fiscal pressure can 
lead to a decline in foreign reserves and the imposition of various fonTIS of exchange 
and trade restrictions. By reducing the likelihood of financing government deficits by 
domestic credit creation, membership of a monetary union reduces the likelihood of an 
oyer-valued exchange rate and the imposition of onerous exchange and trade 
restrictions. 
Costs may_ however, arise from the surrender of the power to conduct national 
monetary and exchange rate policies. Jointly controlled monetary and exchange rate 
policies may be designed to serve the overall majority interest. They may not be 
suitable for particular countries (Johnson 1973, Khatkhate and Short 1980, Robson 
1983). This has created concern among the European countries (George 1990 : 190-
194). 
To help illustrate the costs arising from the loss of the exchange rate as an 
instrument of macroeconomic policy, the models by R enting (1971) and Carden (1972) 
can be used. It is assumed that the world consists of three countries; the home country, 
the other members of the union, and the rest of the world. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that to maintain both internal and external balance, the home country needs to devalue 
its currency relative to the rest of the world, while the other members need to revalue 
their currency with respect to the rest of the world, then their goals are not consistent. 
Being part of a monetary union, the countries would have to devalue their currency 
together (consistent with the needs of the home country), or revalue the currency 
together (consistent with the needs of the rest of the union). It would not be possible to 
alter the exchange rate vis-a-vis the rest of the world to suit all members ' needs. Under 
such circumstances, doing nothing, or revaluing the currency rate could leave the home 
country with an external deficit, forcing it to deflate its ~onomy and suffer 
unemployment. or resort to wage cuts. 
However, in small open economies such as the ECMU countries, the usefulness 
of the exchange rate as a policy instrument is limited in dealing with disturbances in 
balance of payment'> and real income. Because of the high ratio of tradable goods and 
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services to non-ttadable goods and services and the likelihood that money wages would 
move with the cost of living (thus eliminating money illusions), the effects of exchange 
rate changes on relative prices are likely to be negated by changes in domestic costS 
(McKinnon 1963, Treadgold 1988: 286). Nonetheless, there may be scope for 
exchange rate policies to offset me effects of impaned inflation (Treadgold 1988: 286). 
Appreciation of the currency could insulate me domestic economy from imponed 
inflation that would otherwise increase the domestic currency prices of tradable goods. 
By joining a monetary union, a country deprives itself of the exchange rate as a 
policy instrument. It would not be free to devalue its currency to achieve (or regain) 
competitiveness. or revalue it 10 counter imported inflation. The difficult)' of 
conducting exchange rate policies means that economic adjustments required in 
individual countries may not be undenaken, especially if the overall union position is 
satisfactory (Devarajan and DeMelo 1987). 
Another problem relates 10 the issue of domestic credit by the centtal bank to the 
member countries. Agreement among the members with respect 10 credit policies is 
essential. If for example domestic credit is extended to a particular country. this may 
lead to excess money balances in that country. liS residents would attempt to reduce 
their balances by increasing purchases of goods and non·monetary financial assets. In 
small very open economies, such actions will quickly lead to deficits in both the current 
and capital account of the balance of payments. and a decline in foreign reserves. Thus, 
if international reserves are pooled. part of the burden of expansionary credit policies to 
one member may be borne by other members of the union. Even if international 
reserves are not pooled. or if separate accounting is conducted for each member's 
contribution to total reserves, there is still the need for explicit guidelines on how 
central bank credit is to be issued to the member countries. 
The use of a foreign currency would be possible for a monetary union. It would 
provide most of the benefits of a monetary union automatically. It would totally 
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eliminate many of the operational costs associated with a central bank, including the 
need to prevent forgery of the domestic currency. II would also reduce ,other costs. 
Using a foreign cunency however, also has disadvantages. The ability to obtain 
seigniorage from money creation is lost. The currency in circulation is equivalent to an 
interest free loan to the foreign countty whose currency is used, since interest is nOI paid 
on currency in circulation. The magnitude of the cost is equal to the interest rate which 
could have been earned on the investments - real or finac ial - which could have been 
held by a local money-issuing authorit)' multiplied by the amount of currency in 
circulation. Monetary polic)' becomes extremely limited when a forei gn currency is 
used. Using a foreign currency also has political costs. It may run against national 
pride, especially for countries which have newly become politically independent. 
Although impossible to quantify, this cost may be large because using a foreign 
currency may be seen as the perpetuation of colonialism. Thus, although the adoption 
of a foreign currency is an option, it is very unlikely. Its costs and benefits are nOt 
therefore investigated further. 
1.3 Factors determining the benefits and costs of moneta ry union 
The benefits and costs to countries fomling a monetary union depend on the structure of 
their economies. Similarities in natural resource endowment tend to restrict the 
opportunities for intra-union trade and hence the benefits from the elimination of 
exchange risks and the saving of foreign reserves related to intra-union trade. Such 
benefits are likely to be directly proportional to the extent of intra-union transactions. 
Also, if the trading patterns of members with the rest of the worl~ are similar, sav ings 
from the need for less reserves are likely to be small iJe<;ause countries are likely to go 
into deficit with the rest of the world at the same time. 
On the other hand. major differences in the economic struclUre of countries 
which form a monetary union are likely to increase the costS of common monetary and 
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exchange ratc policies. This is because monetary and exchange rate policies which may 
be appropriate for lhe union as a whole may not be appropriate for the individual 
members; or, alternatively, policies which may be unsuitable for some members may be 
suitable for othen. However, the exlent to which the loss of the exchange rate as an 
instrument of policy creates costs depends on characteristics such as the openness of the 
economy. As discussed above, for a sma1l economy which is a price·takcr for its 
expons and impons. and in which the proponion of impons in consumption is large, an 
exchange rate change is unlikely 10 be very effective for correcting external imbalances. 
In these circumstances, the costs from the loss of lhe eXChange rate as an instrument for 
balance of payments adjustments are not likely 10 be large. Nevertheless, costs may still 
be involved because the country may not be able to use exchange rate revaluations to 
offset imponed inflation , 
1.4 PUl'pose and objectives of the study 
For monetary unions to remain attractive, it is imponam that they are so administered 
that the net benefits of their policies on the individual country's economic targets such 
as output, price inflation, the balance of payments and resource allocation, are superior 
to policies which could be conducted by the individual countries. The overall objective 
of this study is to analyse the ECMU, and in particular its effects on the Grenadian 
economy, relative to Grenada having its own individual central bank. Specific 
objectives are: 
(I) to investigate the main features of the Eastern C~bbean economics· 
including the strucrure of production and trading patterns of the members of 
the union; 
(2) 10 investigate the institutional structure, policy decision-making process and 
policies of the East Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), including how 
monetary and exchange rate policies are detennined, and how limits to 
deficit financing are set by the central bank; 
(3) to build and use a macroeconomettic model of the Grenadian economy 10 
increase understanding of the effects of centraJ banking policy instruments, 
such as the level of domestic credil allocation, and the exchange rate, on 
targets such as the rate of growth of output, the rate of price inflation and the 
balance of payments; 
(4) to use the macroeconometric model to determine how fiscal policy 
instruments and external shocks affect the Grenadian economy, and to 
evaluate some of the costs of monetary union; and 
(5) to determine whether, in the case of Grenada, benefits of ECMU 
membership outweigh the costs. 
1.5 Hypotheses of (he study 
The overall hypothesis of this study is that although both costs and benefits are 
associated with monetary integration, in the case of the Grenadian economy, the 
benefits from membership in the ECMU outweigh the costs. Specific hypotheses are 
that 
(I) the monetary union has led to savings by reducing costs of financial 
management for Grenada; 
(2) benefits such as the elimination of COSt of money conversion, the elimination 
of exchange risks, and savings of foreign reserves _are insignificant for 
Grenada; 
(3) the loss of autonomy in monetary policy as a result of participation in the 
ECMU has imposed restraints on macroeconomic management which are 
not hannful and probably beneficial to Grenada; 
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(4) the costs to Grenada from the loss of autonomy in monetary policy small. 
The first hypothesis is tested by analysing the COSt of operation of the ECCB. 
Using two alternative assumptions 4 that a domestic cenuaJ bank may be of equal size, 
or half the siu: of the ECCB - potential costs of operating a domestic central bank are 
approximated. Potential savings in costs are approximated as the COStS of operating the 
hypothetical domestic central bank minus one-seventh of the cost of operating the 
ECCB. An implicit assumption is that the cost of operating the ECCB is shared equally 
among the member countries. 
The second hypothesis is tested by examining the suuclUre of production and 
trading patterns (both intra-union and extra-union trade) of the members of the ECMU. 
Benefits from the elimination of the cost of money conversion are approximated as the 
US dollar value of intra'union trade multiplied by the spread between the commercial 
banks' buying and selling rates for US dollars. It is assumed that a similar per cent 
premium would have been charged for purchasing currencies of the other ECMU 
countries in the absence of monetary union. 
Benefits from the need 10 hold less reserves (because intra-union trade does not 
involve the use of foreign cunency) is approximated as the unit opponunity COSt of 
foreign reserves multiplied by the US dollar value of intra-union impons and divided by 
the ratio of foreign reserves to extra-union impons. 
To obtain an indication of the potential benefits from the elimination of 
exchange risks, the ratio of intra-union trade 10 total trade is analysed. A small ratio 
would signify that the gains are likely to be small. 
Potential benefits from holding less reserves because mem.ber countries are not 
likely 10 go into deficit with the rest of the world at the same lime are difficuh to 
quantify. However, analysis of the suucture of extra-union trade arc used to provide a 
crude indication of the potential benefits. Similarities among the memher countries in 
the concentration of their extra-union trade, both in lenns of commcxlities and markels, 
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would indicate whether the members are likely to be simultancously affected by 
economic shoclcs and therefore whether there would be little scope for_ reductions in the 
required pool of reserves relative to the sum of reserves member countries may have 
held in the absence of a monetary union. 
The third hypothesis is tested by using the model to detennine whether various 
hypothetical policy changes which could have been made under conditions of monetary 
and exchange rate autonomy would have any substantial effects on target variables. 
The monetary policy component of the hypothesis is tested by detennining whether the 
perfonnance of target variables such as the level of output, growth rates of GOP, the 
balance of payments, and the rate of price inflation in Grenada could have been 
improved had separate (more flexible) monetary policy been conducted for Grenada. 
Part of this test is conducted by simulating the macrocconometric model for different 
monetary policy scenarios, and comparing the base period results and the simulated 
results. In addition, by examining the changes in money supply, evidence is obtained to 
indicate whether Grenada could have effectively conducted monetary policy. 
The exchange rate component of the hypothesis is tested by examining the 
effects of exchange rate changes on target variables such as the rate of price inflation, 
the growth of GOP, and the balance of paymentS through the macroeconometric model. 
Exchange rate changes are examined using the model to simulate the effects of nominal 
devaluations and revaluations. The simulated results are compared with the results 
obtained without the devaluation or revaluation. Studying the exchange rate policies 
pursued also provides infonnation whieh is used to test the hypothesis. 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
The remainder of the dissenation is organised as follows. Chapter 2 contains a general 
overview of the East Caribbean, its geographic and historical backb'l'OUnd. the size and 
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perfonnance of the economies in terms of growth of GOP, inflation, and the balance of 
payments. The institutional structure of the monetary and banking an:angements in the 
East Caribbean, and the budgetary practices of the fiscal authorities, are also analysed. 
Chapter 3 analyses the structure of production, the structure of demand. and the 
structure of trade in the ECMU countries. Savings from reduced overhead COSts are 
estimated and the first hypothesis is tested in Chapter 4. Benefits from the elimination 
of the cost of money conversion. benefits from the elimination of exchange risks. and 
benefits from the need to hold a smaller pool of foreign reserves are estimated and the 
second hypothesis is tested. 
The next two chapters are devoted to the exchange rate and exchange nue 
policies, and money and monetary policies in the Eastern Caribbean. Chapter 5 begins 
with a discussion of the nominal exchange rate. The mechanism by which the central 
banking authorities can adjust the nominal exchange rate is analysed. This is followed 
by a discussion of an appropriate exchange rate regime for the ECMU member 
countries, real exchange rates and the exchange and trade arrangements in each country. 
In Chapter 6, money in Grenada and the union and, in particular. the 
determinants of changes in the money supply are analysed. This is followed by an 
analysis of the monetary policies pursued in the East Caribbean. 
A macroeconometric model of Grenada is constructed in Chapler 7. The 
estimated results of the exisling relationship of the behavioural equations of the model 
are presenled and discussed in Chapter 8. In Chapter 9. the model estimated in the 
previous chapter is validated and used to test some of the hypotheses. Dynamic 
simulation exercises are used to study how the Grenadian economy may have responded 
to changes in monetary, fi scal and exchange nlle policies, and external disturbances 
such as import price changes. export price changes, and the third hypothesis is tested. 
The fina l chapter summarises the main conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ECMU COUNTRIES 
2.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide an overview of the EeMU countries, 
including their cenrral banking arrangements. This provides some of the basis for 
assessing Grenada's opportunities and problems with respect to the ECMU. 
Section 2.2 discusses the geographic and historical background of the countries. 
Information on the size (area and population) and economic performance (GDP. price 
inflation and current account balance) are presented in section 2.3. The development 
and functioning of cenrral banking in the East Caribbean, and the various aspects of the 
Bank's modus operandi are discussed in section 2.4. The budgetary actions of the fiscal 
authorities in each member country in terms of revenue, expenditures and the fin'ancing 
of budget deficits are presented in section 2.5. The conclusions are sununarised in 
section 2.6. 
2.2 Geographic and historical background 
The countries which are members of the Easl Caribbean Monetary Union are all small 
island states. They are pan of the chain of islands which lie south of the United States, 
east of Central America, and north of Venezuela. They extend over a distance of 
approximately 800 kilometres. The geographic spread is shown in Figure 2.1 . Islands 
such as Martinique and Guadeloupe, being part of the French Overseas Depanment, 
although pan of the Caribbean chain, are not members of the East Caribbean Monetary 
Union. 
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Some of the Virgin Islands, although they are British colonies, are also not part 
of the monetary union. Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados were part of earlier 
monetary arrangements with me ECMU countries, but withdrew to have their own 
central banks after they gained political independence. Their objective was to have their 
own currency as a symbol of national pride. 
The ECMU countries share a common past. Following the arrival of Europeans 
in the Caribbean towards the end of the 15th century, the ECMU countries, like most 
countries in the area. were the object of fierce inter~olonjal rivalry. In the 17th and 
18th centuries, the ownership of most of the islands changed hands several times 
between England and France. as Ihese countries fought for strategic and economic 
control within the Caribbean region. Britain finally succuded in claiming all the 
ECMU countries as colonies. Between 1967 and 1969, all the ECMU countries except 
Montserrat anained associated statehood with Britain, and have subsequently became 
politically independenl (Grenada in 1974, Dominica in 1978, 51. Lucia in 1979, 51, 
Vincent in 1980, Antigua in 1981, and 51. Kitts and Nevis in 1983). Since then, they 
have adopted a Westminster style, democratic political system. This system of 
government was abolished in Grenada between 1979 and 1983 after a military coup 
established a new government. It returned to the Westminster of system government 
after the. US invasion in 1983. 
The ECMU countries were developed as colonial economies, with the colonists 
enjoying a home market for their tropical commodities in the United Kingdom and 
imponing consumer articles from Europe. Because of the importance the British and 
French attached 10 sugar during Ihe 17th and 18th centuries, sugar Decame the dominant 
export, although the islands. because of their mountainous terrain ·were not suilable for 
sugarcane production. When the importance of sugar expons declined in the 20th 
century, allemalive crops such as arrowroot and bananas were introduced in 51 Vincent, 
cocoa, nutmegs and bananas in Grenada. bananas in 51. Lucia. citrus and bananas in 
Dominica. and cotton in Montserrat. Sugar for expon is now produced only on 51. 
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KitlS. In addition to export crops., foodcrops are grown in the ECMU countries for 
domestic use. 
2.3 Size and economic performance of the ECMU countries 
The ECMU countries share a number of characteristics. One of the moSt striking is 
their smallness, both in physical size and population. Land areas range from 91 square 
kilometres (3 per cent of the total area of the ECMV countries) on Montserrat, to 750 
square kilometres (25 per cem) in Dominica (see Table 2.1). Their popUlations are also 
relatively small. St. Lucia, with a population of 115,900. is the most populous. 
Montserrat is not only the smallest in land area, but also the least populous, with only 
12,100 persons. The ECMU has a tota11and area of 2,900 square kilometres, and a 
population (in 1988) of half a million. 
Table 2.1 shows that between 1970 and 1988, the population of the ECMU 
countries increased relatively little. One of the major causes of the low rate of 
population increase is emigration to counnies such as the United Kingdom, the United 
States of America and Canada. 
The smallness of the member countries, both in tenns of land area and 
population size, means that they have small domestic markets and highly skewed 
resource bases. The potential for impon competing production and intrn·union trnde 
among the ECMU countries is limited. Economies of scale are lacking and production 
is concentrnted on a few commooities for expon outside the ECMU. 
Aggregate GOP in the ECMU countries amounted to US$1165 million, to which 
the principal contributors were Antigua (28 per cent), and St. Lucia (18 per cent). The 
percentage contributions of Dominica, Grenada, St. Kins and Nevis and St. Vincent 
ranged between 10 per cent and 13 per cent. Montserrat contributed only 5 per cent to 
the overall GOP (Table 2.2). 
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Table 2.t Area and population: the EeMU countries 
Population 
A~ 
as a pe=tage ('000) Average 
of Annual 
.... ECMU""" grow<h"" 
(Km') (pacellI) \910 \988 (pacent) 
Antigua 440 14.7 65.9 71.0 OA 
Dominica 750 25. 1 69.' 73.1 0.3 G._ 345 
'" 
9" 91.0 .(). I 
M(X1tserrat 102 3A 11.5 12.1 0.3 
SLKittsandNevis 269 9.0 44.9 44.' .(). I 
SLLucia 606 20.1 99.8 115.9 0.9 
Sl Vincent 389 13.0 87.3 98.0 0.' 
TOIaIECMU 2909 100.0 411.8 506.1 OA 
Sources: CARl COM. Stafis/ies Digt!SI 1982; Organisation of East Caribbean States. Annual Digt!s/ of 
Slanstics. 1984; and ECMU coumries, Ministry of Finance (Statistical Department), AIItIUlII 
IIbsiraCI q[SlIlliJlics, various issues. 
Table 2.2 GDP: EeMU countries, 1988 
GOP as a 
percentage of Poe 
EeMU capita 
GOP Total GOP 
(US$m) (percent) (US$) 
Antigua 327 28 4604 
Dominica 143 12 1941 
Grenada 167 14 1830 
Montserrat 54 5 4479 
51. KillS and Nevis 112 10 2513 
St Lucia 209 18 1802 
St Vincent 154 I3 1575 
Total Union 1165 100 2303 
Sources: EeMU countries, Ministry of Finance (Sllllistiea! Department), AII/IUlJ/ AI;JSlracl of StallSlies, 
various issues. 
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There is considerable disparity in per capita GOP among the member nations of 
the East Caribbean. Montserrat (US$4479) and Antigua US$46(4). have by far the 
highest per capita GOP, with over twice the level of per capita GOP of Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Lucia and SI. Vincent. 
Real GDP growth in the ECMU countries 
Average annual growth rates of real GOP in constant 1980 dollars between 1978 and 
1988 are presented in Table 2.3. Between 1978 and 1988. Grenada experienced the 
slowest rate of growth of GOP among ECMU countries. The average annual real 
growth rate of GOP was only 3.8 per cent. The best performers were Antigua and St. 
Vincent which showed average annual growth rates of over 6 per cent. Hurricanes 
accounted for some of the growth fluctuation. In Dominica, for example, the economy 
grew by approximately 12 per cent in 1978, but in 1979 a hurricane led to a drastic fall 
in GOP. In 1980, the economy grew by approximately as much as it declined in 1979 
due to massive reconstruction effom. Although St. Lucia was not directly in the path of 
the hurricane of 1979, strong winds damaged its banana crop and contributed to the 
decline in GOP. In 1980, St. Lucia was directly affected by another hurricane which 
further depressed GOP. 
ECMU countries grew faster than other Caribbean countries between 1978 and 
1988. In Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana incomes fell. The ECMU 
countries also grew faster than all developing countries as a group. 
Innation rates 
Table 2.4 repons consumer price index (CPl) inflation rales of the ECMU countries, 
other Caribbean countries and other country groups. Rates of increase in prices in the 
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ECMU countries exhibited similar general pauems. Average inflation rates for 1971 10 
1980 ranged between 12.6 per cent in Antigua and 16.9 per cent in Qn:nada. Between 
1981 and 1988, Rverageinflation rates were much lower. Averages ranged from 4.1 per 
cent in SI. Lucia to 6.1 per cent in Grenada. Inflation rales in the other Caribbean 
countties were similar to those in the ECMU countries for the pericxl 1971 to 1980. 
However, in Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, the inflation rates during 1981 
to 1988 were much higher than the rates observed in the ECMU countries. The ECMU 
countries experienced similar average inflation rates to most developing countries 
between 1971 and 1980 but much lower inflation between 1981 and 1988, except for 
Asia. Their inflation rates were similar to inflation in the industrial countries. 
Current account balances 
Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2 presents infonnation on the currenl account balances of Ihe 
ECMU countries. All the ECMU countries experienced persistent current account 
deficits during the 1970s and 1980s although there were considerable differences in the 
average currenl account balance as a percentage of GDP (fable 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Current account balances as a percentage of GDP: ECMU countries, 
1977 _ 1988 (per cent) 
Average Maximum Minimum Coefficient 
value value value of variation 
Antigua - IS.1 0.3 -53.7 SI.1 
Dominica -SA 14.2 -24.2 IS3.8 
Grenada -6.9 3.1 -19.8 125A 
Montserral -11.5 1.0 -25.3 85.6 
SI. KillS and Nevis -lOA 2.9 -29.5 74.5 
SI. Lucia -IS.7 0.9 -31.0 71.6 
SI. Vincent -5.8 6.0 - 17.6 133.2 
Sources: IMF, inlefnlJlionaf Financial SlOlislics. and ECMU countries. Ministry or Finance (SUlListical 
Dcpartment).,(nnuaIAbSlrOCI O/SUUiSlics, various issocs. 
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Figure2.2 C.lTnlt.ccountbalanttSu.Pft"ttnlll~orGDP: I':CMUcountries, 1977 
- 1988(pc:rccnt} 
- Antigua - Dominica .. GRnada - Montserrat 
- St. Kitl'> - SI. Lucia .. SI. Vincent 
Sources: IMF. '",unal;onai Finaffc;a/ SI<J!isl;CS, and ECMU countries. Minislry of Fi ,,~ncc 
(Sutistical Department) , AIInua/Ab5lfaClajSlalislics, various issues 
Antigua and SI. Lucia incurred larger current account deficits as a percentage of 
GOP than the m,her ECMU countries. Dominica, Grenada. and SI. Vincent tended to 
have the smallest percentage deficits. The coefficients of variation show that there has 
been considerable variability in the C\l1TCnt account balance as a percemage of GOP 
during the period. In all the countries, the variability around the mean value has been 
over 70 per cenl. Variability has been greatest in Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent. 
Although for moSt of the years between 1977 and 1988 the current accoum was 
in deficit in all the ECMU countries, for some years the balance showed slight 
improvemem in some countries, while it deteriorated in others (Figure 2.2). 
2.4 Central banking in the East Caribbean 
The use of a common currency has been an integra) part of the history of the islands 
which comprise the ECMU. Their central banking arrangement evolved as a 
centralized unit from the beginning; there was no decentralized banking structure from 
which to start. 
In the early years, the British colonies of the West Indies used British shillings, 
Spanish dollars and Spanish doubloon,. Different rates of exchange were used for the 
same coin in different islands. Complaints from the colonies to the British authorities 
of the substitution of Spanish dollars with mutilated coins or parts of coins, and the 
overvaluation of the doubloon led the British Government to legislate to restore value to 
the monetary system of the West Indies. A Royal Order declared: 
"Her Majesty IuJs been pleased to revoke the Order in C.0~ncil made on 
the 23rd day of March 1825 and by a new order to approve a 
Proclamfltwn declaring that in Her colonial possessions in the West 
Indies and America, 4J2d and64d of British si{I'er soon be deemed legal 
tender for I dollar and J doubloon respectively. lienee, wlUltever may 
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be the current denominations of the lWO coins in any 0/ the colonies 
referred to in the Order, the Sam/! denominations will be applicable fO 
4s2d and 64s 0/ British Silverw (pennington 1848: 202) 
All other currencies in use in Ihe West Indies were sUbsequently replaced by 
sterling. With the formation of the British Caribbean Currency Boanl (BCCB) in 1950, 
British Caribbean currency notes and coins were issued in exchange for sterling. The 
Boanl provided the guarantee Ihat the local notes could be redeemed for sterling on 
demand. 
After the political independence of Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, and their 
withdrawal from the BCCB, the existing monetary arrangement had to be restructured. 
The BCCS was dissolved in 1965, and Ihe East Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA) 
was fonned to serve the needs of the remaining territories. Grenada was not among the 
original signatories to the East Caribbean Currency Authority Agreement, but took up 
fonnal membership in 1968. 
This authority had limited central banking powers. The principal functions were 
the issue of the East Caribbean (EC) dollar, and the provision of limited services to the 
member governments. This included acting as their fiscal agenl with respect to 
transactions with intemationa1 institutions such as the lMF and the World Bank, the 
provision of credit to member governments by investing in publicly issued treasury bills 
and securities, and the giving of advice on economic and financial matters. In addition, 
the authority provided facilities forc!earing inler-bank indebtedness. 
In its early years, with the East Caribbean dollar pegged 10 the pound sterling, 
currency was issued to commercial banks only after the sterling equivalent has been 
deposited with the Authority's agents in London. That is, the East Caribbean dollar was 
backed 100 per cent by sterling. Later, the ECCA began issuing credit to the 
governments of the member countries for domestic assets such as securities and treasury 
bills. Thus, 100 per cent backing of the East Caribbean dollar with sterling was no 
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longer practised. Instead, new regulations stipulated thai the East Caribbean dollar was 
to be backed by at least 60 per cent foreign assets. 
The ECCA had no legaJ powers with respect to: inducing commercial banks to 
adjust their rates of interest; lhe regulation of commercial bank operation in the EeMU 
countries. including the supervision of commercial banks; the imposition of rescrve 
requirements; or the provision of services to the member governments such as 
maintaining governments' principal accounts, managing the public debt. assisting in 
policy (onnulation, perfonning key roles in negotiations wilh international institutions, 
managing exchange controls, and acting as depository for the governments external 
assets. 
Subsequently, it was considered that an institution with a wKlcr range of powers 
was required to serve the needs of member countries. As a result. on October I, 1983 
the ECCA was convened into the EeCH. Lilce other central banks, its main functions 
are: to issue bank notes, to act as banker to financial institutions and supervise their 
operations, to serve the member country governments as banker, and to fonnulate and 
implement monetary and exchange rate policies. 
The East Caribbean Central Hank Agreement 
The ECCB agreement among the governments of the member countries consists of a 
total of 56 articles. These articles can be divided into three brood categories: 
(I) definitional aspectS outlining the establishment of the ECCB as a legal 
entity, its structure, objectives, and overall administration and management; 
(2) issues relating to monetary and exchange rate policies such as the legal 
currency, how monetary and exchange rale policies are to be detennined. 
the ECCB relationship with the member countries governments and 
financial institutions, and how profits are to be shared among the members: 
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(3) operational aspects which define the procedures to be adopted to reduce and 
settle conflicts which may arise among the member governments. The steps 
to be taken to amend articles or tenninate membership are also defined. 
Definitional asocclS nftht; FCCD Amemenl 
The primary purpose and objectives of the ECCB are set out in Article 4. These are: 
(1) to regulate the availability of money and credit; 
(2) to promote and maintain monetary stability; 
(3) to promote credit and exchange conditions and a sound financial structure 
conducive to balanced growth and development of the economies of the 
member countries; and, 
(4) to promote by means consistent with other objectives, the economic 
development of the member countries. 
In effect. the ECCB has been given broad responsibilities for managing the 
monetary affairs of the participating countries. 
The supreme decision making Ixxiy of the ECCB is the Monetary Council which 
consists of one minister of government from each of the participating countries, thereby 
ensuring that each member country's interests are properly represented in the ECCB's 
policies. II meets at least twice a year to receive the report of the Bank from the 
Governor, and at the same time to provide directives and general guidelines concerning 
monetary and credit policies to be pursued by the Bank. 
Although the Monetary Council is the ECCB's supreme d:cision-making body, 
the policies and the genern.l adminisuation of the Bank are the responsibility of the 
Board of Directors. The Board consists of the Governor of the Bank (Chairperson), the 
Deputy Governor, and directors appointed by the Council such that each participating 
member country's interest is well represented. One director with experience in at least 
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fiscal and monetary policy, or finance and accounting, or banking, or economics, or 
law, or other related fields, is appoinled by each of the membcrcounlries. The Bq.ard is 
given the power 10 make., aller, or revoke regulations, notices. and orders. To perfonn 
its function. the Board meets at least once every three months. 
The responsibility for the implementation of the policies and the day to day 
managemenl of the ECCB rests with the Governor. However, the Governor's actions 
are limited by the Board of Direclors whose actions are limited by the MoneW)' 
Council. In perfonning this role, the governor is assisted by the Depuly Governor. 
The ECCB is organised IDIO five depanments under the Governor and Deputy 
Governor. They are the currency department, the banking department; Ihe research 
department, the bank supervision department. and the expon credit department. 
F"Q;ure 2.3 Organisational structure ollhe East Caribbean Central Bank 
j MONETAR~ COUNCil I 
! BOARD OF ~IRECTORS J 
[$ 
I DEPlJTYG~VERNOR I 
I CURRENCY I BANKING lRESEARcH 1 BANK J eXPORT J OEPARTMENT OEPARTMENT DEPARTMENT SUPERVISION CREDIT DEPARTMENT OEPARTMENT 
Source: EaSI Caribbean CcnlJal Bank 
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The primary responsibilities of the currency depanment include the transport 
and distribution of currency to the various member countries. To sat4fy the individual 
member countries demand for currencies, this department also analyses and forecasts 
the currency demand of each territory. 
Transactions between the Bank and commercial banks are handled by the 
banking depanmenl. Such transactions include loca1 and inter-island cheque clearings, 
and the purchase and sale of foreign currencies. In addition, transactions between 
ECCB and other CARICOM centra1 banks, the Caribbean Development Bank, the IMF, 
and the World Bank are also handled by the Banking Department. 1 Other 
responsibilities include the implementation of the ECCB invesnnent policies, the 
management of the Bank's portfolio and internal accounting. 
The research depanment is responsible for economic research and data analysis, 
as well as Centra1 Bank publications and the dissemination of information to the public. 
Its functions enable the Bank to have as full a knowledge as possible of what is actually 
happening. and likely to happen in the economies of the member countries, and be able 
to give advice on policy, (panicularly monetary and exchange rate policies) to member 
country governments and other departments of the Bank. The research department thus 
collects and analyses a wide range of financial statistics from the member countries. 
The primary objective of the Depanment of Bank Supervision is to promote and 
maintain sound banking conditions in the ECMU countries. Specifically. its main 
functions are: 
(1) to ensure commercial banks' adherence to sound principles and practices of 
banking; 
(2) to ensure compliance with legal provisions. regulations and directives of 
monetary policy; 
I TIle Caribbean CommunilY (CARICOM) was founded in 1973 as a successor 10 Ihe Caribbean Free 
Trade Area (CARlfTA). II comprises the ECMU countries and !he Bahamas. Belize, Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 1lIcse countries lIavc agreed upon a common eXlernal tariff. AOOUl 
90 pcrCCllI of Ir1Ide among Ihem is free of lariffs. 
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(3) to ensure proper implememation of directives and instruments by the Bank 
and governments wid! respect to licences, capital, liquidity regulations, asset 
ratio, interest rates, etc.; and, 
(4) to safeguard the interest of depositors. borrowers and customers who obtain 
financial services from the Bank. 
In an attempt to expand exports from the ECMU countries, concessional 
financing is made to exporters through the Expon Credit Department. It fulfils this 
responsibility by: 
(1) issuing pre-shipment and post-shipment export finance guarantees to 
commercial banks on behalf of exponers; pre--shipmcm export guarantees 
are extended to exporters following export contracts; financing after 
shipment is also extended so that exporters can allow importers a grace 
period in the seulement of export bills; and, 
(2) providing export credit insurance facilities to exporters, and credit 
guarantees to banks on behalf of small entreprenclmi. to enable them 10 
obtain working capital and loans for the purchase of machinery, equipment 
and other fixed assets. 
Issues [dating to IDons;tary and s;xchange rats; ooljcjs;s 
Article 18 gives the Bank the sole right to issue the East Caribbean currency (noces and 
coins) in the ECMU counuies. In 1987, in an attempt to monitor the movement of 
currency between member countries, the decision was taken to code the notes issued to 
each country differently. The rationale is to provide a mechanism to detennine the 
movement of currency noces between che member countries when notes are redeemed 
by the Bank. 
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The Bank issues nOles on demand. However. regulations stipulate thai foreign 
I reserve assets equivalent in value 10 at least 60 per cent of the amOlll:J,1 of notes issued 
must be maintained. The rest of the notes issued may be backed by treasury bills, and 
other government securities, or securities guaranteed by the member governments. 
The relations of the EeeB with the panicipating governments are also set oul in 
the ECCB Agreemcnl Article 37 for example. gives the Bank the authority to be the 
banker, agent and adviser to the panicipating governments on monetary and financial 
matteI'S. If member countries desire, the Bank can be made to serve as the deposilOry of 
the member governments. In addition, at the request of member governmentS, [he Bank 
may represent them in transactions wilh financial institutions, other agencies and 
countries. This anicle also holds the Bank responsible for infonning and advising the 
governments on any matters which it thinks are likely to affect the achievement of its 
objectives. 
Article 40 explicitly lays down the conditions under which the Bank may make 
advances to the panicipating governmentS, acquire notes, bills and securities of those 
governments, or guaranteed securities issued by the member governments. With the 
approval of the Board, temporary advances may be made to the participating 
governments to meet their seasonal needs, but in each case, the amount must not exceed 
5 per cent of the average annual recurrent revenue calculated over three preceding 
years. In addition the ECCB may purchase, discount or rediscount tteasury bills 
maturing within 90 days of the date of the acquisition by the Bank. Under no 
circumstance may the holdings of tteasury bills of anyone government at any time 
exceed 10 per cent of that government'S average annual recurrent revenue over the three 
preceding years. 
The Bank may also purchase and sell publicly issued securities of panicipating 
governments (or those guaranteed. by the governments), payable in East Caribbean 
dollars, and maturing within 15 years. But, holdings of securities from any country may 
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nOI exceed 15 per cent of estimated currency issued and in circulation in the particular 
member country. 
The Bank is given powers 10 invest in securities of the paniciparing 
governments using superannuation funds of its staff. No limits are placed on the 
amounts which may be invested. nor the date of maturity of the investment. 
Funhermore. the ECCB can purchase bonds of corporations established under the 
authority of governments for me purpose of financing development. The amoum of 
bonds must nOl exceed 2.5 per cent of the average annual recurrent revenue of the 
government over the previous three financial years. These bonds must mature within 10 
years, and the repayment of the interest and principal mUSt be guaranteed by the 
panicipating govemmem. If there is default of payment, the Bank may charge the 
amount against the share of profits due 10 the particular member country during the year 
of default and succeeding years until the debt has been recovered. 
Specific guidelines for the ECCB dealings in foreign exchange have been laid 
down in Articles 24 through to Article 29. By Anicle 24, the Bank is given the 
authority to maintain external reserves consisting of any combination of gold, foreign 
exchange in the fonn of foreign currencies held abroad, other internationally recognised 
reserve assets, treasury bills issued by foreign governmentS, securities issued or 
guaranteed by foreign governments or international institutions, and bills of exchange 
and promissory notes denominated in forei gn currency and payable outside the member 
counuies. However, the tenns and conditions for holding the external reserve are given 
by the Board of Directors. 
If gains arise from valuation changes of the Bank's assets or liabilities as a result 
of changes in the elltemai value of the East Caribbean dollar, they are to be credited to a 
'Revaluation Reserve Account', and not to be included in the computation of annual 
profits. An imponant provision is that if the credit balance of the Revaluation Account 
is insufficient to cover losses due to revaluation of the East Caribbean dollar, the 
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member country governments are to transfer non-interest bearing, non-negotiable 
securities to the Bank 10 cover the deficiency. The propol1ion wh~ch each member 
country government may be required to transfer is 10 be based on the profit distribution 
fonnu la of the bank. In any financial year, gains are 10 be fj~1 used 10 offset losses and 
then placed to the credit balance of the Revaluation Account. 
One of the benefits to governments from the selting up of a central bank is that 
profits can beeamcd. In the case afthe ECMU. the profits earned are shared among the 
members. Profits earned from investment in external assets used for backing of 
currency in circulation are distributed among the ECMU stales in proportion to the 
currency in circulation in each member country. Profits on other revenue earning 
activities of the Bank are distribUled in proponion to the imputed equity inlerest of each 
member country. 
Articles 30 to 36 provide the general principles in accordance with which the 
ECCB deals with financial institutions operating in the member countries. In this 
capacity, the Bank can: 
(1) purchase from, sell 10, discount/rediscount bills of e)(change and promissory 
notes made for commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes and 
maturing within ninety days. However, if those bills are for financing 
seasonal agricultural operations or mariceting crops, they should mature 
within 180 days; ne)(ibility is given so that the rediscount rates can be 
different for different types of transactions; 
(2) grant to the financial institutions advances by loans or overdrafts for periods 
not e)(ceeding 90 days; 
(3) prescribe the maintenance of different reserve ratios against different classes 
of deJ:M)sits. Such reserves are to be maintained as cash holdings of the 
financial institutions or as deposi ts with the Bank; 
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(4) require financiaJ institutions operating in the region to hold securities issued 
by the member country governments in substitution for required deposits; 
""' (5) accept demand deposits of financial institutions as a basis for the cleanmce 
of cheques and me senlement of balances among them That is, it can 
mainlain exchange settlement accounts for the commercial banks in the 
various territories to seu]e transactions among them arising from the 
c1earnnce of cheques. 
Funhennore, Anicle 41 gives the Bank the authority to monitOr the operations 
of off-shore financiaJ institutions in accontance with the laws and regulations under 
which those institutions have been licensed to operate.. 
A critical role of the ECCB is 10 fonnulate and implement monelaC)' and 
exchange rate policies so as to promote stability, and balanced growth and development 
of the economies of the member states (Article 4). The monetary and exchange rate 
policies pursued by the authorities are discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Operationa l aspeclS oflbe EeeR AgreelIHjnt 
The fonnation of a monetary union and a supra-national centra] bank to conduct 
monetary and exchange rate policies for the members, necessarily creates the possibility 
of conflict of interest among member governments. Specific guidelines are laid down 
in the ECCB agreement to reduce conflict and ensure the smooth functioning of the 
union. Two of the more important guidelines relate 10 the alteration of the existing 
agreemenlS and the tennination of membership by any (all) countries. All panicipating 
governments must agree unanimously \0 changes to existing agreements, that is, if 
anicles are to be amended, deleted, or added. 
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A member country no longer wishing to remain in the union must give 12 
months written notice of withdrawal to the Bank. If the member subsequently wishes to 
cancel its iOlention to withdraw, it can do so within the twelve-month period by again 
notifying the bank in writing. After withdrawal, the ex-member will be held 
responsible for all its obligations to the Bank prior to its withdrawal. 
25 The fiscal actions of the governments 
Sources of government revenue in the East Caribbean 
Fiscal policy may be defined as any act of government expenditure or taxation 
undertaken in the pursuit of macroeconomic goals relating to output, employment, the 
price level and the balance of payments, as well as for the usual allocative and 
distributional reasons. The broad nature of fiscal operations in the ECMU counmes as 
indicated by governments current domestic revenues (tax and non-tax revenue), 
government expenditures. budget deficits and the methods used in financing deficits are 
discussed below. 
Table 2.6 shows government revenue divided between lax and non-tax sources 
between 1912 and 1988. The principal sources of non·tax revenue are fees for various 
services. fines and forfeitures, propeny income, documentary charges, interest and 
dividends from government enterprises. and profits from the central bank. 
Taxation accounts for the bulk of the revenue. The share of tax revenue in total 
revenue ranged between 75 per cent in AOIigua to 90 per cent in St. Lucia. Taxes have 
been a reasonably stable share of government revenue. In 1912, laxes contributed 
approximately 60 per cent to revenues in Antigua. and approximately 80 per cenl by 
1988, showing a small upward trend during the period. In Grenada, taxes contributed a 
larger share to total government revenue than in Antigua, accounting for JUSt under 90 
perceOl in 1912. and approximately 95 percent in 1988. 
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Table 2.6 Averac.e tax and non·tax revenue as percentage of total revenue: [eMU 
countries, ]972 10 1988 (per cent) 
Antigua 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Montserrat 
SI. KitlS and Nevis 
SI.Lucia 
SI. Vincent 
Tax revenue 
75 
83 
87 
82 
78 
90 
79 
Non-tax 
revenue 
25 
17 
15 
19 
22 
10 
21 
Sources: ECMU countries, Ministry of Finance (Statistical Department). A./lIIUal A.bSlfacl of Sllllis/ics, 
various issues. 
Indirect taxation is by far the most important source of government revenue in 
all ECMU countries. (Table 2.7). However, the degree ofreliance on the various forms 
of indirecl laxation differs from countty 10 countty. 
St. Vincent relies most heavily on laxation of impons. The share of impon taxes 
in total taxes for the period 1971 to 1988 ranged from 27 per cem 10 56 per cent. ~ilh an 
average annual share of 42 per cent. 
Table 2.7 Import taxes, other indirect taxes, and direct taxes as percentage of lotal 
tax revenue: EeMU countries, 1971 to 1988 (per cent) 
Other 
Impon indirect Direct 
ta"" 
Antigua 30.5 44.8 24.7 
Dotrunica 21.3 43.7 35.0 
Grenada 25.9 48.9 25.2 
Montserrat 34.4 23.7 41.9 
St.Kitts 29.4 49.2 21.4 
St. Lucia 27.3 35.8 36.9 
SI. Vincent 41.7 26.3 32.0 
Sources: ECMU countries. Minisuy of Finance (Statistical Department). A.nnual AbslroCl of SIIl/jslin. 
various issues. 
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Figure 2.4 Tu aDd noa-tax ~vmue as a ~n:~tage 01 total revenue: Anlll!:WI, 
Dominica, G~aada aDd Montserrat, 1971· 1938 (ptt cent) 
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Figure 2.6 Import taxti, Ofbtr indiud taus and dil'f'Cl lues as a per(tDlage or tax 
revenue: Antilu., Dominica, G~nada and Montserrat. 1972 _ 1988 (per 
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The government of Dominica is least reliant on taxation of importS for its 
revenue. The share of its revenue generated from import taxes aver:aged 21 per cent 
The share of import taxes in tolal taxes in the other ECMU countries ranged from 26 per 
cent in Grenada to 34 per cent in Montserrat. 
The degree of importance of other forms of indirect taxes (including expon 
duties. custom and eKcise duties, stamp duties, foreign eKchange taxes, motor vehicle 
taxes, hotel occupancy taxes etc.) as a percentage of total taxes correspondingly varied 
from country to country. The average share ranged from 26 per cent in SI. Vincent to 
49 per cent in St. Kitts. SI. Vincent's government, which had relied on taxation of 
imports for most of its revenue, obtained the smallest share of revenue from other fonns 
of indirect taxation. Other fonus of indirect taxes contributed between 24 per cent of 
tota1 tax revenue in Montserrat to 50 per cent in Grenada. 
Direct taxation, which consists mainly of income taxes on individuals and 
companies and propeny taxes, also varies between the ECMU countries. In Montserrat 
and St. Lucia for example, the average share of revenue from direct taxation was 42 per 
cent and 37 per cent respectively. In Grenada, personal income taxes were abolished 
and va1ue added sales taxes (VAT) were introduced in 1985 leading to a sharp fall in 
direct taxes. 
Government expenditure in the East Caribbean 
Government expenditure is defined as ail government outlays. It includes transfers 10 
the domestic sector and domestic and overseas public debt payments. Figure 2.8 shows 
total government spending as a percentage of GDP at market prices in the ECMU 
countries between 1973 and 1988. Expenditure patterns differ among the member 
nations of the ECMU. 
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FtgureLS GoVffhmt'llt txpmditureas a percenhlgeorGDP: ECMU muntries, 1973 
-1988(percenl) 
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Swtislin,variousissucs. 
In Grenada. the government's share in economic activity has fluctuated . 
Beginning from just under 40 per cem in 1973. the share increased 10 around 60 per 
cent by 1976, then fell back to about 40 percem in 1977. 
II then showed an increasing trend, peaking at an extraordinarily high level of 
just under 80 per cent in 1983. The principal cause for the sharp increase between 1980 
and 1983 was the construction of an imernational airport which the governmem saw as 
being necessary to boost tourism the exports of tropical fruitS and vegetables to the 
United Kingdom and Canada. Exports had previously been tr,ms-shipped through 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. The ratio of expenditures \0 GDP fell sharply 10 
around 40 per cent in 1988 when the airport was completed. The high proportion of 
government expenditure to GOP was made possible by aid flows. 
Government expenditures in the other ECMU countries also fluctuated, though 
less than in Grenada, between 1973 and 1988. The smallness of the economies means 
that one large government project can substantially increase the government's share of 
economic activity. 
GO~'ernmcnt budgel deficits and their financing in Ihe Easl Caribbean 
A budget deficit is defined in this study as an excess of all government current and 
capital outlays over domestic current rel/enue. The undeveloped nature of the capital 
markets provides limited scope for financing government deficitS by selling bonds to 
the public. More feasible options are to finance budget deficits by borrowing from 
commercial banks, borrowing from the cenlr.ll bank, by foreign borrowing (from 
official and commercial sources) and foreign grant aid. Budgct deficits can therefore 
fonn an irnportam link between monetary and fiscal policy. Government budget 
deficits as a percentage of GDP are presented in Figure 2.9. 
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Grenada's government incurred by far the largest deficits. The public sector 
deficit as a percentage orGDP shot up from around 8 percent in 1973.10 approximately 
18 per cent in 1976, then fell to under 8 per cent in 1977. It then rose agaln to around 
40 percent orGDP in 1982 and 1983. 
There was a particularly steep increase between 1980 and 1983 when the 
intemationaJ airpon was built. After 1983, as work on the airpon came 10 an end, the 
public sector borrowing requirement fell. By 1988, it was around 20 per cent or GOP. 
In Dominica, the budget deficit exploded from 18 per cent of GOP in 1976 to 
around 35 per cent in 1978. II then decreased to less than 10 per cent of GDP in 1988. 
Montserrat, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, incurred lower budget deficits as a percentage of 
GOP than !he other ECMU members. 
Commercial bank credit has been used to some extent to finance government 
deficits in all the ECMU countries. except Montserrat, but this source of funds varies 
among the ECMU countries. In Grenada. approximately 5 per cent of the deficit was 
financed by credit from commercial banks. In contraSt, St.. Kitts's has financed 
approximately 27 per cent of its deficit with credit from commercial banks. 
Table 2.8 Government deficits and their financing: [CM U countries, 1977 • 1988 
(percent) 
Average 
defiCit 
Sources of fi(~~i~;n~~f~~fi~i~ent deficits 
asgrG~~ge Commercial Cenrral Other banks Bank 
Antigua II 13 5 82 
DomlOica IB 7 10 83 
Grenada 25 5 6 89 
Montserrat 8 0 0 100 
SI. Kitts 13 27 4 69 
St. Lucia 7 16 13 71 
St. Vincent II 17 5 78 
Source!;: ECMU countries, Ministry of Finance (Statistical Department) , Allnua/ Abstract of Stalis/ia, 
various issues; East Caribbean Ccmral Bank, Allllua/ RtporlS alld Slatemelll of ACCQUIlU, SI. 
Kit1.'l , Variousissl)Cls 
4' 
Because of the restrictions imposed by the monerary union, a relatively small 
percentage of government deficits was financed by the ECCB (Table Z.8). Montserrat's 
government has not used credit from the Central Bank. The largest average percentage 
of deficit financed with central bank credit was 13 per cent in SL Lucia. These 
percentages were low in comparison with other developing countries. For example, 
during 1975 to 1988, developing countries financed approximately 47 per cent of 
government deficits with cenual bank credit. The industrial countries which have 
sophisticated domestic financial markets and a greater potential for non· bank financing 
of government deficits, financed approximately 12 per cent of deficits with central bank 
credit (World Bank 1989: 62). 
The governments of the ECMU counaies have been using foreign sources of 
finance (borrowing on concessional terms and aid grants) as the major means of 
financing their deficits. In Grenada for example, approximately 89 per cent of the 
deficits incurred between 1977 and 1988 were financed from foreign sources. 
Jamaica, a relatively larger Caribbean country than any of the ECMU countries, 
with its own central bank, financed a much larger share of government deficits though 
its central bank than the ECMU. no doubt because it was easily pressured into 
extending credit to the government. 
On average, the ratio of its government deficits financed by its central bank 
between 1979 and 1986 wasjusl under 51 percent. The result was higher inflation than 
in the ECMU countries and consequent devaluation (see Table 2.9). 
2.6 Conclusion 
The similar chamcteristics of the ECMU countries have meant that they have 
experienced similar problems, and arc thus suitable panners for a monetary union. 
Their GDP growth ra tes have shown considerable variations between countries and over 
time, but remained positive in most years. Their current account balances have been in 
deficit in most years. 
Table 2.9 Percentage change in central bank claims on the government as a 
percentage of government deficits, inflation rates and nominal 
exchange rates: Jamaica, 1979 to 1986 
Central bank 
creditasa 
percentaj;c Consumer price Nominal 
ofdcficlt inflation rate (1$x~:urse$~~) (perccnt) (per cent) 
1979 11I.5 29.1 1.78 
1980 29.5 27.3 1.78 
1981 51.4 12.7 1.78 
1982 27.5 6.5 1.78 
1983 98.7 11.6 3.28 
1984 58.7 27.8 4.93 
1984 -16.0 25.7 5.48 
1986 53.5 15.1 5.48 
Sourc~: IMF. fmttrnmiOR(J/FiR(Jnr,;(J/Slalislics. 1990. 
Binding rules have greatly facilitated monetary policy decisions by providing a 
framework within which policies are conducted. This has reduced potential conflicK 
These r.ules are necessary because each of the ECMU countries is politically 
independent and often has different objectives. Without these rules, individual 
countries may have attempted to put pressure on the Central Bank to achieve different 
objectives, thus making the conduct of policy difficult for the monetary authorities. 
Although the ECMU countries do not have high ly developed domestic financial 
markets, their governments have made relatively little use of the ECCB to finance their 
deficits. This is a result of the constraints which the monetary union imposed on thcm. 
Instead, they turned to foreign sources of finance, mainly concessional borrowing and 
gram aid. Tight monetary policy contributed to low inflation r.ttes. Inflation rates have 
been lower than those in other Caribbean cOllntries, particularly between 1981 and 
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1988. In addition, inflation was generally lower than that of other developing countries. 
except for East Asia. 
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I. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE EeMU COUNTRIES 
3.1 lntroduction 
In this chapter, the economies of the EeMU countries are analysed. Section 3.2 
provides a review of the structure of production in each country. The structure of 
demand is analysed in section 3.3. The purpose of the next section (3.4) is to analyst 
trading patterns. Included in this section is an analysis of the imponance (0 the ECMU 
countries of intra-union trade. The analysis is conducted in ICons of indices of intra-
union trade. An C)I;port index defined as the ratio of intra-union merchandise Cllports to 
total merchandise cxpons and an import index defined as the ralio of intra-union 
merchandise imports to total merchandise imports are constructed. The concentration 
of exports in terms of the products traded and the direction of trade (exports and 
imports) is also analysed. The discussions are summarised in section 3.5. 
The chapter provides the basis for test ing the hypothesis that the benefits from a 
monetary union arising from the elimination of the cost of money conversion, the 
elimination of exchange risks, and savings of foreign reserves are insignificant with 
respect to Grenada. 
3.2 The slruclure or production in the EeMU countries 
The composition of GDP (agriculture, industry, and services) shows important 
differences among some of the countries. Tne contribution of agricul ture (crops, 
livestock and fis heries) varied considerably from country to country. In Montserrat, 
where agriculture is least irnponant, the share averaged approximately 4 per cent. In 
" 
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Antigua, the share was approximately 5 per cent. The relatively low contribution of 
agriculture to GDP is partly due to climatic conditions. These countries are very much 
dryer than the others, ma.lcing it more difficult to develop a viable agricultural sector. In 
the other union members, the share ranges between 12 per cent in Sl Kirts and SI. Lucia 
to 31 per cent in Dominica. 
Table 3.1 Structure of production: EeMU countries, 1977 - 1988 (per cent of CDP) 
Average Minimum Maximum Coefficient 
value value value of variation 
Antigua 
Agriculture 5.3 3.0 9.9 42 
Industry 11.4 9.4 14.6 15 
Services 83.3 79.7 86.6 3 
Dominica 
Agriculture 31.2 27.6 37.8 11 
Industry 13.0 9.6 16.7 15 
Services 55.7 52.5 58.4 3 
Grenada 
Agriculture 19.7 17.2 21.9 9 
Industry 10.6 9.3 12.3 10 
Services 69.7 67.0 72.6 3 
Montserrat 
Agriculture 3.9 3.2 6.0 19 
Industry 14.9 12.5 21.3 16 
Services 81.2 72.7 84.2 4 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Agricul ture 12.2 7.9 17.4 25 
Industry 19.7 17.4 23.2 9 
Services 68.0 61.2 74.4 6 
St. Lucia 
Agriculture 12.3 8.6 14.1 13 
Industry 16.6 14.4 20.1 12 
Services 71.1 68.1 73.0 2 
SI. Vincent 
Agriculture 15.7 12.5 18.0 
Industry 18.6 17. 1 21.1 
Services 65.7 62.8 69.0 
Source: Organisation of East Caribbean States (OECS), Economic Secretariat, unpublished statistics. 
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The level of industrial development gives an indication of the potential for trade 
among countries which do not have comparative advantages relative to each other in 
natural resources and factor endowment. The greater the level of industrial 
development, the greater is the potential for trade. The industrial sector (defined to 
include mining and quanying, manufacturing, electricity and water, and construction) 
contributed relatively Iinle 10 GOP in all the ECMU counoies. The average share 
varied from just over 19 per cent in St. KiltS to 10 per cent in Grenada. 
Services (GOP minus agriculture and industry) dominate in all the member 
countries. In Antigua and Montserrat, services contributed over 80 per cent to GOP. In 
the other ECMU member countries, the share of services in GOP ranged from 56 per 
cent in Dominica to 71 per cent in St. Lucia. Tourism is an imponant component of 
services. 
Table 3.1 also shows the relative stability of the sector shares in GOP. Tn all 
countries, the service sector was the moSt stable sector. The coefficients of variation 
ranged from 2 per cent in 51. Vincent and St. Lucia to 6 per cent in Sl Kitts. The 
agricultural sector was the most unstable sector in tenus of its contribution to GOP in 
all countries except Dominica and Grenada. In those twO countries, the industrial sector 
was the moSt unstable sector. The coefficient of variation for the agricultural sector 
share ranged from as high as 42 per cent in Antigua to 9 per cent in Grenada and SI. 
Vincent. 
Figures 3. 1 and 3.2 give a clear picture of the annual contribution of Ihe sectors 
to GOP. In Antigua, the service sector exhibited a slight upward trend, increasing its 
contribution to GOP from 80 per cent in 1977 to 86 per cent in 1986. In 1987, the 
share fell to approximately 82 per cent. In Grenada, the service sector's contribution to 
GOP also showed a slight upward [fend; the share of agriculture in GDP fell. 
The decline in the imponance of agriculture in the East Caribbean was duc 10 
reduced profitabi lity arising from a number of faclOrs including higher wages in lhe 
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Figure 3.1 Agrial1ture, illdustry, alld strrica as a pn-otntar:t 01 GOP: Antigua. 
Dominica, Grenada aft(( Montsernt. 1977 .1987 (per otnI) 
Antigua 
I tl:=l ::::::=::;::~~~;:;;;:;;;;;;;;;:: 
l '~ _~._ .. .. -.._.-- .  -_ ... - _ 
"" Grenada 
dLi --------========-_.=_. _ .. =-=-- .. . 
,~t 
- Agricultu re -Industry .. Services 
Source: Organ i sa~ ion of East Caribbean S\;llcS (OECS). Economic Sec retarial, unpIJb l i ~Il('(' 
SL1li slics. 
Figure 3.2 Atriallture, Industry. and 5C'nioes as I ptrttntage of GDP: 5L Kitts, 51. 
L~ia IDd 51. ViDttnt, 1977. 1987 (per cent) 
51.Kitts 11 
51. Vinetnt 
- Agriculture - Industry . Services 
---
Souref : Organisation of East CarilJbcan Stales (OECS), Economic Secrcl:lrial, unpubl ished 
statistics. 
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service sector (particularly tourism) which lead 10 labour shonages in the agricultural 
sector, loss of soil fertility, low agricultural prices, and pests and diseases. 
3.3 The structu re of demand in the ECMU countries 
Consumption (private and public) as a perc;entage of GDP was over 70 per cent in all 
the ECMU countries between 1977 and 1988, but there were quite dissimilar 
developments. In MontserrJ.t for example. the share of consumption in GDP was over 
100 per cent during the entire period, with a peak of 129 per cent in the period 1977 to 
1979. Dominica, Grenada, St. Kilts and Nevis. and St. Vincent also experienced 
consumption levels of over 100 per cent of GOP. 
Table 3.2 Total consumption as a percentage of GOP: ECMU countries 1977 -
1987 (percent) 
1977-79 1980-82 1983·85 1986 1987 
Antigua 74 82 84 89 87 
Dominica 108 109 94 85 87 
Grenada 102 103 98 98 92 
Montserrat 129 124 Il7 110 108 
St Kitts 84 96 100 93 101 
St Lucia 82 89 85 71 76 
St. Vincent 104 104 88 82 93 
Source: Organisation of East Caribbean Stales (OECS). Ecooomic SCCrel.Jrial. unpublished sl.Jtisticl. 
The sum of consumption and investment exceeded GDP because of income 
transfers from abraod. In Grenada, the share of invesunent showed an upward trend 
from an average of 24 per cent between 1977 and 197910 35 per cent in 1987. 
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Investment in S1. Lucia has been higher than in the other ECMU countries. 
Between 1978 and 1979. the ,!we of investment was 58 per cent of GDP. but it 
dropped 10 44 per cent in 1987. High levels of invesnnent indicate the continuing 
growth potential of the economy. 
Table 3.3 Total investment as a perttntage of GDP: ECMU countrics, 1977 • 1987 
(percent). 
19n-79 1980-82 1983-85 1986 1987 
Antigua 24 38 24 34 42 
Dominica 38 39 31 22 23 
Grenada 24 31 33 33 35 
Montserrat 34 22 33 34 39 
SI. Kitts 42 23 35 39 29 
St.Lucia 58 53 35 38 44 
St. Vincent 32 34 27 29 33 
Source: Organisation orEaSl Caribbean States (OECS). Economic Secretariat, unpublished statistics. 
The shares of investment in the ECMU countries have been quite variable from 
year to year because the economies are all very small and investment is lumpy. As a 
result. one major project can significantly increase the share of investment in GDP. On 
the other hand, the completion of a major project can cause the investment share to ran 
sharply. 
The economies are very open, but the share of exports differed considembly 
from one country 10 the next. At the lower end, Montserrat exported between 26 and 31 
per cent of its output, with the ratio decreasing. In Antigua, the ratio increased from 53 
percent in 1973 - 1979 to 76 percent to 1986, but then fell to 70 per cent in 1987. 
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Table 3.4 Exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP; 
ECMU countries, 1977 - 1987 (per cent) 
1977-79 1980-82 1983-85 1986 1987 
Antigua 
Exports 53 65 72 76 70 
lmpons 61 85 80 101 100 
Dominica 
Expons 37 33 38 46 45 
lmpons 72 80 63 53 55 
Grenada 
Exports 55 48 43 47 43 
Imports 70 91 73 78 71 
Montserrat 
EJ(ports 30 26 31 25 27 
[mpons 99 93 75 70 74 
St. Kitts 
EJ(pons 62 62 54 60 61 
Imports 80 90 88 82 91 
St. Lucia 
EJ(ports 64 58 58 72 66 
Impons 104 101 78 81 86 
St. Vincent 
Exports 52 59 68 66 52 
Imports 90 97 83 77 77 
Source: Organisation of East Caribbean StateS (OECS). Ecooomic SecretariaL unpublished stauStics. 
Stimulating eJ(ports has been high on the agenda of all the ECMU countries. As 
in many fonner British colonies, marketing boards were established in the 1970s to 
extend export credit and organise marketing for small and medium-sized producers. 
The marketing boards acted as agents or purchased produce from the producers and 
then exported in their own rights. The focus of their activities was on non-traditional 
expons such as fresh fruits, spices (other than nutmeg and mace in Grenada) 
horticultural products and handicrafts. The Expon Credit Department of the Central 
Bank was also established to stimulate non-traditional exports from the ECMU 
countries by extending credit to enlrCprencurs. 
Agricultural research insrilUtions were formed jointly by Caribbean 
governments. Thc Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute 
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(CARDI) was given the tasks of developing technologies and fanning techniques for the 
efficient production and marketing of non-trndirionaJ agricultural CQmmodities. The 
Windward Islands Banana Institute (WINBAN) was fonned by the banana exponing 
ECMU countries to conduct research into increasing banana yields per hectare and to 
improving fruit quality. 
ImportS as a percentage of GDP are also high. There is liule scope for economic 
import substituting production. Even where subsOlUtes can be produced locally, for 
example starchy vegetables such as sweet potatoes, high costs of production due to high 
wages and imported inputs (fertilizers, pesticides etc.) makes them more costly than 
imponed Irish potatoes. Remiuances, grant aid and foreign borrowing raised impon 
capacity by funding persistent [fade deficits. 
3.4 Trade of the ECMU countries 
Intra-union trade 
The literature on currency unions strongly emphasises that the trade patterns of member 
countries are imponant determinants of the benefits from monetary unions. lbe sma!! 
size and similar factor endowments of the ECMU counmes mean that to follow their 
comparative advantages they have to trade with other counmes. Trade among them is 
negligible despite their geographic prox.imity to each other and the fact that there are no 
tariffs or other trade resu"ictions in intra-union trade. 
Table 3.5 presents summary statistics of computed indices of intra-union expons 
and imports during 1970 - 1988. For 1970 to 1988. the avera~e share of Antigua's 
merchandise ex-pons shipped to the other member counmes of the union was only 14 
per cent - the largest average share for any of the counmes. Antigua's minimum share 
was less than I per cent in 1970. while its maximum share was just over 31 per cent in 
1977. Antigua has obtained a small share of its merchandise impons from intra-union 
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markets. The average share obtained during the period was just over 2 per cent. The 
maximum amount in any year was less than S per cent. 
Table 3.5 Merchandise exports and imports or intra-union origin as a percentage 
or total exports and imports or the ECMU countries, and the union as a 
whole, 1970 - 1988 (per cent) 
Average Minimum Maximum Coefficient 
value value value of variation 
Antigua 
Expons 14.0 0.8 31.5 62 
Irnpons 2.2 0.3 4.6 61 
Dominica 
Expons 7.6 2.5 20.6 55 
Imports 10.3 1.0 14.7 35 
Grenada 
Expons 1.8 0.2 4.3 59 
Impons 2.9 0.4 4.4 40 
Montserrat 
Exports 13.1 3.8 27.3 55 
S~~~s 4.0 1.3 6.4 41 
Exports 5.0 2.9 7.8 29 
Impo", 3.3 1.7 6.3 43 
St. Lucia 
Exports 13.0 5.2 22.3 35 
Imports 1.9 0.2 4.7 67 
St. Vincent 
Exports 9.3 0.7 17.1 62 
Imports 3.3 1.0 7.0 49 
Total Union 
Exports 8.7 2.6 11.8 34 
1m""", 3.3 0.7 4.8 36 
Sources: ECMU cruntries. Minisuy of FIIWICC (Sutistical Department). AIlIUlIJI AbstrlJCI if Sill/is/its. 
various issues. 
Grenada has participated least in the intra-union markets for both its 
merchandise exports and imports, as indicated by shares of expons to, and imports from 
other union members. II sold an average of less than 2 per cent of its exports to the 
other members of the union, and purchased an average of less than 3 per cent of its 
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imports from intra-union lTUlIkets. The maximum shares of exports to, and imports 
from intt'a-union markets were less than 5 per cent. 
Although the shares of both intt'a-union exports and imports have been very low. 
Figmes 3.3 and 3.4 show that they have exhibited a slight upward trend. The increases 
were not, however, such that benefits could have been significantly increased for any of 
the countries. 
The ability of countries such as Antigua, Montserrat, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent 
to export relatively larger shares of their exports to intt'a-union markets than do 
Grenada, St. Kitts, and Dominica, Stems from their economic structures. In Antigua 
where agriculture is relatively unimponant. merchandise exports are concentrated in 
small electrical appliances and gannents. In Montserrat, where agriculture is again 
relatively unimportant, exports are concentrated in items such as electrical components, 
polyprophelene bags, Sea Island Couon goods. and leather products. 
St. Lucia exports to intra-union markets mainly consist of cardboard boxes to 
Dominica, Grenada and St. Vincent (for packaging bananas for export to the United 
Kingdom), and beer. Cardboard box plants have been set up in St. Lucia to produce 
those products for expon 10 the other countries, rather than each island having its OWJl 
plant. The objective was to achieve some economies of scale. St. Vincent's major 
exports . to the intra-union markets consist of processed flour and animal feeds. 
Dominica's main expons to intra-union markets consist of coconut products such as 
soap and oils. St. Kins' exports to intra-union markets consist of small quantities of 
clothing and footwear, beer and ale. 
For the Union as a whole, the share of exports relative t? total exports was just 
over 8 per cent. The maximum share in any year was 11 per cent. This occurred in 
1977. The share of intra-union imports in total imports was less than 5 per cent. Large 
fluctuations have also accompanied the low percentage of intra-union trade in 10lal 
trade (Figures 3.3 and 3.4, and Table 3.5). 
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Figure 3.3 Inlnl .... nOOIl merdlaDdde tndt as a pe.-ee_ta!t or total trallt: Antigua. 
Dominica, GrtQ ...... MoolsoNTlt, 1970 - 19&1 (pcJ- cent) 
Grenada 
'"j . !:~ 
~ - - - - - -Montserrat 
j~ 
19S5 
-F."Pflrt~ -Imports L-__________________________ _ 
Sourres: ECMU countries, Minisuy of Finance (Stali~ lical Departmenl), A""ual AbSIWf{ (>/ 
Stilrisrics,variousissucs. 
Figure 3.4 lain·union lIIudlandise b'ade &5. pt'lUDtal t of IOtaI trade: 51. Kitts, 51. 
Luc:ia,5t. Vlncent.nd tbe I!.CMU, 1910 ·1938 (petccnt) 
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St. Vincent 
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Snurces: ECMU countries. Minis!.ry or Finance (Stlllistical Ikpartmcnl), AII"ual AbslrllrI of 
SlatUlics.variousissucs. 
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Another measure of the degrtt of integration of the economies of the ECMU 
countries is the extent to which production in one country is CO'lsumed in other 
members of the Union, as indicated by the level of intra-union trade compared to GDP. 
This is shown in Table 3.6 from 1972 to 1988. 
Table 3.6 Intra-union merchandise exports, imports and Cotallrade as a 
percentage of GOP: ECMU countries. 1970 to 1988 (percem) 
1970-73 1974-77 1978·8} 1982-85 1986-88 
Merchandise expons 
Antigua L3 3.0 3.1 2.0 1.5 
Dominica 1.1 2.1 3.0 2.6 2.2 
Grenada 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Montserrat 0.3 0.8 1.1 L3 0.3 
SLIGns 1.1 2.2 1.9 2. 1 1.6 
SI.Lucia 1.6 5.7 5.2 3.6 4.8 
5l. Vincent 0.5 0.7 4.0 7.1 6.3 
Union 1.0 2.7 3.1 2.9 2.7 
Merchandise impons 
Antigua 0.3 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.6 
Dominica 3.3 7.3 8.0 7.2 6.7 
Grenada 0.7 2.2 2.7 2.0 1.8 
Montserrat 0.9 2.6 3.9 2.9 2.2 
St. Kitts L3 1.7 3.3 2.9 3.7 
St. Lucia 0.4 0.8 1.8 3.0 2.7 
St. Vincent 1.6 3.8 3.6 1.9 1.5 
Union 1.0 2.7 3.2 2.9 2.7 
Total merchandise trade 
Antigua 1.6 5.3 5.1 3.9 3.0 
Dominica 4.5 9.4 11.0 9.7 8.9 
Grenada 1.0 2.6 3. 1 2.5 2.5 
Montserrat 1.2 3.4 5.0 4.3 2.5 
St. Kitts 2.4 3.8 5.2 5.0 5.3 
St. Lucia 2.0 6.5 7.0 6.6 7.5 
51. Vincent 2. 1 4.5 7.6 9.0 7.8 
Union 2.1 5.3 6.3 5.8 5.3 
Sour«!l: ECMU countries, Ministry of Finance (Statistical. Department). A.nnual Abstract of Statistics. 
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There is little room to doubt that the economies of the ECMU countries are more 
integrated with the rest of the world than with each other. In Anti~a, expons 10 the 
rest of the ECMU increased from just over 1 percent of GOP between 1970 and 197310 
around 3 per cent by 1980. Between 1986 and 1988, expons as a percentage of GDP 
fell to 1.5. The situation was similar for Antigua. The lack of integration of the other 
countries was also similar, suggesting that the countries have already achieved their 
malillnum potential to benefit from intra-union trade. 
The relatively low percentages of trade of intra-union origin to all the ECMU 
member countries is a direct consequence of their similar historical background and 
resource base. These have favoured the development of similar production structures 
which export a small number of commodities to metropolitan maricets, and obtain 
imports (processed foodstuff, consumer durables, capital and intenncdiate goods) from 
extra-regional marXets. Being mini-states with similar climatic and weather conditions, 
(except Antigua which is much dryer than the others) limits their potential for 
diversifying agriculture. 
The union is tOO small to enable intra-union trade to be increased by locating 
industries in one country to produce goods for other members. 
The small size of the economies means that even if economies of scale were 
sufficient for one or two finns to operate, there are too few ftnns for competition to take 
place. Unit costs of production are too high for international competitiveness. The 
problems of producing and marketing at an intemationally competitive level are 
exacerbated by high freight costs. Markets are separated by water and spread over a 
relatively large area. Transponing small quantities of goods to other member countries 
incurs high unit costs of shipping. both in bringing inputs to the islands as well as in 
eKponing. 
Lacking the potential to be competitive and to exploit economies of scale 
together with high factor and transportation costs. means that impon substitution 
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production, although it would increase intra-union trade, would not be beneficial to the 
ECMU countries. 
The concentration of exports of the ECMU countries 
The expons of me ECMU member countries are highly concentrated in terms of the 
commodities and the markets to which the products are exponed. Historically, the 
development of international trade of the ECMU member countries has been on 'staple' 
patterns of specialization. Initial development was for me production and expon of 
primary commodities in exchange for manufactures and services mainly from the 
United Kingdom. 
In Dominica, Grenada. St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent where agriculture is 
relatively imponant it is highly specialised in the production of a few crops for expon. 
In 1982. bananas accoumed for around 44 per cent of Dominica's merchandise expons. 
The share increased to 71 per cent by 1987. 
Table 3.7 Banana exports as a percentage of Iota I merchandise exports: Dominica, 
Grenada, St. Lucia and SI. Vincent , 1982 - 1987 (percent). 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Dominica 44 42 45 51 65 71 
Grenada 20 18 17 14 14 16 
St.Lucia 38 45 50 62 70 82 
St. Vincent 30 26 23 25 3 1 49 
To,," 34 35 35 39 50 61 
Sources: ECMU countries, Ministry of Finance (Statistical Department), AII/lUa! AbslraCl of SllIliSlies, 
various issues. 
The share of banana expons in total merchandise expons of St. Lucia also 
showed a large increase between 1982 and 1987. Only in Grenada did the share of 
63 
banana exportS in toW merchandise expons fall. Moko disease prevented the 
expansion of banana production. Once lhe disease is present in a banana plantation, 
striCt field sanitation needs to be observed. Usually, the banana plantation is destroyed. 
Bananas can not be replanted for a few years until the disease organisms in the soil die. 
The high concentration on exports of bananas is assisted by United Kingdom technical 
and financial assistance for the development of the banana industry and preferential 
market access to the United Kingdom. A 20 per cent tariff preference margin favours 
bananas from the Caribbean and quotas limit non-Caribbean bananas. Under normal 
circumstances, banana impons from Latin America are limited 10 5.000 tonnes per year. 
Only when the supply from the Caribbean cannot satisfy demand are additional impons 
of bananas from Latin America pennitted. 
This protection is necessary for the survival of the banana industry in Dominica, 
Grenada. St. Lucia and St. VincenL Their bananas cannot compete with lower-cost fruit 
from Latin America where it is easy to achieve economies of scale in production and 
marketing. In the Caribbean, bananas are grown on hilly sites by smallholders, in 
contrast to estate production on the fiat coastal plains in Honduras and Ecuador. Higher 
wages in the Caribbean also make Caribbean bananas more expensive. A study by 
Stevens (1988) showed that the cif price differential belween impons from the 
Caribbean to the United Kingdom and from the rest of the world to Germany averaged 
30 per cent between 1980 and 1986. This is in excess of the 20 per cent preferential 
tariff margin charged on banana impons from Latin America 10 the United Kingdom. 
The service sector is dominated by tourism. The tropical climate, beaches and 
proximity to the American, Canadian, and European markets. are the Caribbean's 
principal resources, making tourism the leading expon. 
In Antigua and Montserrat where agriculture is relatively unimponam, tourism 
is the principal expon, accounting for close to 90 per cent of expons in Antigua, and 
around 70 per cent of expons in Montserrat, 
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Table 3.8 Tourism as a percentage or exports or goods and services: ECMU 
countries, 1980 - 1987 (per cent) 
1980-83 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Antigua 71 88 89 89 90 
Dominica 21 22 27 24 20 
Grenada 45 54 59 65 66 
Montserrat 69 69 73 78 73 
St. Kitts 34 47 53 54 54 
St. Lucia 41 46 46 42 42 
St. Vincent 41 25 23 24 29 
Sources: Organisation of East Caribbean States, (OECS) unpublished Statistics; and ECMU countries. 
Ministry of Finance (Statistical Department), AMulIlltbstracl ojSlaluticS. various is.sUC$. 
Direction or extra-union trade of the ECMU countries 
The markets for ECMU member country exports are also concentrated. The major 
market for tourism exports is the United Slates. Canada and the United Kingdom are 
other principal markets. 
Tlble 3.9 Tourism .harts by mlJor m l rket: "CMU evuulries IDd tht unlo!!, 1'¥17 - 1988 (per cent) 
Antigu Dominica Grenod. MQntsmal SI. JGm Sl Lucia St. Vinccm 
UnilCdS1I.1eI 
eM'" .. u 
" UnilCdKingdom 
" 
.. 8 7 
'" " Caribbean 20 2l 
" 
.. 
" " 
Sources: ECMU countries, Ministry or Finance (Statistical Department), Annual AbSlract 0{ Statistics. 
variousis.sues. 
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Markets for merchandise exports are similarly concentrated. Table 3.10 shows 
export shares of various trading partners for 1977 to 1987. Merchandise exports are 
sold to the United Kingdom, Trinidad and Tobago. and the United States. The United 
Kingdom accounts for approximately 63 per cent of expons from Dominica and St. 
Lucia, 37 per cent of exports from Grenada, approximately 41 percent from St. Vincent 
and 30 per cent of exports from Sl Kitts. The next moSt imponant market for 
merchandise expom from the ECMV member countries is Trinidad and Tobago, to 
which fruits and vegetables and small amounts of clothing are sold. 
Table ).10 Mutbandi5e nports by destlnallon: ECMU (ol/nrnes and tbt union, 1m - 1987 (per oenI) 
Anligua G,enada Montse,,.., S!.Kilts SL !..ucia SLVincenl 
UnitedSu.w 2<>.> .., 
0; 0.' 1.0 0.' .. , 
UnitedlGngdom 6).6 'M "'.9 
'- 9.' 1.' !i.lS 1.9 ,., .; 
G",~ 03 0.' 0.' 
J&naica ' .7 
Trinidad and Tobt.go ., .. ,.. 2<>'> ", 
,,- '5 B 0.' 
The Federal Republic 
of Germany ,,.. 
D"",,,'" 0.' 
Hol~d 2.' 
'"'Y 0' 
Sources: ECMU coontrics. Ministry or Finance (SLatistical Department),ltntlUOl AbSlract of Statistics. 
variousis:sues.. 
The high degree of concentration of exports of the ECMU member countries 
limits the benefits which can be derived from the monetary union through the need to 
hold less foreign reserves. The existence of preferential trading arrangements involving 
higher prices than those offered in world markets, and the ST ABEX schcme which 
compensates African, Caribbean and Pacific members of the African, Caribbean and 
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Pacific (ACP) when their earnings from commodity exportS fall, have been key factors 
determining the concentration of commodity exportS from the ECMt) countries to the 
United Kingdom. Because conunodity prices tend 10 swing from year to year and the 
compensation only applies to exports sold to the European Community, it has been 
beneficial for the ECMU countries 10 retain their traditional trade links. 
The ECMU countries also impon from few countries. Import sources are 
symmetrical to export destinations. 
Table3.ll ImportsbJ'COWl1ryofor"ln: ECMUcounlrlel.nd !hf union, 1977-1<)81(pr:rcenll 
"""'" 
G,enada Monw,rrOl. St. Kit" SLLucia SLVineent 
UniIe<!SI.I~ ." ", .(3.4 45.2 .(1.3 37.6 
e"",,, M 1.' .. 6.6 ..• 
Uoile<! Kin&dom 15.1 126 IS.7 
'" J"", 3.1 1.' ,., '.2 .. '.0 D B."""" L' '.2 3.> 3.6 '.2 
O"'~ 0.6 L3 ,. 0.' OA U 2.0 
" " " 
1.1 2.0 
" 
L' 
12.0 11.1 12. 1 
'" 
13.2 
,,~ 6.3 J3 0.6 0.' 
" Fedc:r&1 Rcpublic: 
ofGermony 0.' L' L' 1.6 I.' JA 
"""'"'" 
0.' 0.' 0.' JA 0.' 0.' 
Holland 19.0 2.0 
" " 
'.1 
Il.Ily '6 
Sources: ECMU tOlinuics, Minisay of Finance (Statistical Department), A/lIUUl/ Abstract of StlltiltU:l. 
various issues. 
3.5 ConciusiollS 
The ECMU countries are very similar in tenns of their structure of production, structure 
of demand and structure of trade. This similarity has reduced their potential for intra-
union trade. Thus, although the countries are geographically relatively close to each 
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other, and a1though they all use the East Caribbean dollar and there are no restrictions 
on intra-union trade, intra-union trade peaked early at a low level. 
Because of their smaJl size and narrow resource base, exports are concentrated 
on a sma1l range of products which are sold to a few markets. The small volume of 
intra-union trade and the high concentration of similar expom limit the benefits from 
monetary union which normally result from: the need to hold less foreign reserves; the 
savings from the elimination of exchange risks; and savings from the elimination of the 
costs of money conversion. These isues arc addressed in detail in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BENEFITS TO GRENADA FROM TH E MONETARY UNION 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, some of the benefits of the monetary union to the ECMU countries, and 
to Grenada in panicular, are analysed. The benefits are estimated in purely economic 
tenns. In section 4.2, benefits arising from the need to hold lower foreign reserves 
because foreign exchange are no longer needed for intra-union trade are estimated. 
Benefits arising from the el imination of the costs of money conversion are analysed in 
section 4.3. Savings in costs as a result of the ECCB are estimated in section 4.4. The 
main conclusions of the chapter are presented in section 4.5 
4.2 Benefits from the need to hold less fureign reserves 
To estimate the benefits fro m the need 10 hold less international reserves, the 
opponunity cost of holding reserves must be identified. A number of economists have 
suggested different measures of opponunity COSts. Wood (1973) has argued that 
holding international reserves constrains monetary authorities to invest in shon-tenn 
rather than longer-tenn foreign assets which yield higher returns. He suggested that the 
difference between the rates of return on a long asset and the US three-month Treasury 
Bill rate should be used as a proxy of the opponunity COSt holding international 
reserves. Bird (1982: 87) on the other hand suggested that an appropriate opponunity 
cost of holding reserves may be calculated as the difference between the social rate of 
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return on capital and the return on reserves. However. he admits that it is difficult to 
obtain a measure of the social cost of capital. 
Edwards (1985) also admitted that it may be difficult to find an appropriate 
opportunity cost of holding international reserves. He wrote: 
"From the prospective of empirical analysis, Iw~er, there are /IOn-
trivial difficulties in computing adequate series for the llfi opportunity 
cost of holding reserves. TMse difficulties are particularly serious for the 
case of developing countries. First, in most WCs there are no reliable 
ddla on marginal product 0/ capital, or on a/rernarive measures for the 
gross /oregofiL income of holding reserves. Second, there are no ddta 
availilbie on the compOSition 0/ reserves, or on the return obtained from 
these Iwldings. For this reason, any attempt to empirically analyse the 
relation between the demand for reserves and its net opportullity coSt 
rUluiresjinding a proxy for this net opportunity COSI H (Edwards 1985: 3). 
He suggested that the gross income lost from holding reserves could be 
represented by the cost at which a country borrows from international financial markets. 
His rationale was that countries will borrow until returns on domestic investment match 
the COSt of borrowing. He argued that the difference between a country's foreign 
borrowing rate and the London Interbank Offer Rate (representing a measure of the 
returns on international reserves) was a proxy for the opponunity cost of holding 
reserves. While supponing Edwards' hypothesis that the cost of borrowing could be 
used to compute the opportunity costS of holding foreign reserves, LandeU-Mills (1989) 
argued that because of risks related to borrowing, developing cou~tries may not borrow 
until the returns on domestic investment equal the cost of borrowing. She suggested 
that governments may not view domestic investments as the best alternative to holding 
international reserves. Instead, they may consider repayment of external debt as a beller 
alternative to holding international reserves so they can maintain credit-wonhilless and 
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good prospects of borrowing on favoumble terms. The difference between the unit cost 
of borrowing (the 3-month and 6-month UBOR mtes) and the 3-~nth US Treasury 
Bill rate was suggested as an appropriate mea5UR: of the opponunity cost of holding 
foreign reserves. 
In the present study, the ECMU countries' opponunity cost of holding 
international reserves is approximated as the difference between the US Government 
long-term bond yield and the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate. The US long-term bond 
yield is used as a proxy for the mte of return which the ECMU countries could earn by 
moving foreign reserves out of treasury bills. The US Treasury Bill rate of interest and 
the US government long-term bond yield are presented below. 
3-Month US US Government 
Tre",mry 
Bill rate ~~a-~1cl:t 
1970 6.4 7.4 
1971 4.3 6.2 
1972 4.1 6.2 
1973 7.0 4.8 
1974 7.9 7.6 
1975 5.8 8.0 
1976 5.0 7.6 
1977 5.3 7.4 
1978 7.2 8.4 
1979 10.0 9.4 
1980 11.6 11.5 
198 1 14.1 13.9 
1982 10.7 13.0 
1983 8.6 11.1 
1984 7.6 12.5 
1985 7.5 10.6 
1986 6.0 7.7 
1987 5.8 8A 
1988 6.7 8.9 
Sourct: IMF,/llurnaliOMI FilUlllcilll S/oli.llies.l990 
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It is assumed that because intra-union trade does not require foreign reserves, 
the monetary authorities are less constrained toward bolding shon-teno assets. An 
additional amount of foreign reserves equivalent to 25 per cent of the value of intra-
union imports would be available to be invested into longer-tenn higher yielding assets 
rather than into shoner-tenn more liquid assets which earn lower rates of return. It is 
assumed that the ECCB on average holds net foreign assets equivalent to three months 
of extra-union imports. Extta-union imports and net foreign assets are presented in 
Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Extra-union mcrchandise imports and ECCB nct roreign assets, 1972-
1988 (ECSm) 
Net foreign 
assets asa 
Extta-Union Net foreign percentage 
merchandise impons of imports 
1972 308.5 58.9 2.3 
1973 322.2 56.8 2.1 
1974 408.9 69.4 2.0 
1975 450.4 110.2 2.9 
1976 454.5 157.9 4.2 
1977 533.8 178.9 4.0 
1978 663.7 151.1 2.7 
1979 832.0 175.3 2.5 
1980 1117.3 211.2 2.3 
1981 1221.1 207.7 2.0 
1982 1142.3 208.2 2.2 
1983 1121.0 210.3 2.3 
1984 1325.7 277.1 2.5 
1985 1462.8 317.2 2 .• 
1986 1752.9 287.0 2.0 
1987 2037.6 488.1 2.9 
1988 2329.7 709.3 3.7 
SourC:e!: ECMU countries. Minislry or Finance (Sullistical Department). AllruwlltbstraCl of Statistics. 
various issues; and East Caribbean Centnll Bank. Annual Reports and Statement of AcCOlUltS. 
Sl KillS. various issues. 
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Benefits arc estimated as the opponunity costs of holding net foreign assets 
multiplied by the additional amount of longer-tenn assets which the ECCB authorities 
can hold. If we assume that the rate of return on US government long-tenn bonds and 
3-month US Treasury Bills in period t arc rll and rot respectively. then the opponunity 
costs of holding intematiooal reserves is (rk - r.J. If the value of intra-union impons of 
ECMU country i in period t (in US dollars) is represented by I~i. then the benefits 10 
each country in US dollars in year t is Im,i multiplied by ( Til - roJ. The benefits arc then 
converted into East Caribbean dollars and presented in Table 4.3 as a percentage of 
nominal GDP. 
The results show that the benefits are very small. For every country, they are 
much less than one-tenth of one percent ofGDP. 
Table 4.3 Benefits as a percentage of GOP arising from the elimination of the need 
for foreign reserves ror intra-union merchandise imports: EeMU 
countries. 1970 - 1988 (per cent) 
Antigua 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Montserrat 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
SI.Lucia 
St. Vincent 
ECMU 
1970-73 1974-77 1978-81 1982-85 1986-88 
O.OOl 
0.009 
0.001 
0.003 
0.004 
0.001 
0.012 
0.003 
0.012 
0.033 
0.010 
0.013 
o.(m 
0.003 
0.037 
0.012 
0.001 
0.002 
0.001 
0.001 
O.OOl 
0.000 
0.000 
0.001 
0.013 
0.047 
0.014 
0.020 
0.020 
0.020 
0.004 
0.020 
0.008 
0.037 
0.010 
0.012 
0.020 
0.014 
0.014 
0.014 
Sourtes: ECMU «lUI1tries. Ministry or Finance (Statistical Department). Annual AlmrtUt of S/aris/ics. 
varioos issues; IMF, In/unalloMI Financial SIll/ill/cr. various issues. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, if the member countries of a monetary union do not 
go into deficit with the rest of Ihe world at the same lime, and if economic shocks do 
not simultaneously affect them, a smaller pool of foreign reserves may be required than 
if they managed their reserves individually. This will be beneficial to the members. 
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Although the benefits are difficult to quantify, the correlation coefficients for expon 
earnings can provide an indication of their magnitudes. ColTelation of earnings from 
expons of goods and services for the ECMU countries between 1977 and 1987 are 
presented in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 CorTtlation cotfficitnts ror tarnings rrom uports or goods and services: ECMU 
countries, 197710 1987 
Antigua Dominica Grenada Montseffilt SI. KiltS SI. L..ucia 
E.<I""-' 
Dominica 0.94 
Grenada 0.94 0.81 
MOIltscrrJt 0.92 0.90 0.19 
St. KitlS 0.97 0.91 0.95 0.85 
SI.LlICia 0.94 0.87 0.91 0.90 0.96 
SI. Vincent 0.94 0.87 0.84 0.93 0.85 0,82 
Source: OrganiSMion of Ea.~t Caribbean States (OECS). Economic Secretariat, unpublished Sia.tiSliu. 
The high correlation coefficients indicate thaI expon earnings are highly 
synchronised, no doubt because the expon sectors of the ECMU countries are similarly 
affected_ by economic shocks. This suggests Ihal Ihe countries are likely to go inlO 
deficits with the rest of the world at the same time. Therefore, benefits are not expected 
to be large. 
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4.3 Savings from the elimination of money conven;i(HJ cosls 
Exchange coSts are the costs of converting one currency into another. They can be 
reflected by the buy/sell spread which banks charge for fore ign exchange tntnsactions. 
Benefits arising from the elimination of the need to conven domestic currencies into 
foreign currencies for intra-union impons are presented in Table 3.12. The benefits are 
computed as the difference between the ECMU country coounercial banks' selling and 
buying rates for US dollars multiplied by the amount of intra-union impons in U5 
dollars. It is assumed that in the absence of the ECMU, if the counmes had individual 
currencies, commercial banks would charge a similar percentage spread when buying 
and selling those currencies. 
Discussions with officials at commercial banks in the ECMU countries indicated 
that the buying rate for one US dollar was EO 2.6882 and the selling rate was EO 
2.7169. Estimated benefits from the elimination of the costs of money conversion are 
presented in Table 4.5. 
Table 4.5 Benefi ls as a percentage of GDP a rising from the elimination of the need 
for money conven;ion for intra-union trade: ECMU countries, 1970· 
1988 (per cent) 
1970-73 1974-77 1978-81 1982-85 1986-88 
Antigua 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.12 
Dominica 0.08 0.60 0.56 0.28 0.48 
Grenada 0.08 0.16 0.20 0.12 0. 12 
Montserrat 0.08 0.20 0.28 0.16 0.16 
51. Kills 0.12 0.15 0.24 0.16 0.28 
51. Lucia 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.20 
51. Vincent 0.16 0.32 0.28 0.12 0.12 
Union 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.12 0.20 
SUll rus: EeMU countries, MiniSlI)' of Finance (Slatistical Dcp3rtmem). Annual Abstract r( Statistics, 
various issues: IMF. IntunmiOil<l1 Fimmdl'/ S/(J(;s/icJ, v;"ious issues: ar>d di scussion wilh 
officials ~l commercial b.1Jlks in the EeMU counlIics. 
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As can be seen, the benefits are extremely small. Although Dominica benefited 
most, annual benefi ts were no larger than 0.15 per cent of GOP. 
4.4 Benefi ts from .-educed overhead cost of the ECCB 
One of the attractive features of a common central bank for tiny economies is that they 
can save on overhead costs. Because the costs of operation of a central bank are lumpy, 
it may not be economical for individual countries to have one. The expenditure and 
revenue of the ECCB between 1975 and 1988 are presented in Table 4.6. 
Administration is a major cost component, but the ECCB revenue has exceeded 
expenditure every year. II is doubtful whether this could be replicated in individual 
country central banks which would have greater difficulty in hiring appropriate staff. 
Savings to each member country are approximated as the costs of operating the 
hypothetical domestic central bank minus one-seventh of the COSt of operating the 
ECCB. An implicit assumption is that the cost of operating the ECCB is shared equally 
among the member countries. Two scenarios are analysed. In the first scenario. it is 
assUlned that a central bank of equivalent size and scope and thus equivalent cost as the 
ECCB might be required. In the second scenario. it is assumed that a central bank of 
half the size as the ECCB might be required. It is further assumed that under the 
existing arrangements each member incurs approximately one-seventh of the 
administrative costs of the ECCB. 
Table 4.7 reports savings to the ECMU countries from rC£1uced overhead costs 
of the ECCB as a per cent of nominal GDP. 
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Under the first scenario where it was assumed that a cenrrnl bank of equal size to 
the ECCB would be required, Antigua could be expected to annually save 
approximately 0.5 per cent of its GOP as a result of the joint central bank. The average 
savings to Grenada would be approximately I per cent of GOP. Montserrat. which has 
the smaUest economy, couid save an average of just under 3 per cent of GOP in 
overhead COSts during the period 1975 to 1988. 
The second scenario assumes that a hypothetical central bank of appro)limately 
half the size and administrative costs as the ECCB may be required with monetary 
autonomy, individual countries would then save less. Antigua would save 
approximately 0.2 per cent of its GOP as a result of the ECMU. Grenada would save 
around 0.4 per cent of its GOP. Being the smallest member, savings to Montserrat are 
over I per cent of GOP. 
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Table 4.7 Savings as a percentage of GOP through reduced overhead costs 8S a result of the common central bank: ECMU 
countries, 1975· 1988 (per cent) 
1975·80 1981·88 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
SUnario I, J. national ctlltral bank of fquivaltllt silt to the EeCD 
Antigua 0.36 0.53 OAO 0.63 0.47 0.63 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.53 Dominica 0.71 1.07 0.76 1.20 0.90 1.22 1.10 1.08 1.14 1.21 Grenada 0.55 0.92 0.60 0.97 0.86 1.06 0.94 0.93 0.95 1.04 Montserrat 1.98 2.78 1.85 2.88 2.24 3.15 2.99 2.93 2.98 3.20 SI. Ki\tsand Nevis 0.78 1.37 0.90 1.47 1.22 1.59 lA5 1.34 1.42 1.55 St.Lucia 0.36 0.64 0.39 0.65 0.52 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.72 0.83 St. Vincent 0.65 0.95 0.69 1.03 0.76 1.07 0.96 0.96 1.02 1.12 
Sctnario 2, a national ctlltral bank of half the Silt oft he ECCB 
Antigua 0.14 0.21 0.16 0.25 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.21 Dominica 0.28 OA2 0.30 0.47 0.35 OA8 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.48 Grenada 0.22 0.36 0.24 0.38 0.34 0.42 0.37 0.37 0.38 OA I Montserrat 0.78 1.10 0.73 1.14 0.88 1.25 1.18 1.16 1.18 1.26 St.Kitts 0.31 0.54 0.36 0.58 OA8 0.63 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.61 St.Lucia 0.14 0.25 0. 15 0.26 0.20 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.28 0.33 51. Vincent 0.26 0.38 0.27 0.41 0.30 OA2 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.44 
Sources: Eastern Caribbean Centrat Bank,Annual Reports and Swtelflcnt of Accounts, 51. Kill\:; ECMU coontries, Minislfy of Finance (5L1ltistical DeparunenO. 
AnfWlJIAb.ftTac/ofSIIlI;slics,Yariousissues. 
I 
4.5 Conclusions 
The benefits from monetary union which are proportional to intra-union ttade, are very 
small for the ECMU countries. This is because of the similar strucrure of their 
economies, which has resulted in very little intra-union trade, and highly correlated 
expon earnings. However, the savings from the coSt of a shared central bank rather 
than each counuy having its own are moderate. It is highly unlikely that the countries 
would be able to profitably operate individual central banks. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE EXCHANGE RATE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES ·IN THE EAST 
CARmBEAN 
S.l Introductton 
If a country decides to join a monelary union, it is in effect handing over the exchange 
rate as an instrument for economic stabilisation to an external instilUtion. As discussed 
in Chapter I, this action can involve COSts. In this chapter, the exchange rate and 
exchange rate policies in the East Caribbean are analysed. Section 5.2 focuses on the 
nominal exchange rate. The ECCB's mechanism for changing the nominal exchange 
rate is dlscussed in section 5.3. An appropriate exchange rate regime for the ECMU 
countries is investigated in section 5.4. Real exchange rates are analysed in section 5.5. 
The exchange and trade restrictions in the East Caribbean are analysed in section 5.6. 
The conclusions are summarised in section 5.7. 
S.2 The nominal exchange rate of the ECMU countries 
The nominal exchange, rate defined as me domestic price of foreign currencies, is a 
policy instrument widely used by monelary authori ties to manage imernai and external 
balance. Monelary authorities have to choose between a floating or pegged exchange 
rate regime. If mey decide to adopt a floating regime, they funher have to decide 
whether to adopt a free-floating or managed-float policy. For a comprehensive 
discussion of me various exchange rate options see for example Williamson (1981) and 
Carse, Williamson and Wood (1980). 
Under a free-floating exchange rate regime, the exchange rates are freely 
detennined by demand for, and supply of, currencies in response to market forces. 
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Thus. if the authorities decide to pursue a free-floating exchange rate policy. they have 
in effect decided against undertaking any systematic interventio~ in the foreign 
exchange market and allow eKchange nates to move in response 10 market forces. 
With a managed-float policy. the authorities intervene in the foreign eKchange 
market to influence the exchange rate. However, they do not commit themselves to 
maintain a fixed rate. There are at least three analytically distinct cases of managed 
floating, depending on the nature of the intervention policy pursued by the monetary 
authorities. Under one option tenned "leaning against the wind", the monetary 
authority buys/sells foreign exchange reserves when the domestic currency is 
appreciating/depreciating, but not in sufficient quantities to reverse the movement of the 
exchange rate. A second method of central bank intervention involves setting "target 
zones" for the exchange rate. Here, the central bank has some idea of the rate it regards 
desirable and intervenes to move the rate in the direction of the target zone. A third 
method of intervention is termed the "unannounced. adjustable-under·pressure peg". 
With this approach to exchange rate management. attempts are made to stabilise the 
exchange rate until strong pressure develops in the foreign exchange market Then the 
authorities withdraw from the market. When the pressure dissipates, attempts are made 
to stabilise another rate. 
If the authorities decide to adopt a pegged exchange rate regime, they have to 
decide whether to adopt a rigidly pegged regime, a crawling peg policy where 
devaluations are made in a series of small steps (for example steps of I per cent over 
lWO years to achieve a 10 per cent devaluation), or, an adjustable peg where 
devaluations are made in a single step. With a decision to peg the exchange rate, other 
issues such as to what benchmark the exchange rate should be pegged, and at what level 
it should be pegged, will arise from time to time. 
From its introduction in 1965, the East Caribbean dollar (ECS) which replaced 
the British Caribbean dollar (BeS) was pegged to the pound sterling at the rate of 
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E<::$4.80 to £1.00. The choice of the pound sterling as the benchmark to which to peg 
the East Caribbean dollar and the level chosen are due to the historical, economic, and 
political links of the ECMU member countries to the United Kingdom. 
Earlier currencies in usc in the ECMU member countries were also pegged at 
the equivalent E04.80 = £1.00. For example, although UK coins and currency notes 
expressed in pounds, shillings and pence were used in the British West Indian Colonies. 
accounlS were sometimes kept in dollars and cenlS. One dollar was equivalent to four 
shillings and two pence, and one cent equalled half a penny (Clauson 1944). Since 
twelve pennies equalled one shilling. and twenty shillings equalled £1.00, then £1.00 
was equal to E04.80. 
After the adoption of generalised floating exchange rate systems by the 
industrial counmes, the choice of an appropriate exchange rate peg for the East 
Caribbean dollar was given renewed attention. In a world of floating rates, if a 
country's exchange rate is pegged to a single currency, it is in effect floating jointly with 
the currency used as the bcnchmarlc against all other currencies. Hence, only ecOnomic 
transactions conducted with the country to which the domestic currency is pegged are 
conducted a l fixed rates. 
Significant past depreciations of the pound sterling led the East Caribbean 
monetary authorities to question its suitability as the benchmark 10 which the East 
Caribbean dollar should be pegged. In July 1976, the parity of the East Caribbean 
dollar was redefined with respect to the US dollar instead of the pound sterling. The 
East Caribbean dollar was then pegged at EC$2.70 to USSI.oo. This was the actual rate 
at that time. 
There is no doubt that the realignment of the currency peg from the pound 
sterling to the US dollar was influenced by other Caribbean counmes, inCluding 
Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Belize which had also redefined 
the parity of their exchange rates to the US dollar instead of the pound sterling. Since 
B3 
then, the East Caribbean dollar has remained pegged to the US dollar at EC$2.70 to 
US$I.00. 
5.3 The ECCB mechanism (or changing the exchange rate regime 
With a pegged exchange rate regime, international reserves have to act as a buffer 
between the demand for, and the supply of, the national currency on foreign exchange 
markets. When economic conditions in the economy are such that the demand for 
international currencies is greater than supply, lhe monetary authorities intervene in the 
foreign exchange market to maintain the exchange rate at the pegged level by selling 
foreign reserves. If disequilibrium continues because sterilisation policies are being 
pursued, this puts pressure on international reserves. Because the monetary authorities 
cannot continually supply international reserves (since their stock: is limited), the excess 
of outflow of international reserves over inflows could eventually lead to balance of 
payments difficulties. If the monetary aulhorities do not sterilise, lhen the domestic 
money supply would fall, eliminating lhe excess demand for international reserves. To 
avert such outcomes, the monetary authorities may have to revert to active exchange 
rate policies such as exchange rate devaluation or the imposition of ellchange and trade 
restrictions. Alternatively, the authorities may decide to abandon pegging the exchange 
rate and allow it to float. 
In a monetary union, exchange rate policy decisions which may be appropriate 
for some member governments, may be inappropriate for others. This could create 
tension among member countries and lhus lead to serious pm~lems for the ECCB 
authorities if guidelines for changes in the exchange rate regime were not explicitly 
defined and followed. 
The guidelines for the mechanism by which the East Caribbean monelliry 
authority may change the external value of the East Caribbean dollar are set out in 
Article 17 of the 1983 ECCB Agreement. A change in the eKtemal value of the East 
Caribbean dollar can only be made if there is unanimous agreement to .do so by ECMU 
countries, the governor and deputy governor of the Bank. Once a unanimous agreemenl 
has been reached, each member country government must state in writing that it ha.~ 
accepted the change, and that all the necessary steps to make the change effective in its 
territory will be undenaken. 
The need for unanimous agreement by all ECMU member countries before any 
change can be made in the exchange rate regime can be restrictive to member countries. 
It forces them to pursue domestic policies other than exchange rate adjustments in 
response to short-tenn economic shocks. According to Devarajan and DeMelo (1987), 
such a restriction could be beneficial for small developing economies by preventing 
them from inappropriately using the exchange Tate in response to temporary economic 
shocks . . Because of the difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreemenl, the only major 
eKchange rate policy change was the move already discussed (the change of the peg 
from the pound sterling to the US dollar in July 1976). 
Discussions with the monetary authorities suggest that during the 19805, 
institutions such as the IMF advised that Ihe Easl Caribbean dollar be devalued. 
However, unanimous agreement could not be obtained. The ECCB authorities, and the 
member. governments were nOI convinced. Their reluctance to devalue was due to 
pessimism regarding the potential contribution of devaluation to an improvement in the 
trade balance. It was argued that the price elasticity of demand for imports is likely 10 
be low because raw materials, other intenncdlale goods and capital goods were all 
imported and there was no potenliai for domestic supply. lbeir volumes were nOllikely 
to be responsive 10 relative price changes. In addition, because there was little scope for 
switching from imports of consumer goods to domestically produced substitutes. 
demand for imponoo consumer goods was also thought to be unresponsive to relative 
price changes. Thirdly, even though incomes of exporters may have increased, their 
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consumption of imports would have also increased, thus reducing the beneficial effects 
on the trade balance. 
The potential response of the expon sector to a devaluation was also thought to 
be small. Because the tourism sub-sector, for e:umple, uses a high proportion of 
imponed inputs, including food, increased prices are likely to be passed on to the prices 
of tourism services. There was also pessimism about the response of merchandise 
exports to a devaluation because agricultural output cannot respond immediately to a 
devaluation, and production requires imponed inputs such as fertilizers, herbicides and 
pesticides. The price increase of those inputs and labour costs would have offset 
increased profitability resulting from increased domestic prices of exports. 
5.4 An appropriate exchange rate regime for the East Caribbean 
The debates on the appropriateness of alternative exchange rate regimes for developing 
countries have led to the development of criteria for the adoption of exchange rate 
regimes (soe for example lshiyama 1975, Heiler 1977, Bird 1979, Bautista 1981. Yenko 
1982, Guide and Siehr 1985). 
To floal the exchange rate, domestic fmancial markets muSt be relatively 
developed and integrated with financial markets in me rest of the world. If this 
condition is satisfied, other criteria which should be considered are: the values of 
export and import demand elasticities; the extent of commodity diversification; the 
extent of geographical trade diversification; the degree of openness of the economy; the 
sources of economic disturbances 10 the domestic economy; and~ the relative rates of 
inflation of a country and its trading panners. 
Wim a well developed and integrated capital market, mobility of capital can 
substitute for exchange rate fluctuations, and as a consequence, a floating exchange rate 
can be expected 10 be relatively stable. For example, if a counny experiences balance 
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of trade deficits it can finance such deficits by shoo-run capital movements. However. 
if the domestic capitaJ market is nOI developed nor fully integrated with international 
markets. a floating exchange nte would be volatile because random shocks in the 
external sector would be borne by the exchange Illte. 
Volatility of the exchange Illte creates exchange risks in international 
transactions and increases uncertainty regarding impon and export prices. The cost of 
forward cover (if it is available) is high. impacting negatively on international trade. In 
addition. for tiny. very open economics. large and frequent fluctuations in the price of 
foreign exchange would be speedily and directly converted into large and frequent 
movements in domestic prices and costs. thereby reducing the liquidity value and hence 
the use of the local currency (see Hellciner 1982. Drake 1983. and Treadgold 1988). A 
floating exchange rate is thus not an option for economies such as the ECMU because 
the financial system is too rudimentary (Robert R. Nathan Associates and Price 
Waterhouse 1989). The necessary conditions do not exist. Those countries do nOt have 
developed financial markets. A pegged exchange rate is a bener option. The relevant 
issue therefore. is to determine the most appropriate benchmark to which the exchange 
rale should be pegged. 
Clearly. if a country's lrade is principally with a particular country, the 
exchange rate should be pegged to that particular country's currency. A number of 
advantages could result (Lipschitz 1979. Connolly 1982, Dreyer 1978). One advanrage 
is that a single currency peg eliminates fluctuations of a country's exchange nlte relative 
10 the currency of its main trading partner. This reduces fluctuations in the domestic 
price level through reduced variability in local-currency import and export prices, which 
may be caused by exchange rate fluctuations. Another advantage of a single currency 
peg in such a situation is the likelihood thai it may even reduce fluctuations in the 
country's income through reduced variability of export earnings. This is because 
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expons would be priced at a stable rate of exchange. Trade between countries pegging 
to the same benchmark could be facilitated. 
But, if a country's foreign transactions are diversified. a single currency peg will 
have costs. One undesirable effect could be larger balance of payments imbalances as 
export and import prices fluctuate due to exchange rate changes of its trading panners, 
thus creating a need for larger amounts of international reserves. In addition, if expons 
constitute a signiHcam portion of GDP, a single currency peg can lead to instability of 
income through variability of expon earnings as export prices fluctuale (Dreyer 1978). 
The debates suggest that if a country's international O1Ulsactions are sufficiently 
diversified, a currency basket peg will be more appropriate than a single currency peg. 
A basket reduces some of the undesirable effects of a single currency peg, while at the 
same time maintaining the benefits of pegging. This is because in contrast to a single 
currency peg which in effect means noating jointly with the benchmark against all other 
currencies, floating is reduced. 
Although many developing countries have switched from single currency pegs 
to basket pegs (Lipschitz and Sundararajan 1980, Takagi 1986), there seems to be no 
consensus in the literature as to the major objective of pegging the exchange rate to a 
basket of currencies. Neither is there consensus on how the currencies should be 
selected for inclusion in the basket. Objectives of pegging 10 a basket of currencies, and 
the methods for selecting the weights for a basket. are summarised in Table 5.1. 
While the objectives for exchange rate pegging differ, there is a consensus that 
the selection of the basket should be detennined by trade. Differences of view, 
however, emerge regarding whether the weights for the basket should be based on 
imports, exports, total bilateral trade, or trade elasticities. Crocketl and Nsouli (1977) 
argued that for developing countries. weights based on elasticities of trade may nOI be 
feasible because the data required to compute elasticity indices may not be available. 
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Import, export, or total trade shares based on the direction of trade are therefore widely 
u<cd. 
Table S.1 Suggested objectives for adopting II a/rTffil:Y basket pq: lind the selection of the weights 
rortbebaset 
,,,"'" 
Bla,;;:lr.(I976a) 
Suggested$ptt'ificobjective Critetia for determining Ihe weights 
for abasket peg forlhebasket 
To minimiselhe variance of TocaItr.ldeshart:sin goodsandsetVioes 
rnukdlOnon-tradedgoods based 011 lhecurreocics in which uade 
isconducledforshort-runstability, 
or,lhe diroctlOll oftntdeforlong·run 
stability 
Cmckeuand Nsouli Stabilisinglheeffective Import sharesbasedondiroctionoftnldc 
(1911) exchangcrnte 
Randen and Hc\pman Minimise the varianc;e of the An elasticity trade weighted basket based 
(1979) balance of trade on IhedU?ctioo of trade 
Minimisethcvarianceofrea1 TocaItr.Klesharesbascdonthediroction 
income ofrrade 
Upschitz(l979) Tostabilisctherealeffectivc Elasticity wcights based on Ihet1ircction 
exchangernle oftOtaltnde 
Branson and Katscli- Toredocevariationsinthc Jmport,. exponorlOlalrradeshares based 
Papaefstnlliou(1980) relativepricesofexJlCl"U on direction oftra<le 
andlorimpons 
UpschilZand Tostabilisetherealeffectivc Elasticity of tJade shares basedontbe 
Sundararajan(1980) exchange rate directionofu-ade 
F\aJl<\enand Tominimisebalanceofu-ade Elasticity ofuade wcightsbascdon the 
Tishler(1981) variation<; directionofuade 
ConnoUyandYoosef To minimise Iht level and Trade shares basedon the direction of 
(\982) variability of inOation rrade 
Connolly(1983) To stabilise moncwygrow\h Trade shares based on the direction of 
andinOation trade 
If the East Caribbean dollar were 10 be pegged to a basket of currencies 
weighted by expon shares, impon shares or total trnde shares, the problem of Ihe 
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selection of weights suitable for all the member counuies would arise. For example, if 
an expon· weighted index is to be selected, there would be difficulty in the selection a 
consistent set of weights. Antigua's merchandise exports to the United Kingdom are 
only 8 per cent of its total exports, while Dominica and St. Lucia sell over 60 per cent of 
their merchandise expons to the United Kingdom. The share of expons of services with 
various trading pannen: varied among the ECMU member counuies (see Table 3.9). 
There are also differences in the shares of impons from various countries (Table 3.10). 
Similarly, there would be difficulties if a trade weighted index were to be selected (see 
Table 5.3). 
The amount of trade conducted with the United States and other Caribbean 
counuies which have pegged their exchange rate 10 the US dollar provide a more 
consistent trade pattern. The shares of tourism from the United States and other 
Caribbean counuies to the ECMU member countries are also relatively high. They 
ranged between 45 per cent in St. Lucia,. to 68 per cent in Antigua The average share 
for the union is 62 per cent (Table 3.8). 
Were factors such as the currency in which foreign borrowing and foreign grant 
aid are denominated to be considered in computing the weights, there is no doubt that 
the weight of US dollar transactions would be higher because all the ECMU member 
countries are heavily dependent on foreign grant aid and private remittances from the 
United States. 
Another option is for countries to peg to the SDR whose value is determined by 
a representative trade-weighted basket of the major currencies. Pegging to the SDR 
may be attractive because the IMF provides daily quoles of its ~alue in terms of the 
major currencies. Thus, by pegging to the SDR a country would be able to readily 
detennine the rate of its currency against the major currencies. Also, because a 
substantial amount of data are I"ttluired to compute a basket. it may be advantageous for 
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a small developing country to use the readily available SDR basket rather than to create 
its own basket. 
A major disadvantage of pegging 10 the SDR is the loss of precision if the 
currencies and weights used in the computation of the SDR are different from those 
which would be chosen on the basis of a trade-weighted basket. The greater the 
difference between the SDR basket and a trade-weighted basket, the less appropriate 
wouJd be the SDR. The weights of currencies used for the computation of the SDR for 
various periods can be observed below. 
Table 5.2 Weights of currencies of industrial countries in the SDR (per cent) 
US dollar 
Deutschemark 
French franc 
Japanese yen 
Pound sterling 
Prior to 1986 
42 
19 
13 
13 
13 
Percentage weights 
Sourt'e: IMF, f"tuflDtioft(Jl Finoncia/ Statistics, various issues. 
After 1986 
42 
19 
12 
15 
12 
Because the weights of currencies assigned 10 the SDR are much lower than the 
share of transactions of the ECMU member countries with those currencies (the US 
dollar and pound sterling), and omits countries with which the ECMU conducts 
transactions (Canada for example), considerable distortions would be created by 
pegging the ECMU dollar to the SDR. 
Given the impossibility of obtaining a single set of suitable weights for all the 
member countries, the relatively high ratio of transactions in US dollars, the potential 
difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreement among ECMU members on any major 
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policy change. the present pegging of the ECMU dollar 10 the US dollar seems 
appropriate. 
s.s The real exchange rate 
A country's real exchange rate can be defined in teems of the relative 'internal price' 
form. or in tenns of purchasing power parity (PPP). See for example Koneweg (1980), 
Lothian (1986), Hsieh (1982), Dornbusch (1980), Stockman (1983). With respect to the 
relative internal price form. the real exchange rate is defined as the price of traded 
goods relative 10 the price of non-traded goods. This representation can be traced 10 the 
work of Swan (1960) and Salter (1959). and is commonly used in relation to small open 
economies for which the terms of trade are assumed to be exogenously determined. 
The 'internal price' fonn of the real exchange rate can be represented algebraically as 
follows: 
RE~ = Pn / P", (5.1) 
where: RER is the real exchange rate; 
PT is an index of traded goods prices measuttd in domestic currency; 
PN is an index of non·trnded goods prices measured in domestic 
currency. 
The rea] exchange rate so defined may be interpreted as a ~asure of the relative 
profitability of traded goods vis-d-vis non-traded goods. It can give a measure of the 
'competitiveness' of traded goods in the domestic economy, and an indication of 
possible resource movements between the traded and non-traded goods sector. An 
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increase in the competitiveness of traded goods could lead to the increased production 
and expoI1 of those goods. 
An appreciation of the rea] exchange nlte (decrease in RER) would occur if the 
prices of non-traded goods increased relative to the prices of traded goods. Conversely, 
a depreciation of the real exchange rate would occur if the prices of non-traded goods 
decreased relative to the prices of traded goods. 
The PPP real exchange rate is defined as me ratio of foreign prices in domestic 
currency to domestic prices. Constructing PPP of real exchange rates is easy in lhat 
unlike the "internal priceR fonn, traded and non-traded goods prices (which are not 
easily obtainable. especially in developing countries) are not required.. However, these 
rates have been criticised in the literature. A limitation commonly cited is that by their 
failure to capture changes in the relative incentives guiding resource allocation between 
tradables and non-tradables. they do not provide precise inIonnation on how relative 
prices impinge on the external sector and the balance of pay men IS (Edwards 1989 : 6). 
Real effective exchange rates CREER) based on the PPP definition can be used 
as a measure of the degree of competitiveness of a country relative to a group of its 
trading panners. An appreciation of the REER (decrease in REER) would occur if lhe 
prices of foreign goods fell relative to the prices of domestic goods. both expressed in 
the" same currency. An index of the REER can be expressed as follows: 
REER,. = c,.pr, I P, 
where: REER is an index of real effective exchange rate; 
e is an indcK of the domestic currency price of foreign currency; 
pr is an indCK of foreign prices; 
P is an index of domestic prices. 
9 3 
(5.2) 
I 
The foreign price index can be defined as follows: 
(5.3) 
where; P,; is the price index of trading parmer i in year r; 
O'j is the share of trade with panncr i (ex pons, impons or toW trade); 
r,i is the number of US dollars per unit of currency of trading partner i 
in year t; 
f(ji is the number of US dollars per unit of currency of trading panner i 
in a selected base year, 
w ; =l (i= 1-13). 
Indices of rea1 effective exchange rates may be based on a set of weights 
reflecting bilateral trade flows between the home country and its trading panners. 
Alternatively, real exchange rate indices which take into account any competitive 
relations between two countries in third markets may be constructed. These include an 
index which considers the structure of trade of two countries with all other countries 
with which they are trading, lhe price elasticities which determine the response of their 
trade flows 10 exchange rate changes, and traded goods price changes which are induced 
by exchange rate changes. 
Although bilateral indices of real effective exchange rates ignore competition in 
third markets, it has been argued (Black 1976a), that if a country. is a price-taker with 
respect to its impons and expons, real effective exchange rates based on bilateral rrade 
weights are consistent with muhilaterally based indices. Under such circumstances, 
using bilateral real effective exchange rates does not present serious limitations. 
According to Rhomberg (1916) and Black (1976b), the weighting scheme moSt 
appropriate for computing effective exchange rates should be influenCoCd by the specific 
questions being asked in policy analysis. For example, if the question of interest is the 
effect of exchange rate changes on the costs of exports to foreigners (the 
competitiveness of expons in world markets), an expon-weighted index should be used. 
Alternatively, if the question of interest is the effect of exchange rate changes on the 
cost of impons, then an imponed-weighted index is more appropriate. 
It has been recognised that REER indices computed by the above fonnulation 
are sensitive to the trading panners included (Rhomberg 1976). If for example a major 
trading partner is left out, this can markedly affect the value of the indices. In this study 
the major trading panners of the ECMU member coumries are used. These are the 
United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago, France, the Federal Republic of Gennany, Denmark, Holland, and Italy. 
The shares of each of the ECMU countries trade with each of those countries are shown 
in Table 5.3. 
The most appropriate price series to be used in computing REER indices is 
controversial. With respect to the internal price form, tradable and non-tradable goods 
prices are required. In developing countries in panicular, traded and non-traded goods 
prices are not usually available. This raises the issue of obtaining appropriate indices 
(or proxies) of traded and non-traded goods prices (see for example Officer 1976; 
Goldstein and Officer 1979; Kravis and Lipsey 1978; Edwards 1989, Manin and 
Nguyen 1989). 
According to Goldstein and Officer (1979), wholesale p.rice indices (WPi) and 
the implicit GOP deflator (PGOP) can be used as proxies for traded goods prices and 
non-traded goods prices respectively. Kravis and Lipsey (1978) have suggested the use 
of the GOP deflator for setvices and government expenditure as a proxy for the price of 
non-tradable goods, and the deflator of the other sectors of the economy (agriculture, 
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industry) as a proxy foc tradable goods price. Alternatively, Edwards (1989) suggested 
that the CPI be used as a measure of the price of non-tradable goods .while the WPI be 
used as a measure of tradable goods prices. 
Table 5.3 Total trad~ shares by major trading parlMfS: ECMU countries and the Union, 1977 _ 
1987 (pcr cent) 
AntigILI Dcminie. Or ..... Montserro, SL Kit" SL Lucia SL Vincent 
19.7 ... 
C~ ... . , •.. ., .., '.9 
UnitodlGngdom '43 39.8 26.7 "-, 23.' 31.0 " .. 
!.,... .5 '.0 '.0 '.9 l.7 '.2 
s • .,..,. 2.' 3.9 3.' 
G",~ 0.' I.. 1.0 1.0 
lamaica ... .. 3.2 'A 30 
Trinidadand Tobago 20.2 22> 14.9 
,,~ 15 20 
Fo:lcfllRepublic 
olGennany 
" 
1.0 ,., 
13"",,.,,, 
" 
0.' 1.1 0.' 1.0 0.' 0.' 
'A 20 21 2.2 
!oJ, 
Sourcts: ECMU countries. Minish)' of Finance (Statistical DepartmCOt). AMUaI AbJ/f(Jcl of SliJlurics. 
VariOUSisSllCS. 
With respect to the PPP fonn of the real exchange rate, possible candidates are 
implicit GOP price deflators, wholesale price indices, and consumer price indices. 
According to Kravis and Lipsey (1978), whichever measure is used for pUipOses of 
international comparisons, suffers from a weakness because the methods used for 
computing the series may differ from country 10 country. They argue, however, that of 
the three types of price measures, the GOP implicit deflator seems to give the best 
measure of a country's price level. This argument is based on the premise that implicit 
GOP defl ators are constructed using a methodology which assigns an appropriate 
weight to each good irrespective of its classification as traded or non-traded gO<Xl. 
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Funhermore, they argue that the scope of GOP deflators is more likely to be similar to 
I the UN System of National ACCQunts. 
Support for the use of the GOP deflators has also been provided by Officer 
(1976, 1983), and Barra ( 1983). They believe that the GOP deflator is a genuine price 
measure of aggregate production, and is not subject to distortions arising from price 
controls. Therefore, it is felt that real exchange rate indices computed using implicit 
GOP deflators give a reasonable measure of changes in competitiveness of production. 
Wholesale price indices have also been widely used as price indices for 
computing real exchange rate indices. However, it has been argued (Kravis and Lipsey 
1978) that wholesale price indices have no clear conceptual framework. They are more 
likely to be subject to international differences than GDP deflators or CQnsumer price 
indices. They funher argue that wholesale price indices of different countries are likely 
to be more similar than consumer price indices or impliCit GOP deflators because they 
contain higher proponions of uadables. Also wholesale price indices ignore services. 
Thus, wholesale price indices are likely 10 introduce bias in the direction of unifonn 
price movements because tradable goods price movements are usually more similar in 
different countries than are those of non-tradables. 
Consumer prices only provide partial coverage of price changes (Kravis and 
Upsey 1978). 
In this slIJdy, uade-wcighted indices of PPP real effective exchange rates using 
implicit GOP deflators and consumer price indices are constructed for the ECMU 
countries. The selection of the price variables was largely influenced by data 
availability. 
Figures 5. 1 and 5.2 show the behaviour of the real exchange rate indices 
between 1973 and 1988.In most of the countries, the indices based on CPI and GOP 
deflators tended to follow similar paths, although the indices based on the implicit GDP 
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deflators showed less appreciation (decrease). Real exchange roues have been quite 
variable during the period. The behaviour was also different among the countries. 
Trend coefficients of real exchange rates of the ECMU countries estimated by 
linear trend regressions for three periods, 1973 to 1988; 1973 to 1980; and 1981 to 1988 
are presented in Table 5.4. These coefficients also show that the behaviour of the real 
exchange rate indices differed among the counmes. 
Table 5.4 Estimated trend coefficients of real effective exchange rates: EeMU 
countries, 1973 - 1988 
1973-88 1973-80 1981·88 
A~~ 0.001 0.030 0.006 
REERpcDP 0.005 0.056 -0.037 
Dominica 
REERc" -0.016 0.013 0.002 
REERPGOI' -0.024 -0.016 -0.033 
Grenada 
REERc" -0.024 0.002 0.002 
REERpcDP -0.008 0.027 -0.030 
Montserrat 
REERc" -0.016 -0.016 -0.002 
REERPGDP --0.022 -0.014 ·0.026 
St. Kitts 
REERc" 0.008 0.037 0.009 
REERpcDP 0.007 0.056 -0.033 
St. Lucia 
REERc" 0.004 0.030 0.027 
REERpcDP 0.001 0.031 -0.005 
St. Vincent 
REE"", 0.004 0.031 0.005 
REERPGOI' 0.004 0.043 ·0.016 
Sources: ECMU countries, Ministry of Finance (Statistical DepartlllCIl(), Annual Absefact of Seatutics, 
various issues; Organisation of East Caribbean StaleS (OECS). Economic Secretarial. 
unpublished statistics; and IMF intcrnatiotIQ/ FiMllcial SUllut;CS. 
For the ent ire period, both indices of real exchange rates showed an overall 
appreciat ing trend in Dominica, Grenada and Montserrat , indicating a loss of 
competitiveness relative to trading panners. In Antigua. SI. Kitts. St. Lucia and St. 
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Vincent, thc rea] exchange rate indices showed an overall depreciating trend. During 
the sub-period 1973 to 1980, both indices of the re,al exchange rate in Montserrat 
showed an appreciating trend, while in Dominica only the index based on the implicit 
GOP deflator showed an appreciating trend. In the other countries, the real exchange 
rate depreciated. During 1981 to 1988, all countries showed an appreciation of their 
real exchange rate based on the implicit GOP deflator. The index based on consumer 
prices showed a deprttiating trend except in Montserrat. The underlying rrends in the 
relative price behaviour would have created problems for the centraJ bank if the 
exchange rate had been used as a macroeconomic policy instrument. It would have 
been difficult to choose exchange rate policies which would have been appropriate for 
all ECMU members. 
The different behaviour of the real exchange nue indices in the member countries 
is hardly surprising. EmpiricaJ studies have identified variables such as net capital 
flows. the leons of trade, fiscal policy attitudes of the governments, and the rate of 
growth of the money supply relative to the rate of growth of GOP as some of the 
detenninants of the behaviour of a country's real exchange rate (Edwards 1989: 136 -
142). As discussed in Chapter 2, the fiscal policy attitudes of the governments of the 
ECMU countries differed. Also, there were some differences in the exports of those 
oountties, suggesting that their terms of trade were differenl. It is therefore not difficult 
to see why the real exchange rate indices followed differenl time paths. 
5.6 Exchange and trade restrictions in the East Caribbean 
Exchange and trade restrictions are commonly used to avoid balance of payments 
problems. They were panicularly imponant under a fixed exchange rate regime (Bird 
1984. Phylaktis and Wood 1984). Exchange and trade restrictions are said to occur in 
an economy when the monetary authorities regulate the flow of foreign currencies and 
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goods into and out of the country by prohibiting the non-bank public (private 
individuals, traders, companies etc.) from freely buying, selling, or. holding foreign 
currencies, or exporting and importing goods. 
The maln objective of exchange and trade restrictions is to make up for distorted 
macroeconomic policies and thus rescue the balance of payments from difficulties and 
protect international reserves. As with other resaictive measures, exchange and trade 
restrictions are instilUted to affect the symptoms rather than the causes of paymentS 
disequilibrium. In this respect, they suppress rather than cure baJance of payments 
problems. When institUled, they may involve certain costs caused by evasive 
mechanisms used by residents such as the development of a 'black market' for foreign 
currencies, under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports (World Bank 
1985), and 'transfer pricing' at other than arms length within multinational companies 
(Vernon 1977). Exchange and trade restrictions involve additioinal costs in tenns of 
competitive rent seeking (Krueger 1974), employees' time for processing applications 
(LittJe, Scitovsky and Scon 1970), delays and disruption of trade (Marshall 1963), 
cheapening of impons of capital goods and raw materials leading to over capitalisation 
and inappropriate choices of techniques by substituting capital for labour, the 
production of outputs for which there is no comparative advantage, low levels of output, 
and excess holding of inveR!ories (Bhagwati 1978). 
Some of the more CORUnon restrictive instruments are import control (including 
import quotas, rationing of the supply of foreign exchange to potential importers, or 
outright prohibition of the imponation of certain commodities); resmctions on the 
amoUR! of foreign exchange for travel purposes; reslrictions on remittances of dividends 
andlor capital transfers, prohibition of domestic residents from holding foreign currency 
accounts; prohibition of foreign residents from holding domestic accounts; the 
compulsory sale of foreign currency receipts to authorised banks within a certain time; 
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regulations in the In\ding of gold; and compulsory repatriation of dividends from 
overseas investments. 
Once a country has imposed a restrictive measure, a network: of control 
measures is required. This is because when one avenue for obtaining foreign exchange 
is restricted, allernative avenues emerge. For example, if the amount of foreign 
exchange made available 10 imponers is rationed, they would be inclined to retain 
foreign currency receipts from exports, overseas dividends and investments. Thus, il 
may necessary to enforce regulations requiring the swrender of such receipts. There 
would also be a need to enforce regulations with respect to the amount of foreign 
exchange allowed for travel purposes, remittances and capital rransfers to prevent 
residentS fonn obtaining funds for impons through those avenues. 
Effective exchange restrictions are even more difficult to achieve where a 
number of countries use a common currency. as in the case of the East Caribbean. To 
be effective in a monetary union, the exchange restrictions in each country with respect 
to the rest of the world must be unifonn. If for example one member decides not to 
impose restrictions while the others do, this would seriously undennine the 
effectiveness of the control measures in the other territories. 
Although attempts have been made to institute various forms of exchange control 
measures in the East Caribbean, the restrictions cannot be considCTCd binding. A black 
market for fore ign currencies has not emerged. If items are purchased locally using US 
dollars, the buyer is often likely to rtteive a rate of exchange of a few cenls less than 
the rate offered by commercial banks. The lower rate is considered to have deducted an 
amount equal to the 'convenience' of not having to first conven the US dollars inlo East 
Caribbean dollars before conducting the transaction. Discussions with authorities of the 
Ministry of Finance in the member countries confmn that the exchange and trade 
restrictions are not binding. All requests are nonnally granted except in cases where 
there is doubt aboUi the legality of the request. 
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The administration of exchange and trade restrictions in t he East Caribbean 
The administration of exchange and trade restrictions are the responsibility of the 
Ministries of Finance of the ECMU member countries. However, depeoding on the 
type of restriction, they may be jointly administered by more than one ministry. In 
Antigua for example, depending on the type of commodity to be imported. licences are 
issued by the Collector of Customs in the Ministry of Finance, and by the Ministry of 
Economic Development. In Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, the 
Ministry of Trade handles import and export arrangements and controls. 
Controls on capital transfers in the EeMU countries 
As shown in Table 5.5, all ECMU countries except Antigua restrict capital flows to 
some degree. In the countries which apply restrictions, approval is required for all 
outward transfers of capital, and in some cases inward transfer.; as well. In Dominica, 
for example, the purchase of foreign currency securities and real estate abroad is not 
normally penniued. 
Table 5.5 Exchange controls on capiul f\ow5: ECMU countries, 19711 • 1988 
Capitalinnows 
Capital outflows Borrowing abroad Fordgn investments 
Antigua Nonelegislau:d Nooe legislated Nonelegislatcd 
Dominica Approvalrcquired Approvalrcquired Approval required 
Gn::nada Approval required Approvalrcq~ Approval required 
Montserrat Approval rcquircd Approvalrcquired Approvalrcquired 
SL KillS Approvalrcquired Approvalrcquired ApprovalnmTCquired 
SL Lucia ApprovaJrcquired Approval required Approvalrcquired 
SL Vincent Approvalrequirod Approvalrcquired Approvalnmrcquired 
Sources; IMF. ItflflU(J/ RepoN 011 Exd'illlge Itrrallgemellu a/ld Exchallge ReslficlwlIJ. Washington. 
various issues. and discltlisions with 3ulhori.ties or !he Ministries or Finance orlhe ECMU countries. 
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In the other countries. residents are only pennitted to purchase securities and 
real estate abroad for business purposes. In Dominica. Grenada, and SI. Lucia. approval 
is required before direct investments by non-residents may be undenaken. In Antigua. 
Sr. Kitts and St. Vincent. no prior approval is required. If authorised foreign exchange 
dealers wish to borrow abroad to finance their operations, they require prior approval in 
all the ECMU member countries except Antigua. 
Controls on current account invisibles in the EeMU countries 
The principal regulations relating to the payments for. and the proceeds from, current 
invisible transactions are summarised in Table 5.6. All the ECMU member countries 
have imposed restrictions on the payments for invisibles; authorisation is required 
before payments can be made. Limitations on the amounts of foreign exchange allowed 
for travel abroad exists in all the member countries. but the amounts differ widely from 
country 10 country, and by the purpose of travel. Smaller amountS are allowed for 
tourist travel than for business travel. 
Table 5.6 Exchange C'1)ntrol mell$urrll oa invisib5es: ECMU cO\Illtries.1978 1988 
PaymentsiorlllvlSl!iles Procoedsrromlllvlslbles 
Appro"" LimitsrO£ Limitsonrrofit Surrenderor 
required travel repatriatioo proo::edsrcquircd 
Antigua y~ y~ No No 
Dominica y" y" No y" 
Gre""" y" y" No y" 
Montserrat y" Yo. No y" 
SLKitlS y" No y" 
SLLucia y" y" No y" 
SL Vincent y" y" y" 
Sourees: iMF, IUI/IUlJ{ R~pon 011 Exchallg~ 1o"Q/lgem~l\Js (lII(/ E.x:clrilng~ R~SlriCliollJ. Washington. 
various issues. and discussions with authorities of the Ministries of Fin3Ilce of the ECMU 
countries. 
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Foreign exchange up to the limits imposed can be pwt:hased from commercial 
banks upon presentation of evidence of intention to travel. Any amounts required above 
the limits need approval from the Minisay of Finance. 
The government authorities have set no limits on the amounts of profits which 
may be remitted, provided that the Comptroller of Inland Revenue has prior knowledge 
of the U'ansfer, for corporate income-tax purposes. 
Controls on merchandise lrade 
All ECMU countries impose control measures on impons and ex:pons (Table 5.7). 
Although goods may be free ly imponed under open general licences granted by the 
Minisrry of Finance and/or Ministry of Trade. certain commodities require individual 
licences unless imponed from CARICOM countries. 
Table 5.7 Import and uport rontrol regime: I':CMU countries, 1978· 1988 
Irnportcontrolsystem Export contrOl system 
Foreign 
Licensing Qcllange 
sysu:mfor f=ly Type of Sum:ndcr 
m05tgoods availabk 
''''''''' 
of,...... 
Antigua Opm",- y~ SpecifLCforsomegoods No 
Dominica Opm.""", y~ SpecifIC for some goods y", G."'" Opcngcnaal y~ Specific for somc goods y", 
Montserrat Opengenernl y", SpecifIC for some goods y", 
SLKitts Opcngenet'3l y", SpecifIC for some goods y", 
SLLucia N"", y", SpocifLC for some goods y", 
SL VirlCtnl N"", y", Spocific for some gOOds y", 
Sources: IMF, A.II/IUQ/ Rtpor/ 011 uchallgt A.mJIIgemtnlI /JIId Uchallgt Res/ric/wItS, Washington, 
various issues, and discussions with authorities of the Ministries of Finance of the ECMU 
countries. 
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Generally, goods competiting with locally produced goods, and/or goods from 
other CARICOM countries, may require a licence before they can be imponed. Foreign 
exchange is normally freely available for imports, and can be obtained upon 
presentation of documentary evidence of purchase of goods. 
Certain commodities require licences before they can be exponed. In all the 
counaies except Antigua. regulations require that the proceeds from exports are 
surrendered. However, in SL Kitts, the proceeds may be deposited in a US dollar 
account. 
Cootrols on foreign currency accounts 
All the member countries have regulations requiring prior approval from the Ministry of 
Finance before foreign currency accounts can be opened for residents or non-residents. 
Foreign currency accounts are, however, usually allowed for resident individuals or 
firms in tourist-oriented industries and other expon trade, where most receipts are in 
foreign currencies, and a large portion of inputs are imported or financed in foreign 
currencies. When opened, these accounts can only be credited with foreign currencies 
earned from outside the ECMU. 
5.7 Conclusions 
The ECCB authorities have not actively pursued exchange rate policies. Since the EaSt 
Caribbean dollar was introduced in 1965, the only major exchange rate change occurred 
in 1976 when the peg was moved from the pound sterling to the US dollar and pegsed 
at the cross rate with the US dollar prevailing at the time. The exchange and trnde 
restrictions in member countries differ, but they cannot be considered either stringent or 
effective. This is indicated by the absence of a black: market for foreign currencies. 
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The lack of stringenl exchange and trade restrictions can partly be attributed to 
the monetary union and the restrictive policies which it entails. Thus, there was no need 
IQ make up for distoned monetary and trade policies by using exchange and trade 
restrictions. Given that restrictive measures are costly, this can be considered an 
additional benefit of the monetary union. 
Real exchange rate changes have been different in different member countries. 
There was appreciation in some but depreciation in others. This has created difficulties 
for the ECCB authorities. A common exchange rate policy would nOI be appropriate 
for all members.. 
Differences in the relative shares of the ECMU countries' trade with various 
panncrs makes it impossible 10 select weights for a cll1TCncy basket suitable for all 
members. Pegging to the SDR is a1so not a suitable option. The weights used for the 
currencies in the SDR basket are different from the share of the ECMU countries trade 
with those countries. The high percentages of ECMU trade with the United States and 
with other countries which have pegged their currencies 10 the US dollar, suggests that 
the decision to peg the Easl Caribbean dollar 10 the US dollar is a sensible one. 
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CHAYfER6 
MONEY AND MONETARY POLICY IN THE EAST CARlBBEAN 
6.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter I, joining a monetary union involves the surrender of the 
ability to conduct individual monelal')' policies. However, the fixed exchange rate and 
the absence of effective exchange restrictions means that the monetary base is 
endogenous. The objective of this chapter is to examine the degree to which the 
monetary base and the money multiplier contributed to monetary growth in Grenada 
and the ECMU, and to describe the monetary policies pursued by the ECCB. In section 
6.2 the money supply process is analysed. including the behaviour of the money 
multiplier. Changes in the money supply arising from changes in the monetary base 
and the money multiplier are analysed in section 6.3. The monetary policies of the 
ECCB are discussed in section 6.4. The main conclusions of the chapter are prc;sented 
in section 6.5. 
6.2 The money supply in (he East Caribbean 
The monetary base (MB) can be expressed in tenns of net foreign assets and net 
domestic assets of the central bank. Thus, the MB is increased when the central bank 
acquires assets in the form of international reserves and/or issues domestic credit. This 
definition of the MB can be expressed algebraically as follows' 
MB = CBC+NFA (6.1) 
where: CBC is net central bank credit; 
NFA is net foreign assets of the central bank. 
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Alcemarively, the MB can be defined in teons of the central bank's liabilities as 
follows: 
MB = O>+R (6.2) 
where: R is total commercial bank resclVes; 
0> is currency in the hands of the non·bank public. 
We can defme the ratio of bank re5elVes as follows: 
(6.3a) 
0<. 
where: 0 is total deposits with the commercial banks; 
cr.. is the ratio of reserves against deposits. 
Substituting equation (6.3a) into (6.2): 
MB=O+cr..D (6.4) 
The actual stock of money at any time can be defined as follows: 1 
M=(»+D (6.5) 
I Ii is recognised thaI this roprescm.:uion is somewhat of a simplifICation since D may have included 
government dcpos ics with commetCial banks. Government deposits are not normally consiocred part of 
thc moncy supply. 
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where: M is the nominal money supply. 
The proportion of me money supply which the non-bank public holds as 
currency is represented by the currency to money supply ratio. A high ratio of currency 
to tOtal money supply limits the capacity of the banking system to extend loans and 
undertake investments. In effect. it limits the ability of banks 10 increase the money 
supply much beyond i~ases in the monetary base. Indeed, if the currency to money 
ratio were one, no secondary expansion of the money supply could occur as a result of 
an increase of the monewy base because all money would be held as currency. The 
currency to money ratio can be expressed algebraically as follows: 
y = (»!M 
where: "( is the cUlTency to money supply ratio; 
o and M are as defined above. 
(6.6a) 
Rearranging (6.00). we obtain the following expression for currency in the hands 
of the non-bank public: 
O=y.M 
Substituting (6.3b) and (6.6b) into (6.5): 
M = y.M + RIOT 
From equation (6.2); 
R = MB -O 
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(6.6b) 
(6.7) 
(6.8) 
Thus, 
M='Y.M+(MB-O)/u-r 
Substituting defmition 0(0 from (6.6b) into (6.9): 
M = 1.M + (MB - 'Y.M)/Gr 
Solving (6.10) for M: 
M = MB/('Y+oy{l-'Y) 
Letting 
1 
----=" 
'Y+G.{l--y) 
we can write 
where: ~ is the money multiplier. 
The behaviour ofthe money multiplier 
(6.9) 
(6.101 
(6.11 ) 
· (6.121 
(6.131 
A critical assumption in monetary policy is the stability of the money multiplier. If it is 
stable and predictable, then by varying its monetary liabilities, a monetary authority 
can obtain predictable effects on the domestic money supply. 
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Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the actions of the non-bank public and 
commerdal banks affect the net foreign assets of the central bank, thus affecting the 
monetary base. Also, the actions of the non-bank public affect the currency to money 
ratio; and the commercial banks determine their reserve !O deposit ratios, subject to 
minimum ratios imposed by the central bank. Thus, monetary authorities may not be 
able to exen independent control of the money supply_ 
The instability of the money multiplier and its components, both for Grenada 
and me ECMU as a whole for 1973 10 1988, are shown in Figure 6. 1. The multiplier 
generally followed similar trends in Grenada and the ECMU. but there were periods 
when movements in opposite: directions occurred. Examples of such periods were 
between 1980 and 1981, when the multiplier for the ECMU increased, while the money 
multiplier in Grenada decreased. Another period of opposite: movements occurred 
between 1987 and 1988. 
FluclUations in the money multiplier have been due mainly to changes in the 
reserve to deposit ratio which are inversely related to the movementS of the multiplier. 
Periods of increases of the reserve to deposit ratio coincided with decreases of the 
money multiplier. 
The currency to money ratio has been relatively stable in the ECMU as a whole, 
but showed a small downward ucnd. The average, minimum and maximum values 
were 9 per cent, 8 per cent, and 12 per cent respectively. The coefficient of variation 
was only 14 per cent. In Grenada, the currency to money ratio increased from 0.14 in 
1973 to 0.22 in 1978. 
When the government of Grenada was ovenhrown in 1979 by a military coup. 
and the new government established close political and economic links with Cuba and 
countries of Eastern Europe iocluding the Soviet Union, it was widely fell that monetary 
assets in commercial banks were unsafe. People held more currency re lative to other 
monetary 
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assets. The currency to money ratio jumped from approximately 0.23 in 1979 to around 
0.27 in 1983. 
After the: US invasion towards the end of 1983 and the fonnation of a 
democratic govemmenl in 1984, confidence returned. In addition, the introduction in 
January 1985 of regulations prescribing a minimum deposit nne of interest of 4 per cent 
may have induced the non-bank. public 10 hold monetary assets rather than currency. 
The currency to money ratio fell to less than 0.15 in 1988. 
Average Minimum Maximum Coefficient 
value value value of variation 
(percent) 
Grenada 
a 0.14 0.05 0.34 64 
Y 0.19 0.12 0.28 28 
" 
3.40 2.32 5.47 25 
ECMU 
a 0.22 0.09 0.34 30 
Y 0.09 0.08 0.12 14 
" 
3.54 2.50 5.03 19 
Soun:es: East Caribbean Central Bank, Anllual Reporu and Slllle~"1 of ACCOIUllS. Sl Kitts, East 
Caribbean Central Bank. CommuciDl Banking Statistics: Grenada, Minisuy of Finance 
(Slalistical Depanmcnt) Annual A.bstract of SWlisricr, various issues, IMF,r"IU"Oliofl(ll 
FiNlllcilllSIilUslics, various issues. 
As indicated by the computed coefficients of variation, the money multiplier has 
been relatively more stable in the ECMU as a whole than in Grenada. This is hardly 
surprising because the ECMU effect represents the combined effects of the individual 
countries. which off·set each other to some extent. For the ECMU. the money 
multiplie r, the reserve to deposit ratio, and the currency 10 money ratio showed 
coeffi cients of variation of 19 per cent, 30 per cent, and 14 per cent respectively. For 
Grenada, about Iwice as much variability occurred in the reserve to deposit ratio, and 
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the currency to money ratio. The coefficient of variation of the money multiplier was 
around 25 per cent. 
6.3 Decomposing money supply changes into various components 
The change in the money supply can be expressed as follows: 
.6.M= M..-M...\ (6.14) 
The money multiplier in the previous period can be expressed as follows: 
(6.15) 
Rearranging (6.15) we can express the money supply changes in the previous period as 
follows: 
(6.16) 
SubstiMing (6.16) inlo (6.14): 
(6.17) 
But, 
M, '" (JJ,.] + .1J.l).(MB,.] + 6MB) (6.18) 
Expanding (6. 18): 
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(6.19) 
Substituting (6.19) imo (6.17): 
(6.20) 
As was demonstrated above, the money multiplier is determined by Ihe reserve to 
deposit ratio and the currency to money ratio. Thus, Ihe money multiplier can change if 
eilher or bolh of these components change. Finite changes in the money muliiplier is 
Ihe sum of partial derivitives with respect to (1 and Y evaluated at time 0, can be 
expresed as: 
(6.21) 
According to (6.21), Ihe change in the money multiplier can be decomposed into 
changes arising from Ihe reserve to deposit ratio, changes arising from the currency to 
money ratio and the interaction of changes arising from both the reserve to deposit ratio 
and the currency to money ratio. 
If an attempt is made to empirically decompose money supply changes into 
those arising from changes in the monetary base and those arising from changes in the 
money multiplier, the problem of allocating the changes due to the cross product 
between the monetary base and the money multiplier is encountered. In an attempt to 
decompose money supply changes into those arising from changes in the moneta!)' base 
and the money multiplier. Ahrensdorf and Kanesathasan (1960-61), arbitrarily allocated 
the cross products equally between the monetary base and the money multiplier. When 
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they attempted to disaggregate changes in the money supply arising from the money 
multiplier betwocn those due to the reserve to deposit ratio and the cl,lrrency to money 
ratio. mey again arbitnuily allocated the cross products. 
Bhatia (1971) investigated the changes in the money supply for countries in one 
of the African monetary unions. He allocated the cross product of changes in the 
monetary base and the money multiplier to the monetary base, and omitted the cross 
product effect of the reserve to deposit ratio and the currency to money ratio. He 
argued that because the cross products of the interaction of the reserve to deposit ratio 
and the currency to money ralio are likely to be small, they can be omitted. 
This approach does not seem satisfactory. Since a large change may be made up 
of a large number of small changes, each of which would be approximated to be zero by 
the above approach, the magnitude of errors introduced in the analysis could be large. 
One method of overcoming this problem is to represent finite changes by integruting 
along the growth paths. This overcomes the problem of the decomposition of the cross 
product effects on money supply changes between the monetary base and the money 
multiplier, and between the reserve to deposit ratio and the currency to money ratio. 
This approach is now implemented. 
Let t = 0 be a point in time at which data on all the relevant monetary stocks and 
ratios are available. Let t '" I be the next point in time at which such data are available. 
Funhennore, let 4x be the finite change in any variable x between t '" 0 and t = I. By 
differentiating (6.11), it is possible to decompose the changes in the money supply into 
the effects of small changes in the monetary base, changes in the currency to money 
ratio and and changes in the reserve to deposit ratio: 
dM '" ~.dMB - 1l2.MB.(I ·(J).dy- ~2.MB.(I -y) .d(J (6.28) 
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By integrating (6.28), it is possible to obtain a consistent decomposition of 
monetary growth even for finite changes: 
,1,M=M t = lY\.=.1.M ... + AM.., + 6.M,. (6.29) 
The finile contibutions of the monetary base, the currency to money rntio and 
lilt reserve to deposit ratio to money supply changes are given as follows: 
, , , f dM.dt = f J.1.dMB dt fMB .(1-a,.) dy dt dt -d-I . - [Y+cM1-y)]2 "-;- . -
" , , 
, fMB.(1- Y> dOT ---- - dt (6.30) 
011+0..<1 -y))2 . dt . 
The flnt term of the right hand side of (6.30) gives Ihe contribution of the 
monetary base to money supply changes, the second term gives the contribution of the 
currency to money ratio and the third term gives the contribution of the reserve to 
deposit ratio. Full derivation of the above formulae and Ihe data used to compute 
money supply changes are prescmed in Appendi:110 A. 
Empirical results of decomposing money supply changes 
Summary statistics for money supply changes due to changes in the monetary base, and 
those due to changes in the money multiplier for Grenada and the ECMU are presented 
in Table 6.2 for 1973 to 1988. In Grenada for example, changes in the monetary base 
caused an annual average rate of increase in the money supply of approximately 13 per 
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cent, while changes in the money multiplier caused an average annual percentage 
decrease of just over 2 per cent. The ~sult was a net increase in the. money supply of 
around II per cent. Although the average annual change of the money supply arising 
from changes in the monetary base was only 13 per cent, individual yearly changes 
varied quite substantially. During the period, the money multiplier contributed to larger 
reductions in the money supply than the monetary base. The largest decrease in the 
money supply by a change in the money multiplier was over 41 per cent, while in the 
case of the monetary base, the largest decrease was less than 17 per cent. Despite the 
large decreases in the money supply arising from the money multiplier and the 
monetary base, the minimum net change in the money supply was positive. 
Table 6.2: Annual percentage changes in the money supply (6.M) decomposed into 
changes due to variations in the monetary base (6.M .. > and variations in 
the money multiplier: Grenada and the ECMU, 1973 - 1988 (per cen!) 
Average Minimum Maximum Coefficient 
value value value of variat ion 
Grenada 
6.MIM,.t 11.3 0.3 28.1 72 
6.M,../M,,\ 13.3 ·16.5 60.1 133 
6.Mw'M1_1 ·2.1 -41.28 33.4 857 
ECMU 
6.M/M,.1 14.8 6.7 23.7 29 
6.M..JM"_1 17.3 -lO.7 52.1 110 
6.M~'_ 1 -2.5 -30.2 21.8 646 
Soun::es: Grenada, Ministry of Finance (Statistical Depanmenl), Annual Abstract of Statlltiel, variotJs 
issues; Easl Caribbean Central Bank, AIlllUDI Reports and Sicuemelli of A.ecoU/lrs. SL KillS. 
various iss\lCll; East Caribbean Central Bank.. CommercicJ l Banking Sla/islia. SL Kitts. various 
issues; and IMF,/IIIerllalioMI FiMllcial Sralisrics, various issucs. 
The monetary base and the money muhiplier have also caused large increases in 
the money supply over the period. However, larger increases were caused by Ihe 
monetary base. The maximum percentage increase in the money supply in anyone year 
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was approximately 28 per cent Maximum money supply increases caused by the 
monetary base and the money multiplier were 60 per cem and 33 per c~nt respectively. 
Changes in both the monetary base and the money multiplier in Grenada have 
contributed 10 significant variability in changes in the money supply. Coefficients of 
variation of the money supply caused by the monetary base and the money multiplier 
were 133 percent and 857 percent respectively. 
The contributions of changes in the monetary base and the money muhiplier to 
changes in the money supply for the ECMU as a whole were similar to those observed 
for Grenada, but the fluctuations were not as large. 
Figure 6.2 shows the paths followed in Grenada and the ECMU by the annual 
pert:entage change in the money supply, and the contributions to this change of 
variations in the monetary base and the money multiplier. An interesting feature of the 
results is that there is an inverse relationship between changes in the money supply 
caused by changes in the monetary base, and those caused by changes in the money 
multiplier, indicating that the multiplier effects tend to compensate for changes arising 
from the monetary base. 
Funher analysis is undenaken in Table 6.3, which decomposes the annual 
pert:entage changes in money supply attributable to variations in the monetary base into 
variations attributable to changes in central bank credit and variations attributable 10 
changes in net foreign assets. Being a member of the ECMU where foreign assets are 
pooled and held by the ECCB, net foreign assets for Grenada are appr01l:imated as the 
sum of the ECC8's liabilities to commercial banks in Grenada and the estimated 
currency in circulalion less the ECCB credit to the Grenadian Government (IMF 1989: 
272). 
In Grenada, of the approximate 13 per cent average annual increase in the 
money supply due to changes in the monetary base, 8 per cent was due to changes in 
central bank credit. 
121 
Gnnada 
ECMU 
\ ..- .-1. 
I 
I 
.. Total change 
r 
I 
, .. ,.' 
r 
\ I 
Ii 
- Change due to Mfi - Change due lu fJ. 
Sources: Grenada, Ministry of Finance (Statistical Department), Allium! AbslTlJC/ of Stalislin, 
various issues; East Caribbean Centra] Bank, AIlIWiII Rtports olld Sialemelli of 
AeeolUlu, SL KiU$, various issues: East Caribbean Celltn!l BanI:, Commereia/Ba,wllg 
Sialisliel, Sl KiWi, various issues; and IMF,lIllUfl(JlionaJ FifI(Jllf;ia/ Sta liSlies, various 
issues. 
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On me other hand, for the ECMU as a whole, the net foreign assets contributed 
more significantly to changes in the money supply caused by the monetary base. In 
both Grenada and the ECMU as a whole, the conoibution of net foreign assets to 
changes in the money supply due to the monetary base was more variable than the 
contribution of centra] bank credit. 
Table 6.3: Annual percentage changes in the money supply due to the monetary 
base (6.MM1), decomposed into changes due to variations 10 central bank 
credit (AMc.J, and net foreign assets (6.M,...J: Grenada and the ECMU. 
1973 • 1988 (per cem) 
Grenada 
AM..JM...! 
6M.:.JM..L 
6 M""jM"1 
ECMU 
.1M...tMc'1 
6MaJM.., 
6.M""jM,.] 
Average 
value 
13.3 
8.0 
5.3 
17.3 
3.5 
13.8 
Minimum 
value 
-16.5 
-8.2 
-15.6 
-to.7 
-1.7 
-14.2 
Maximum 
value 
60.1 
38.8 
45.0 
52.1 
11.9 
44.9 
Coeffi cient 
of variation 
133 
158 
278 
110 
93 
127 
Sour«S: Grenada, Ministry of Finance (Smtistical Depanment), MIliUl/ Abs/FUCI of S/(ui$lics, various 
issues: East Caribbean Central Banic, A._I RtporlS and Slaum~lI/ of AccoUlll.S. Sl Kitts, 
various issues; Easl Caribbean Callral. Bank, COll1JUuilJl BuMing Sla/istics. Sl KillS, various 
issues; and IMF, /lIltrllll/iQlIlJ1 Financial SIll/is/ies. various iSSl.leS. 
Figure 6.3, suggests that no consistent pattem occurred between the changes in 
the money supply due to changes in net foreign asscts and tho~e due to changes in 
central bank credit. For the ECMU as a whole, the data clearly show that changes in the 
money supply due to the monetary base have been due mainly to balance of payments 
changes (net foreign assets). 
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An auempt has a1so been made to quantify the changes in the money supply due 
to changes in the currency 10 money I1I.tio, and changes in the reseIVe to deposil ratio. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 6.4. 
In both Grenada and the ECMU as a whole, the reserve 10 deposit ralio 
contributed most of the changes in the money supply attributable to variations in the 
money multiplier (see Figure 6.4). In Grenada, decreases in the money supply of up to 
13 per cent and 59 per cent were caused by changes in the currency to money I1I.lio and 
changes in the reserve to deposit ratio respectively. The largest decrease in the money 
supply caused by changes in the currency to money ratio and changes in the reserve to 
deposit ratio in anyone year were smaller for the ECMU as a whole than for Grenada. 
Table 6.4 Annual percentage changes of money supply due 10 the money mulliplier 
(AM .. ), decomposed into changes due 10 the reserve 10 deposil ralio 
(AM...,), and the currency to money ratio (6MI'l'): Grenada and the 
ECMU,1973 - 1988 (per cent) 
Grenada 
AM.JM'_l 
6M..,iM,.1 
.6.~'.1 
ECMU 
.6.MWM'.1 
6M..-.{M..l 
6~'.1 
Average 
value 
-2.1 
-0.7 
- 1.4 
-2.5 
L1 
-3.7 
Minimum 
value 
-41.2 
-13.7 
-59.5 
-30.2 
-3.0 
-32.1 
Maximum 
value 
33.4 
30.7 
29.2 
21.8 
10.5 
24.3 
Coefficient 
of variation 
857 
1285 
1572 
646 
276 
485 
Sour(f/S; Grenada, Ministry of FillllflCe (Suuistical Department), AJtJlual A.bstract of StalisticJ, various 
issues: Easl Caribbean CXntrll.l BlInk, Annual Reports and S/(Jlemmt of AccOUll!s. SL Kius, 
various issues; East Caribbean Central Bank. Commucwl BanJ:ing Sw.tisticJ, St. KitlS, various 
issues; and IMF,lnll!TnoliolW/ FintJl1(;ia/ SIClIurics. various issuC$ 
The coerficieOls of variation indicate thaI the changes in the money supply 
caused by changes in the currency \0 money ratio and the moncy multiplier have been 
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SlIllisrics. Sl Kitts. various issues: and IMF,/nrunlltiQnaI Financial Statistia. variou,; 
issues. 
very variable. For changes in the currency to money ratio, and the reserve to deposit 
ratio, deviations around the mean were 1285 per cent, and 1572 per c;:ent respectively. 
These deviations were significantly higher than in the ECMU as a whole. 
From the discussions above, it is possible to differentiate between changes in the 
money supply which arose from variables which the monetary authorities may have 
controlled and those which were influenced by the non-bank public and commercial 
banks. In a small open economy maintaining a pegged exchange rate regime, the net 
foreign assets effect on the money supply can be considered beyond the control of the 
monetary authorities. If the aulhorities increase net domestic credit, there is likely to be 
a corresponding decrease of net foreign assets (Aghevli el al. 1979). This is because 
under a pegged exchange rate regime, lhe non-bank public can adjust the nominal 
money supply to what it demands by exporting or importing money through deficits or 
surpluses in lhe balance of payments (see also Treadgold 1990). 
Prior 10 1984, the monetary authorities did not impose legal reserves on 
commercial banks in the ECMU countries. Moreover, the 6 per cent legal reserve ratio 
imposed. in 1984 cannot be considered binding because commercial banks held high 
levels of excess reserves. Wilh a legal reserve ratio of 6 per cent, the average excess 
reserve ratio between 1973 and 1988 was 8 per cent in Grenada and 16 per cent for the 
ECMU as a whole (see Table 6.1). Therefore, the total reserve to deposit ratios are 
considered to have exerted uncontrolled effects on lhe money supply. Money supply 
changes arising from lhe non-bank public's holdings of currency relative to total money 
are also considered to have exerted uncontrollable effects on the money supply. Only 
money supply changes caused by central bank credit can to some exte", be considered 
to have been controllable by the monetary authorities. Because a money supply 
system such as the ECCB lacks mechanism for the discretionary creation of local 
money, it will have a potential deflationary bias. 
However, because the exchange rate is pegged and the economies are very open, 
it is doubtful whether the authorities could have exerted a considerable degree of 
control over the money supply using central bank credit. Increases in central bank 
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credit will manifest themselves in losses in net foreign assetS, thus reducing the 
monetary base and the degree of control which the monetary authorities have over the 
money supply (see for example Polak 1957 and Polak and Argy 1971). Thus, the 
available instruments of monetary policy could not have been used to control changes in 
the money supply in Grenada and the ECMU as a whole. This suggests that the loss of 
monetary autonomy as a result of membership of the ECMU cannot be considered 
costly to Grenada. It is doubtful whether authorities in Grenada could have used 
monetary policy to achieve desirable economic goals even if they had complete 
monetary autonomy. 
6.4 T he conduct of monetary policy in the East Caribbean 
The principal instruments of monetary policy available to central banking authorities 
are variations in central bank credit to commercial banks (rediscounting), open market 
operations. variable reserve requirements. quantitative credit controls, intereSt rate 
comrols and moral suasion. Because the money supply is the product of the money 
multiplier and the monetary base, those instruments can be classified according to 
whether they affect the monetary base or the money multiplier. Variations in the central 
bank credit to commercial banks and open market operations generally inOuence the 
monetary base. Variable reserve requirements, quantitarive credit controls, and imerest 
rate controls affect the money multiplier. Moral suasion can affect both the monetary 
base and the money multiplier. For a more detailed discussion of those issues see for 
example Trcadgo\d 1990: 25 - 27. 
T he structure, depth and any on· going liberalisation of the domestic money and 
capital markets, the finan cial integration of commercial banks and security services 
within the domestic financ ial system, the particular exchange rate system, and the 
fmancial openness of the domestic money and capital markets all impinge upon the 
extent to which a ceotml bank can use various monetary policy instrumenls. Clearly, if 
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the conditions are not suitable, for example if the financial structure is too rudimentary, 
monetary policies can only playa very limited role because the authorities may not be 
able 10 use monetary policy instruments, and in particular open market operations 
(Drake 1986). 
The reserve to deposil ratio 
The reserve to deposit ratio delennines the maximum amount of loans and investments 
that commercial banks may maintain in re lation to deposits. If, for example, lhe reserve 
requirement is 15 per cent. then loans cannot exceed 85 percent of deposits. However. 
for an increase in the required minimum reserve to deposit ratio to be effective, the 
increase mUSt be greater than the difference between the commercial banks' actual 
excess reserve ratios and their desired excess reserve ratios. Otherwise, the commercial 
banks would meet the new requirement without any change in total reserves. Similarly. 
for a decrease in the required reserve to deposit ratio to be effective. then:: must be a 
demand for the additional loanable funds. Limited demand for loanable funds would 
only force commercial banks to hold more excess reserves than desired. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, prior to 1984 the East Caribbean monetary 
authorities did not have the power to impose required reserves on commercial banks 
operating in the ECMU member countries. During that time, reserves which 
commercial banks ke pt with the authorities were voluntary and were hence excess 
reserves. However, some of the East Caribbean governments had the commercial banks 
operating in the ir territory transfer a percentage of their deposits to their domestic 
treasuries. 
With the exception of Montserrat, all governments imposed reserve to deposit 
ratios on the commercial banks. However, these deposits cannot be considered a 
reserve to deposit ratio instrument in the true sense because in all cases, the depos its 
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W~ used by the governments to finance cl!;penditures. Instead., they must be 
considered as loans to the governments. 
Table 6.5 Required reserve to deposit rattos imposed on commercial banks by the 
ECMU member country governments 
Reserve to deposit ratio (per cent) 
Antigua 10.0 
Dominica 7.5 
Grenada 20.0 
Montserrat 
St. SI. Kitts 5.0 
St. Lucia 10.0 
St. Vincenl 7.5 
Source: Discussion willi officials at. the East Caribbean Cenual Bank.. 
Antr the ECCB was given power to impose reserves on financial institutions 
doing business in the member countries, minimum reserve \0 deposit ratios of 6 per cent 
were introduced in March 1984. Of this total, 1 per cent had to be satisfied in cash, 
while the remaining 5 per cent could be satisfied by a transfer from the commercial 
banks' special deposit accounts which they were required to hold in member countries' 
treasuries. Treasuries which had received commercial banks' deposits were required to 
tum over the deposits to the ECCB over a 15 year period, beginning 1989. The 6 per 
cent reserve to deposit ratio has not been changed since it was imposed. 
The relatively high level of excess reserves which the banks in the ECMU 
member countries keep, mean that the required reserve to deposit ratio as an instrument 
for regulating domestic liquidi ty is not effective. Commercial banks keep an average 
excess reserve to deposit ratio of 8 per cent in Grenada, and 16 per cent overall in the 
ECMU (see Table 6.1). In addition, the wide fluctuations in the liquidity of the banking 
system, and IOtal reserves to deposits, would necessitate frequent adjustment in the 
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required reserve to deposit mtio in order to achieve desired results. These factors have 
significantly reduced the potential for effectively using the reserve 10 deposit ralio as an 
mstrumenl ofmonctary policy in lhe East Caribbean. 
Central bank credit 
Allhough the creation of the ECCB has limiled the ability of the individual member 
country governments to obtain credit to finance deficits, flexibility is allowed if 
unanimous agreement can be obtained. As outlined in Chapler 2, the amount of credit 
allowed is directly proportional to the ability of the governments to generate domestic 
revenue, and the estimated cUITency in circulation in the member countries. The 
amounts allowed are summarised in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6: Pen:entages of central bank credit allowed to EeMU governments as 
specified by the East Caribbean Central Bank Agreement (per cent). 
Credit instrument 
Treasury bills 
Temporary advances 
Government bonds 
Guaranteed securities 
Percentage of 
Benchmark benchmark allowed 
Government revenue 10.0 
Government revenue 5.0 
Government revenue 2.5 
Currency in circulation 15.0 
Source: East Caribbean Ccnual Bank, East Ca~1UI Ct:nlTal Balik Agrt:t:mt:III.lUlpUblijhi!:d. 
Actual central bank credit as a percentage of average government revenue over 
the previous three years has been computed and compared with total central bank credit 
which the governments would have been eligible to receive according to the 
percentages specified above. Because the limits to the amount of guaranteed publicly 
issued securities were specified in tenns of currency in circulation, the specified amount 
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had to be convened to a percentage of government revenue before the total percentage 
allowed could be obtained. This was done by dividing the estimated currency in 
circulation by average government revenue for three preceding years, and multiplying 
by 15 per cent. A time series of government guaranteed securities as a percentage of 
government revenue based on estimated currency in circulation was then obtained. The 
other percentages allowed were added. 
As presented in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, the use of central bank credit by the 
governments varies by country. Dominica and Grenada have been able to obtain much 
more credit than the percentages specified by the Bank Agreement. Prior to 1979, 
central bank credit to Dominica was within the limits allowed. In 1979, although the 
total outstanding credit from the centrJ.i bank should not have exceeded 22 per cent of 
government revenue, the actual percentage was approximately 50 per cent, and it rose to 
over 70 per cent between 1981 and 1985. Grenada has also been able to receive a 
significantly larger percentage of central bank credit than specified in the agreement In 
the case of Dominica, unanimous agreement for bank credit exceeding the specified 
limits was obtained after Dominica was devastated by a hurricane in 1979. In the case 
of Grenada, extra bank credit was given in 1980 to help finance the building of an 
international airpOrt. 
In Antigua and St. Lucia the extra amounts have not been proportionately as 
large as in Dominica and Grenada. In Antigua, the percentage became larger in 1984, 
then fell. For S1. Lucia, the larger amounts began in 1980 when the island was 
devastated by a hurricane. St. Vincent has kept weU below the percentages specified in 
most years. Montserrat has not used any credit. 
Two gener-dl observations can be made. The demand for credit by member 
countries from the central bank relative 10 government revenue varied from country to 
country. There ha.~ been unanimous agreement among the countries to al low credit 
beyond the specifi ed amount'> to be extended 10 countries. 
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The rediscount rate 
If commercial banks bolTOW from the central banle (receive advances from or sell assets 
to the centra] bank) 10 meet unexpected demands for cash by the non-bank public, the 
monetary authorities can USc the rate charged on such InUlsaclions as an inslJUmen( of 
monetary policy. By raising lhe rate charged, the central bank. makes such transactions 
more expensive. Since one of die major objectives of commercial banks is 10 earn 
profits, they may seek to reduce their losses from increases in the rediscount rate by 
increasing their loan rates and/or reducing their need 10 borrow from the central bank by 
holding more excess reserves. Either action increases the reserve to deposit ratio and 
thus reduces the money multiplier. 
The high levels of reserves which commercial banks hold has meant that there 
has been no need for commercial banks to borrow from the central bank. Thus, the 
ECCB has not been able to use the rediscount rate as an instrument of policy. 
Open market operations 
The purchase and sale of government securities of different maturities and varying 
prices in the open market (Open Market Operations) is another insrrument of monetary 
policy available to central banks. It can be used for regulating interest rates and 
liquidity in the domestic economy. However, this instrument has not been used in the 
East Caribbean. There is not sufficient demand for government securities among the 
non-bank public. In addition, to be effective, a wide range of assets of varying 
maturi ties is needed so that holders of these assets can switch funds among themselves, 
depending on the degree of fluctuation in their prices. Neither of these conditions is 
satisfied in the East Caribbean. Although a treasury bill market was introduced in 1988, 
the main panicipants in the market are the commercial banks. 
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Direct credit controls 
The monetary authorities may a1so use direct control measures ranging from moral 
suasion to fmn instructions 10 the banks as monelat)' policy instruments. In developing 
countries, direct control measures have been used to regulate total investment or to 
reallocate resources among sectors if it was considered lbal the market was nOt efficient 
in allocating funds. Controls may also be used if conunercial banks do not borrow from 
the central bank. thus ruling out the possibility of using a rediscount instrument. if it is 
not feasible to conduct open market operations, or, if the required reserve to deposit 
ratio is not binding because commercial banks hold larger amounts of reserves than 
desired. 
However. direct controls are costly. Ceilings on interest rales provides 
distorting signais to consumers, indicating that they should consume rather than save, 
leading to low savings. Ceilings also encourage capital intensive prOOucrion techniques 
by making the use of capital more profitable relative to labour. The resulting over-
capitalisation or some sectors together with capital ulilisation in those sectors, and the 
under-capitalisation of other sectors leads to low levels of productivity and income 
(Shaw 1973, Gonzalez-Vega 1983). 
Although the economic conditions and structure or the ECMU economies have 
not racilitated the use of conventional monetary policy instruments, and although the 
Bank Agreement has given the ECCB authority to prescribe direct control measures 
(such as maximum and minimum rates or interest payable on deposits; maximum 
maturities and minimum cash margins or security required with respect to making 
advances, and the issuing of letters of credit, etc), these measures have been used only 
to a very limited extent. The only fonn of direct control implemented was the setting of 
minimum rates of 4 per cent to be paid on deposi ts (excluding demand deposits). 
Maximum rates of interest on lending have not been imposed. The objective was to 
136 
I 
I 
reduce the spread between inlcresl rates which banks pay to depositors. and the rales 
received from lending. This measure was aimed at assisting financial intermediation 
and to reward and encourage savings by small depositors. 
6.5 Conclusions 
It appears that the money multiplier has been quite unstable, especially in Grenada. 
Thus, the necessary condition for the efficacy of monetary policy instruments does not 
exist. In addition. money supply changes were due mainly to changes in variables 
which monetary authorities could not have controlled. II is thus not surprising that the 
ECCB authorities did not pursue any active monetary policy for stabilisation purposes. 
Because the monetary authorities could not have actively used the monetary 
policy instruments for the ECMU as a whole or for Grenada, the loss of monetary 
autonomy as a result of membership in the ECMU cannot be considered costly for 
Grenada. 
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CHAYfER7 
A MACRO ECONOMETRIC MODEL OF GRENADA'S ECONOMY 
7.1 Thestructureofthemodcl 
Macroeconometric models provide a systematic approach to the analysis of economic 
systems. In such models, complex interactions are reduced to a few simple equations 
by strong assumptions. The degree of simplicil)'. and consequenl1y lhe model size, 
depend imer alia on data availability, the process being modelled, and the purpose for 
which the model is 10 be used. 
The Grenadian econometric model is designed to analyse a small, open 
developing economy. It reflects the fact thai economic activity and prices are heavily 
influenced by forces external to the economy. The objective is to study the effects of 
changes in monetary. fiscal and exchange rate instruments on targets such as prices, the 
balance of payments and output. 
The model consists of 21 equations (6 stochastic, and 15 identities) divided into 
four main blocks; the monelaI)' block, the domestic price fonnation block, the e)!;temal 
block, and the real block. It contains a total of 47 variables. 21 of which are 
endogcnous 10 the model (that is, their values are detennined by the model). 
The money market block contains a stochastic equation which el\plains the 
demand for money, and a number of identities to analyse the money supply. The real 
demand for money (narrowly defined), is modelled as a function of real GOP, and the 
prime lending rate of interest. A dummy variable is used 10 capture the effects of the 
increase in petroleum prices in 1973n4, and political instability in Grenada in 1974. 
The domestic price fonnation block contains an identity which cl\plains Ihe 
behaviour of the implicit GDP deflator, and a stochastic equation el\plaining the rate of 
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change of the consumer price index. In the specification of the stochastic equation, a 
central explanatory role is ascribed to impon prices, reflecting the small open 
characteristic of the economy, The specification also attempts to caplUre the effects of 
excess demand for output. 
The external sector contains behavioural equations which explain exports and 
impons, and an identity for the balance of payments. Exports are divided into expons 
of goods and exports of services. Exports of goods are modelled in terms of trend, 
export prices relative to the overall implicit GOP deflator, and dummy variables to 
capture policy and weather effects. Exports of services, which consist primarily of 
tourism, are explained by foreign real income, foreign consumer prices relative to 
domestic consumer prices, and dummy variables capturing the effects of the petroleum 
price increase of 1973n4, political instability in Grenada in 1974, and economic policy 
in 1985. Impons of goods and services are modelled as a function of real GOP, import 
prices relative to the implicit GOP deflator, and a dummy variable intended to capture 
the effects of the petroleum price increases and domestic political events in 1974 on the 
demand for imports. 
The real sector contains equations which explain private domestic demand 
(consumption plus investment), the budgetary actions of the government and real 
output. Real private domestic demand is modelled as a function of real disposable 
income and the prime lending rate of interesl. 
The actions of the government are modelled with identities for revenue, and 
foreign borrowing and aid requirements. Government revenue is modelled in nominal 
tenns. It is disaggregated into revenue from direct taxes, revenue from import taxes, 
revenue from all indirect taxes excluding import taxes, and revenue from non-tax 
sources. Foreign borrowing and foreign grant requirements are modelled as the 
difference between the government deficit and borrowing from the East Caribbean 
CentTal Bank and commercial banks. A critical assumption here is thatlhe government 
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deficit is freely financed by the central bank only up to the limit imposed by the East 
Caribbean Central Bank. Agreement. 
The model though simple in form and behaviour, is rich enough to shed light on 
some of the major issues which this study socks to investigate, panicularly the effects of 
the restraints on Grenadian macroeconomic policy imposed by the Eastern Caribbean 
monetary ammgemenL 
The working of the model can be illustrated by considering an increase in 
government expenditure on goods and services, financed by the central bank. The 
initial effect of the increase in government expenditure is 10 increase real GOP by 
boosting aggregate demand. At the same time, the increase in central bank credit which 
finances the increase in government expenditure increases the monetary base and hence 
the money supply. 
These direct effects then exert secondary effects on the other endogenous 
variables in various degrees. The final effect on each endogenous variable is nOI 
straight-fOlWanl because changes to a variable may be offset by feedback effects from 
other variables. 
The increase in the money supply causes interest rates to fall, leading to an 
increase in private expenditure. A rise in GOP increases disposable income which also 
exerts a positive effect on private expenditure. Increased private expenditure in turn 
increases GOP. A rise in GOP increases the tax base, and therefore increases 
government revenue, leading to a reduction of the deficit, and consequently a fall in the 
need for foreign borrowing and grant aid. 
Increased GOP exerts a positive impact on impons, leading to a fall in net 
foreign assets, together with a reduction in the monetary base and the money supply. 
Increased GOP also exens inflationary effects on domestic prices, as output is 
increased relative to trend. Increased prices cause expons to fall as domestic prices are 
increased relative to foreign prices. The fall in exports resuhs in a fall in GOP, and a 
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fall in net foreign assets, the monetary base, and the money supply. Increased domestic 
prices relative to foreign prices also cause imports to increase. The fall in expom, and 
increased imports cause the trade balance to worsen. The effects continue until to the 
system relUms to equilibrium. 
7.2 Specifications of the equations of the model 
The demand for money 
The opponunity cost of holding money is an imponant detenninant of the demand for 
money (Pigou 1918, Marshall 1923, Keynes (930). For the narrow definition of money 
(M I), which comprises notes and coin in circulation with the public, plus domestic 
currency demand deposits held by the private sector, the opponunity cost could be 
interest rates on time and saving deposits, interest rates on bills, interest rates on other 
liquid investments (Keynes 1930), the income from investment in physical assets 
(Marshall 1923; Hamburger 1966, 1917), or price inflation (Pigou 1918). On the other 
hand, if money is broadly defined 10 also include private time and saving deposits 
denominated in domestic currency (M2), or all other deposits (domestic and foreign 
currency) held with the banking sector (M3), then the interest rates on these assets can 
no longer be considered as opponunity com. 
Despite the voluminous amount of literature which exists on the subject (see for 
example Laidler 1917, Feige and Pearce 1917), there is no general agreement among 
economists as to which of the many rates of interest observed in an economy should be 
used as the proxy for the opponunity cost in specifying money demand. It has been 
suggested that a shon-tenn interest rale is appropriate for estimating the demand for 
money function (Laidler 1966, 1917; Clinton 1973; Heller 1965; Lee 1967). 1ne 
argument is based on the premise that shon-tern] rates represent rates of re turn on assets 
which are a closer substitute for money than the assets to which longer-tenn rates apply. 
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Therefore, it is argued that short-term rates arc more likely to give a true measure of the 
, opponunity costs of holding money. 
Arguments favouring the use of long-tenn rates have also been presented. One 
argument for the use of long-tenn rates is that they arc more representative of the 
average nte of return of capital in the economy than short-tenn rates (Laidler 1977). In 
an empirical investigation Hamburger (1969) found no evidence that shon-tenn rates 
were more appropriate for estimating the demand for money than long-tenn rates. 
The use of an inflation variable in demand for money fu nctions is also 
controversial. Deaver (1970), for example, suggests that if it is not possible to find any 
measure of real returns, then the expected rate of inflation can be used as a proxy for the 
opportunity cost of holding money. Other authors who propose the use of such a proxy 
arc Diz (1970); Dutton (1971), Khan (1978), Khan and Knight (1981), and Kamath 
(1985). 
Some studies have gone a step further in suggesting that inflation is an imponant 
detenninanl, in its own right, of the demand for money and therefore should be included 
in addition to interest rates (Otani and Park 1976; Shapiro, 1973; Aghevli 1977; 
Nasution 1982). However, because nominal interest rates tend 10 renect innationary 
expectations and thus already incorporate a measure of inflation, the inclusion of 
inflation rates as an explanatory variable may nOt be necessary .. 
It is generally accepted that real income is an imponant detenninant of money 
demand (Freidman 1969, Laidler 1977; Tumovsky 1986, 1987; Domowitz and 
Elbadawi 1987; Otani and Sassanpour 1988). It can be argued that changes in real 
income affect the demand for money by changing the total volume of transactions to be 
effected. The change in the total amount of transactions leads to a change in the 
demand for real money balances. Alternatively, income can be regarded as a proxy for 
wealth. 
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In this study, it is postulated that the main factors affecting the public's demand 
for real money balances (narrowly defined) are the level of income and the cost of 
holding money. Therefore, the demand for real money balances is specified by using 
real GOP as a measure of income and the time prime lending rate of interest as a proxy 
for the opportunity costs of holding real money balances. The treasury bill rate which is 
sometimes used in money demand SlUdies was not deemed appropriate because the 
central bank and commercial banks hold most of the outstanding government treasury 
bills. Thus, the treasury bill rate is not suitable as a variable to explain the demand fOf 
money by the non-bank public. 
It is postulated thai as income increases in the economy, so tOO does the demand 
for money balances. It is funher hypothesised that as the rJ.te of interest increases, the 
desired stock of real money balance decreases. In addition, a dummy variable is 
included to capture the effects of both the petroleum price increase of 1973n4 and 
political instability in Grenada in 1974 on the demand for money. The desired demand 
for real money can thus be represented by the following log-Linear fonnu lation: 1 
(7.1) 
where: M is the stock of nominal money narrowly defllled: 
Pg is the implicit GOP deflalOr; 
Y is total real income, (GDP) at constant 1980 prices; 
r is the prime lending fate of interest; 
Dum74 is a dummy variable taking the value I in 1974,0 in other 
years; 
t denotes lime; d denotes desired . 
III isrccogniscd that therighl hand sil1e of tile tquatioll should also illcludca random enur tenn whose 
values an: ba:;ed on an undcrlying prob.lbility distribution. Howcvcr. inwritingt llis:mdother slochnstie 
cqu3lions, theerror tcnnisignoredtosimplifythe layoul. 
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The above specification defines the long·run demand for real money balances. 
In ~,ractice, however, we may not observe the long·run demand for money. Instead the 
public may be adjusting its actual holdings of real monetary assets to its desired level 
according to a paniaJ adjustment mechanism, indicating that full adjustment to the 
desired stock. may not occur in each period. See for example Otani (1975), Goldfeld 
(1973, 1976), Laidler (1982). Gordon (1984). Otani and Sassanpour (1988). The 
adjustment mechanism can be specified as follows: 
Alternatively. (7.2) can be written as: 
where: A\ is the coefficient of adjustment; 
O<AI < I; 
P&:, M and t are as defined above. 
(7.2) 
(7.3) 
Substituting equation (1. 1) into equation (7.3), gives the following money demand 
specification: 
The shon·ron income elasticity coefficient PI is expected to be positive. The 
intereSI rate coefficient P2' which renects the opportunity costs of holding money 
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balances is expected to be negative. The coefficient ~3 is expected to be negative. while 
P4 is expected to be positive. 
The supply or money 
The money supply can be represented by the following identity: 
Mt=IJt·MBt 
where: J.l = is the money multiplier; 
MB is the monetary base. 
(7.5) 
For simplicity, the money supply is specified as the above identity and not by 
means of a stochastic equation. This is not too much of a limitation because the 
conducting of shocks to detennine their effects on the money supply is not of interest to 
the study. 
The monetary base can be defmed as the sum of outstanding central bank credit, 
and net foreign assets of the central bank.2 Thus, the monetary base is increased when 
the central bank acquires assets in the fonn of international reserves and/or issues 
domestic credit. Algebraically, the monetary base can be expressed as follows: 
where: CBC is outstanding central bank credit; 
NFAf is net foreign assets in US dollars; 
E is the domestic CLl!'Tency price of US dollars; 
the time subscript t refers to end of period. 
2 The monetary base may also be dcfillCd as the sum of currency in cin:ulation plus bank rese rves. 
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(7.6) 
Central bank credit can be divided between net credit to the government and 
credit to commercial banks) This can be represented as follows: 
where: CBCg is net central bank credit to the governments; 
CBee is net central bank credit to conunercial banks. 
Substiruting equation (7.7) into equation (7.6): 
The rate of innation 
(7.7) 
(7.8) 
A number of researchers have investigated the causes of inflation in the Caribbean. In 
an attempt to model inflation in Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica, Bourne and Persaud 
(1977) used a model of 15 equations which was subsequently reduced to a single 
equation consisting of 16 explanatory variables. Some of the explanatory variables 
were wage rates, import prices, the commercial bank loan rate, exports of goods and 
services, net domestic credit of the banking system, government deficits, the stock of 
money and excess aggregate demand. Regression analysis indicated that for Trinidad 
and Tobago, the main determinants of inflation were wage rates (lagged by four 
quaners), the import price index (lagged by one quarter), the bank loan rate and gross 
government debt. With respect to Jamaica, the main detenninants of inflation were 
import prices and the bank loan rate.4 The analysis suggested that the government 
deficit and the money supply were nOt imponant determinants. 
31n the East Caribbean, the cenlnll bank lias not e ~tendod credit 10 me private lIOIl-bank sector. 
4 Because o f the lack of data. the wage rate was not used for Jamaica. 
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SL Cyr (1979) investigated the formation of prices in Trinidad and Tobago 
between 1965 and 1976. His work indicated that the main determinants of price 
inflation were import prices. the money supply and price expectations. 
Another study investigating the causes of inflation in the Caribbean was 
conducted by Downes (1985). His study focussed on Barbados from 1960 to 1977. His 
inflation model consisted of impon prices. the cost of credit, and wage rates as 
explanatory variables. He found that import prices wert the main detenninant of 
inflation. They accounted for about 70 per cent of domestic price changes. His 
research also indicated that the interest rate on loans also contributed 10 domestic 
inflation. The wage rale was found to contribute linle towards price (onnalion. 
Another investigation of the causes of inflation in Barbados, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago was conducted by Holder and Worrell (1985) using annual data 
from 1963 10 1985. Their research indicated that the main detcnninanls of inflation 
were import prices, exchange rate changes, trade controls, wage rates and real income. 
The extenl to which the variables were significant in explaining inflation rates in the 
three counlries differed. Interest rates exened upward pressure on prices in Barbados, 
downward pressure in Jamaica and were not significant in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Another slUdy by Worrell and Holder (1987), concluded that in Barbados, Jamaica. and 
Trinidad and Tobago, foreign prices led to price rises of non-tradables. In addition, in 
Trinidad and Tobago, the demand for the output of non-tradables exencd upward 
pressure on the price of non-tradables. In Jamaica, wage rates were significant in 
detennining the price of non-traded goods, while in Barbados, neither wage rates nor 
demand were significant detenninants of the price of non-traded goods. 
The only study which investigated price fonnalion in the ECMU countries was 
undcnaken by Allen (1977). He used statistical analysis to investigate the causes of 
inflation in 51. Kitts and Montserrat. He concluded thaI from 1971 \0 1974 inflation 
mainly resuhed from increases in imponed prices. 
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Although import duties and indirect taxes are known to contribute to domestic 
inflation, they were not explicitly modelled in the inflation equation in the standard 
way. Because a time series for import prices was not available for Grenada, it was 
constructed from the national accounting identity. Using nominal and real aggregates 
for GOP. private expenditure. government expenditure, exports of goods and services, 
and nominal imports of goods and services, real imports of goods and services were 
derived. The price of imports and services was constructed as nominal imports divided 
by real imports. Modelling indirect taxes and import duties in the usual way would 
have been inconsistent. 
In the present model. it is poslUlated that the domestic price level is influenced 
by foreign prices. Higher prices abroad translate directly into domestic inflation 
because of the inclusion of imported consumer goods in the consumer price index. In 
addition, higher prices abroad affect domestic prices indirectly. They increase the costs 
of intermediate goods used in domestic production, thus increasing the prices of final 
goods. This effect is especially critical in small economies where there is little scope 
for producers to switch from imported intennediate goods 10 domestic sources of 
supply, because the imemlediate goods are not usually produced domestically. In 
addition, as a result of foreign price increases, the relative price of available domestic 
goods is lowered. thus increasing their demand. Increased demand can exert upward 
pressure on prices. 
It is funher postulated that there is a 'natural' or 'capacity' level of output 
growing at an exogenously given constant rate. II is assumed that because of aggregate 
demand forces, output can be above or below the capacity level. If the real output is 
above this level, it is expected to exert upward pressures on domestic prices. 
Grenada 's domestic price inflation as measured by the rate of change of the 
consumer price index can be represented algebraically as follows: 
where: P"is the consumer price index; 
Pmf is tht: inde){ of imporl prices in US dollars; 
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Y<:.iscapacily(trend)output;5 
Y is as defined above; 
e is as defined above. 
In the above fonnulation, the second tenn captures the direct transmission of 
foreign infla tion to the domestic economy. As the foreign rate of inflation increases, 
this would have a positive effect on the domestic rate of inflation. Therefore, i!t6 is 
expected to be positive. The third teon captures the effects of output disequilibrium on 
the rate of inflation. It suggests that if the level of actual real outpUI is greater than the 
capacity (trend) output, this is expected to exert inflationary pressures on the economy. 
Thus, the coefficient i!tl is expected to be positive. 
Dynamic properties are incorporated in the model so that when there is no 
excess demand in the domestic economy, that is, when output is at its trend level, the 
rate of domestic inflation converges to the foreign rate. Thai is, the coefficient j!.8 is 
imposed so that j!.6 + \38 = 1. 
Exports of goods 
Grenada's merchandise exports mainly comprise agricultural commodities. ExportS of 
goods are postulated 10 be a function of the profitability of exporting and the capacity 
to produce. The ratio of an index of the domestic prices of exports to the implicit GDP 
deflator is used as a proxy for the profitability of exports. Because exports of goods 
consist mainly of tree crops, changes in their relative prices in a panicular year are not 
ellpected immediately \0 affect the supply of exports. It is assumed that at least two 
years are required before supply responds to price changes. The implication is that wilh 
price increases, producers would increase planting as well as activity on already 
established plantations. Bul. there would be a lag before increased production was 
obtained. 
From the discussion of Chapter 2, it seems a reasonable approllimation 10 
assume thai Grenada faces a perfectly price elastic demand for exports. That is, the 
5 The (fend level of reat income is Ukcn as a proxy ror c3p3Cily ompul. 11 is constructed as follows: ye l 
= Yoe&t; where Yon:prc.'iClltsthe base level. g r"llfCScnlS lhe trend growth .. "tc of real income. 
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foreign market can absorb al l exports without an effect on prices. Therefore, the index 
of eKport prices in foreign currency is treated as an eKogenous yariable. If export prices 
in local currency rise (cither because of a depreciation of the currency, or a rise in 
foreign currency prices) relative to domestic prices, then it would be more profitable to 
produce for eKport. 
Faced with a perfectly elastic demand for exports, the yolume of exports will be 
constrained by the economy's capacity to produce. A time trend is used as a proxy for 
the capacity to produce. 
Dummy variables are used to capture the effects of policy and weather on 
exports. Favourable weather conditions are postulated to have positively affected 
merchandise exports in 1976. In 1980, hurricanes affected some of the ECMU member 
countries. Although the hurricanes did not directly affect Grenada, heavy rains and 
slrong winds reduced agricultural production. A dummy variable is also used to capture 
the effects of political decisions on exports of goods in 1984/1985. After the US 
military invasion of Grenada in 1983 and the establishment ofa new government, large 
stocks of nutmegs were exported in \984. It is also postulated that the US invasion and 
the subsequent new government policies stimulated agriculturaJ production beginning in 
1985. The variable Dum845 taking the yalue of 1 in 1984 and 1985, and zero in other 
years is used to capture those effects. 
The desired supply of exports is therefore specified as the following log-linear 
expression: 
In(Exg)d, = ~ ... ~ln(e.Pxf/pg)'.2 ... ~Trend ... ct;Dum76 ... a.Dum80 ... 
CLJDum845 (7.9) 
where: Exg is the volume of merchandise exports. measured in tenns of 1980 
prices; 
e is an index of the domestic currency price of one US dollar; 
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Pxf is an index of merchandise export prices in US dollars; 
Trend is time trend; 
Dum76 is a dummy variable equal 10 1 in 1976, Oin other years; 
DumSO is a dummy variable equal to I in 1980,0 in other years; 
Dum845 is a dummy variable equal 10 I in 1984 and 1985,0 in other 
years; 
d denotes desired; 
PI is as defined above. 
The coefficient as is expected to be positive. If expon prices in local currency 
rise relative to domestic prices. then it would be more profitable to produce for expon. 
As a resu\[, the supply of exports is expected to increase. The coefficient ~ is expected 
to be positive. 04) is expected 10 be negative and (tID is expected to be positive. 
In any given period the actual level of exports may nOt adjust completely 10 the 
desired level. This is posrulated on the assumption that some producers may nOI 
respond immediately to price changes. They may wait to detennine whether the price 
change is a lasting one, or whether it is only temporary. The adjustment process can be 
represented as follows: 
where: ~ is the panial adjustment coefficient; 
O<~< I; 
Substituting (7.9) into (7.10) and manipulating, we obtain the following: 
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(7.10) 
where: P9 =~; ~LO = ~~ ~ll = ~Cl?; ~12 = ~CXs; IlI3 = ~~; 
~1.=~C110; Ilu=(l-~· 
Exports of services 
Grenada's exports of services consist mainly of services sold to tourists. Exports of 
services are therefore modelled as foreign demand for tourism. The quantity of tourist 
services demanded. by foreigners are expected to be a function or their income and 
foreign prices relative to domestic prices. In addition, events such as political 
disturbances can be expected to influence the demand for foreign travel to the affected 
countty, and therefore, its exports of services (Loeb 1982). 
A number of empirical studies have provided support for the hypothesis that 
export of services is positively related to fore ign income, and foreign prices relative to 
domestic prices. See for example Loeb (1982), Kwack (1972), Truett and Truett 
(1987). 
In the present study, real income of the industrial countries is taken as a proxy 
for foreign income. Obtaining an appropriate relative price measure is, however, a 
problem. A number of studies have allowed for the effect of competing destinations by 
specifying the relative price variable as the price in the countty of destination relative to 
a weighted average of prices in competing destinations. See for example Artus (1970), 
Barry and O'Hagan (1972), Loeb (1982), Stronge aIld Redman (1982). Other studies 
have specified the relative price variable as the price in the country of destination 
relative IQ the price in the country of origin. See for example Kliman (1981), Witt 
(1980). 
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In this study, a weighted index of consumer prices of Grenada's main trading 
partners (converted to USS) is used as the foreign price. This can be represented as 
follows: 
(7.12) 
where: pf is an index of foreign prices in US dollars; 
(Ji is the trade weight of country i with Grenada, Wi '" I; 
'Vi( is the number of US dollars per unit of country i currency in year t; 
'Via is the number of US dollars per unit of country i currency in a base 
year; 
p(i is the consumer price index of country i . 
Grenada's consumer price index is used as the domestic price variable. 
In addition to foreign income and relative prices, it is postulated that the 
political events in Grenada in 1974 affected foreign demand for Grenada's exports of 
serv ices. A dummy variable taking the value of I in 1974, and 0 in all other years is 
thus used to capture this effect. Promoting Grenada abroad as a tourist destination in 
1985 is also postulated to affect the foreign demand for exports of services. A dummy 
variable taking the value of I in 1985. and 0 in all other years is thus used \0 capture 
this effect. 
Mathematically, the foreign demand for Grenada's export.~ of services can be 
expressed as the following log-linear function: 
(7.13) 
where: Exs is the volume of service exports in 1980 prices: 
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yf is an index of foreign GOP. 1980 = 100; 
pr is an index of foreign currency consumer prices, 1980 = 100; 
pc is an index of domestic consumer prices, 1980 = 100; 
Dum85 is a dummy variable equal to 1 in 1985, 0 in other years; 
e. d. and Dum74 are as defined above. 
It is postulated that the demand for Grenada's exports of services is positively 
related to foreign income, and foreign prices in domestic currency relative to the 
domestic consumer price index. As foreign income increases, there would be an 
increased demand for Grenada's exports of services. Therefore, al l is expected to be 
positive. Similarly. if the level of foreign prices in domestic currency increases relative 
to domestic prices. the demand for Grenada's exportS of services is expected to increase. 
It follows that al2 is expected to be positive. The political events of 1974 are expected 
to have negatively affected foreign demand for exports of services. Therefore, all is 
expected to be negative. The promotional effortS of 1985 are expected to have 
positively influenced the foreign demand. for exportS of services. Therefore, a l .. is 
expected to be positive. 
In any given period the aeNal level of exports of services may nOt adjust 
completely to the des~ level. If the adjustment process follows the partial adjustment 
model, it may be represented as follows: 
where: A:, is the panial adjustment coefficient; 
O<~<J. 
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(7. 14) 
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Substituting (7.13) into (7.14) and manipulating: 
in(Exs)\ = ~16 + Pn1n(Yf), + P1Sin(e.pf"lJlC)\ + P,oPum74 + JlwDum85 + 
~lln(Exs)l_ 1 
when:: PI6 = ~(lHp Pn ='-1(111; PIS ='-3al l; P19 = ~al3; ~=~(l14; 
~" =(1-).,). 
Imports of goods and services 
(7.15) 
The impon model specified in this study is conceptually similar 10 the demand models 
found in the literature. The aggregate demand for imports is postulated 10 be dependent 
on the level of real income, the mtio of the domestic currency price of impons 10 
domestic prices, and a dummy variable 10 capture the effects of the oil shock and 
political instability in Grenada in 1974. 
where: lmgsd is the volume of desired imports of goods and services in 1980 
prices; 
Pmf is the iode)!; of the price of impons in US dollars; 
Dum74, Y, e and p& are as defined above. 
As income increases, the demand for impons is expected to increase. Therefore, 
(116 is expected to be positive. If import prices in domestic currency increase relative to 
domestic prices. the demand for impons is expected to decrease. The coefficient aL1 
should be negarive. The politica1 events in Grenada in 1974 are expected to have had a 
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depressing effect on the demand for imports. The coefficient (In is expected to be 
negative. 
According to the partial adjustment modeJ, the change in real impon demand 
between two periods (period t and period \-1) will be equal to a fraction of the 
difference between the desired level of demand in period t. and the level of actual 
imports in the previous period. This can be expressed mathematically as follows: 
where: ).,4 is the partial adjustment coefficient; 
0 <A.4 < 1 
Substituting equation (7.16) into equation (7. 17) : 
(7.17) 
In(lmgs)1 = ~2 + Ilnln(y),'" P24In(e.Pmf/pI). + P25Dum74 + ~61n(Imgs)' . 1 
(7.18) 
Net foreign assets 
As illustrated by (7.6), the monetary base is equal 10 the sum of central bank credit and 
net foreign assets. Therefore, changes in the monetary base can arise from changes in 
net foreign assets and changes in central bank credit. In this study. changes in net 
foreign assets are defined as the sum of expons minus impons of goods and services, 
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net government foreign borrowing and aid. private unrequited transfers. and other 
transfers and capital f1ows. 6 Th.is can be written algebraically as follows: 
where: NFAf is net foreign assets in US dollars; 
FAB is government foreign borrowing and aid US dollars; 
K' is other net transfers and capital flows in US dollars; 
ReqP is net private unrequi ted transfers in US dollars; 
TRDBAL is the trade balance in US dollars. 
(7.29) 
Therefore. net foreign assets at the end of period t can be written as follo ws: 
(7.20) 
The decision to treat other net transfers and capital flows (K,) as an exogenous 
variable was made because empirical difficulties prevented explicitly modelling capital 
moveme nts. For Grenada, reliable data do nOl exist on capital movements. As a result, 
the time series of K' was conS[lUcted as: K', = NFAf, - NFAft _1 . TRDBAL, - FAB, -
The trade balance in US doBars in period I can be defined a.~ follows: 
TRDBAL, = ICe.Px!.Exg), + CPC.Exs),· (e.PmfJmgs),11Et (7.2 1) 
where: TRDBAL, E, e. Pm!, pc Pxf, Exg, Exs and hngs are defined above. 
6 Olhe r lraflsfcrs and capital flows include public unrequited tr".Ulsfers, consisti ng of tax receipts from 
!lOn.residents, rcpar.nions, etc .. and net private capital inflows and outflowS. 
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Private Expenditure 
Real private expenditure (consumption plus investment) is postulated 10 be a function of 
the rate of interest and real private disposable income. Because data on the rate of 
interest on bank loans were not available, the prime lending rate of interest is used as a 
proxy for the COSt of capital. In addition, it is postulated thai the political events which 
culminated in the US military invasion in 1983 affected private expenditure. A dummy 
variable taking the value I in 1983, and zero in aU other years is therefore included in 
the specification. The private expenditure function can thus be specified as follows: 
In(PDEM)d. = (X]9+ Owln(yd~ + ~I Dum83 + cx.n1n(r), 
where: POEM is real private domestic expenditure; 
yd is real private disposable income in 1980prices; 
r is the inlerest rate on time deposits: 
DumB3 is a dummy variable equal to I in 1983, 0 in other years; 
d is as defined above. 
(7.22) 
As real disposable income increases. the private seClOr is expected 10 increase its 
desired real expenditure (consumption and investment). Thus, ~o is expected to be 
positive. The political events of 1983 are expected 10 have caused private expenditure 
to have fallen, and thus ~I is eKpected 10 be negative. If the interest rate is increased in 
the economy, the invesnnent component of private expenditure is expected 10 decrease. 
It is also assumed thaI the substi tution effect of interest rates on consumption dominates 
the income effect. Therefore, it is postulated that a ll is negative. 
Allowing for lagged adjustment, the change in private expenditure between twO 
periods will be equal to a fraction of the difference between the desired and the ac tual 
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level of expendi ture in lhe previous period. This can be expressed mathematically as 
follows: 
(n(POEM)! - In(pDEM)c_1 "" Xs{ln(PDEM)d\ - In(POEM)\.I ) (7.23) 
where: A.s is the partial adjusunent coefficient; 
Substituting equation (7.22) inlo equation (7.23) and manipulating: 
(7.24) 
Real disposable income is cruddy defined in the study as follows: 1 
yd:: (pY - DTxr -lmTxr - lnTXf + Trand + (E.ReqP)tpc (7.25) 
where: PY is GOP in current prices; 
DTxr is revenue from direct taxes; 
Trand is government transfers to the domestic private sector; 
RcqP is net private transfer receipts from abroad in US dollars; . 
InTxr is revenue from indirect taxes excluding impon duties; 
ImTxr is revenue from indirect taxes on impons; 
1 It is recognised ihal lhisdcfinition is has weaJmcsscs in that. due to dm3 ulJ3vailability, i lis grossof 
dcprociaoonorcapitalconsumplion. 
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Governmenl revenue 
Total government revenue is broken down into revenue from import taxes, revenue 
from direct taxes, revenue from indirect taxes other than from impons. and non-tax 
Total government nominal revenue is represented by the following identity: 
where: GREV is government domestic revenue; 
NTxr is government non-tax revenue. 
DTxr, InTu, and ImTxr are as defined above. 
(7.26) 
Revenue from direct taxes, import taxes, and other indirect taxes can be 
represented by identities a .21), \1.28), and (7.29) and (7.30) respectively: 
(7.27) 
(7.28) 
ImTxrc = ImT~.(e.Pmr.lmgs)1 (7.29) 
(7.30) 
where: dTxn is the average direct tax ratio, conslnlcted by dividing direct 
taKes by nominal GDP; 
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InTxrt is the average indirect laX ratio, consttucled by dividing indiroci 
taxes by nominal GDp; 
ImTxrt is the average import tax ratio. constructed by dividing impon 
taxes by nominal impons of goods and services; 
NTxrt is Ihe average ratio of non-tax revenue collection, constructed by 
dividing non-tax revenues by nominal GDP. 
Government foreign borrowing and aid requirement 
Due to Ihe undeveloped nature of the domestic financial market. there is very little 
scope for domestic financing of government budgel deficits in the ECMU member 
countries. Instead, governmenl deficits are to a large extent financed by transactions 
with the central bank and/or non-residenlS (foreign borrowing and foreign aid). The 
government's foreign borrowing and aid requirement in US doUars is represented as 
follows: 
FADt = ()l<:.GEXt + Trandt + Tranr( - GREVt - (ooMs( - COM' t.,] -
[CBO t - CBO(. tl)~ 
where: GEX is real government expenditure on goods and services; 
(7.31) 
Trand is government transfer payments to the domestic private sector; 
Tranr is government transfer payments made abroad (including 
inlcrcst); 
COM8 is the level of end of period commercial bank credit to the 
government; 
FAB, GREY and CBO are defined above. 
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This simplistic specification which aggregates foreign borrowing and aid 
assumes that borrowing and aid leads rather than follows government derlCilS. In reality 
lIlis may not be the case, particularly willl foreign aid. Aid flows are detennined by 
donor governments - recipient governments do not say no to aid. Data limitation 
prevented a more robust specification. 
Output 
Total rea1 GOP is assumed to be demand detennined. This can be considered an 
acceptable short-run approximation, implying lIlat output is not supply-constrained in 
lIle shon-run. It is represented by the following identity: 
where: GEX is real government expenditure on goods and services; 
Y, Exg, Exs and lmgs are as defined above. 
Nominal output is represented as follows: 
(J.32) 
The impliCit GOP deflator is, by definition, gross domestic product al current 
prices divided by gross domestic product at constant prices. This can be represented as 
follows: 
162 
p&=PY/y 
where: pg, PY and Y are defined above. 
73 Summary of the Model 
T he Stochastic Equations 
In(M'P&), = ~o + ~lln(Y)1 + ~ln(r)t + IlJDum74 + ~4In(M/Pg)t.1 
~I >0; ~<O; IlJ >0; ~4>0. 
Rale of jnflatjon 
A1n(PC)1 = ~5 + ~~[ln(e)+ln(PmI)J t + ~7[lnY -lnycJ + ~86.1n(PC)t.1 
136>0; ~>O; 1la>0. 
Exports of foods 
(7.34) 
In(Exglt :: ~ + I3loln(e.Pxf/pg),.2 + puTrend + ~12Dum76 + ~13Dum80 + 
1314Dum845 + PI5 ln(Exg),.! 
13\0> 0; ~ l l >0; ~12>0; PI43<0; P14> 0; ~IS >0. 
Expom of seryjces 
In(Exs), = ~L6 + 13171n(YI), + ~L81 n(e.pftpc), + ~1,pum74 + ~wDum85 + 
1l211n(EIls),.1 
P17 >0; ~18> 0; PI9<O; 1320> 0; 1121 >0. 
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Irnnon of roods and sc;rvjces 
In(Imgs), = Ilu + ~ln(Y), + ~ln(e.Pmrtpr:)1 + ~~Dum74 + ~261n(lmgs),., 
Il,,> 0; IIu <0; Il" <0; 1Iu>0. 
Priya1e expendjhU'e 
In(PDEM)t E I3n + Pu:ln(Yd), + ~um83 + Mn(r),+ l3J,ln(PDEM)I_l 
Pu:>O;~<O;~o<O;~ >0. 
The Identities 
Central bank credit 
CBC = CBCg + CBCc 
Ford gn excban rt reserves 
TRDBA!... = [(e.Pxf.Exg), + (P'.Ex~) - (e.PmfJmgs)JIE 
Goyem!I!tot revenue 
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GoytIDIDeOI diDjCI tax rr;ytnue 
Gnyqnment jdjDjCt tax reYen"e 
Government import lax wen"e 
Goyernment non-lax reven"e 
NTxrc = NTxn..(PY}t 
GovemrDtjnt forejgn bmrpwjngand ajd 
FABt = (P'C.GEX. + Trandt + Tranft-GREVt - (COM' t- COM' t_I]-
[eBOt - CBC'c_l1YEt 
Y t ::::: POEM,. + GEXt + Exg. + ExSc - ImgSc 
Disposable income 
yd = (py - OTxr -lmTxr _ lnTxr + Trand + (E.Reqrypc 
~ 
PYc = PC.POEMc + f'C.GEXt + e.Pxf.Ex& + P<'.ExSc - e.Pmf.lmgSc 
Implicjt Gpr defla{o[ 
p& ::::: PY!y 
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CHAPTERS 
THE MODEL ESTIMATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the estimations results of the Grenadian macroeconomic model 
specified in the previous chapter. The model's equations are estimated with annual data 
from 1972 to 1988 by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Data-FIT by Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1987) was used for the econometric estimation. Data-FIT was selected because of the 
excellent diagonostic tests which it provides. 
For convenience of exposition. the results are presented and discussed equation 
by equation, in terms of economeuic properties. adjustment parameters and elasticities. 
The statistical significance of the estimated coefficients is evaluated on the basis of t-
tests. Where it is postulated that a parameter should be of a particular sign. a one-sided 
I-lest is used to detennine whether the coefficient is statistically different from zero. In 
cases where the sign is not postulated a priori. two-sided I-tests are used 10 determine 
statistical significance. 
In cases where variables were not statistically significant on the basis of I-Iests, 
but had had the correct sign according 10 economic theory, they were not dropped from 
the regression equation. Because of the shon data series used, il was considered that 
sufficient infonnation was nOt available to test the theory that the variable should not be 
included. In addition. in most developing countries, Grenada being no exception, the 
quality of available data is usually not robust. While this could contribute to imponam 
explanatory variables being statistically insignificant in the estimated relationships, it 
does not provide sufficient grounds to omit those variables. 
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The staristica1 significance of an overall regression equation is evaluated using 
theF-tcsl. 
In addition to the conventional I-tests of the statistical significance of individual 
regression coefficients. and F-Iests of the significance of overall regression equations, 
diagonosric tests were also conducted to detennine whether each estimated equation is 
an adequale representation of the economic phenomenon il purpons to represent. Tests 
were conducted on each equation to ascertain mat serial correlation was nOI a problem, 
and that the functional fonn selected was appropriate. 
HeteroscedasticilY occurs if the OLS assumption that the error terms form a 
distribution with a constant variance is violated. This assumption is more likely to be 
violatoo when cross sectional data rather than time series are used. This is because with 
cross sectional data. there is more likely to be wide disparilY between the largest and 
smallest values. It is posssible for heteroscedastic errors to occur in time series models 
if important explanatory variables are omitted. Then, the proportion of the omitted 
effect not represented by the included variables is absorbed by the error tenn. Test-
statistics for the presence of heteroscedasricity are therefore also reported. 
Although structural change can occur over time, tests were nOi perfonned. The 
data series were too short. The use of dunuuy variables was an attempt take account of 
events such as weather, political instability, petroleum price increases and policy 
decisions, which were likely to affect the estimated relationships. 
In section 8.2, the theoretical aspects of some of the diagonostic test conducted 
on the estimated regressions are presented. The estimated results are presented in 
section 8.3. The conclusions of the chapter are presented in section 8.4. 
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8.2 Theoretical aspects of the tests of serial correlation and Functional Form 
Tests for serial correlation 
A critical assumption of OLS is that the error tenns of the equation are uncorrelated 
with each other. If serial correlarion occurs. and there are lagged endogenous variables 
in the regression, then the coefficient estimates are biased and inconsistent. On the 
other hand. if there are no lagged dependenr variables in the regression, although the 
coefficients would be unbiased and consistent, the F-test statistic obtained may be 
incorrect and an overoptimistic Rl is obtained. Predictions from such a system would 
be incorrect: the variances obtained may not be 'minimum'. 
When using time-series data to estimate an economic relationship, it is not 
possible to know a priori whether serial correlation exists. Funhermore, it is difficult to 
know a priori if serial conelation exists., whether an assumption of first order 
autoregressive errors is reasonable. To establish whether or not serial correlation is 
likely to exist, the following hypotheses are tested: 
H.:p,*-O 
where: p is the correlation coefficient between the error terms. 
If the null hypothesis (flo: p = 0) is rejected as a result of the test, indicating the 
presence of seriaJ correlation, then an estimation technique other than OLS should be 
employed to correct for the presence of seriaJ correlation. 
One of the tests for de tecting the presence of ftrst-order serial correlation in a 
regression which includes a constant term, bUi does not include values of the lagged 
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dependent variable as regressors. is the Durbin-Watson (1950. 1951) test statistic. This 
test is defined as follows: 
where: d is the Durbin-Watson statistic; 
~ is the residuals of the equation. 
(8.1) 
Given the null hypothesis that there is no serial correlation and a two-sided 
alternative hypothesis. the appropriate decision rules are as follows: 
if (4 - dJ < d < 4, then reject flo, negative serial corelation is present; 
if 0 < d < du then reject flo, positive serial correlation is present; 
if 2 < d < (4 - du). then do nOI reject Ho: 
if du < d < 2, then do not reject Ho: 
if d.. < d < du. the result is indeterminate; 
if (4 - du) < d < (4 - dJ,lhe result is indeterminate. 
where: d.. is the tabulated upper value of the Durbin-Watson statistic; 
do, is the tabulated lower value of the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
Residual serial correlation is also tested according to Godfrey (19788, 1978b). 
For a comprehensive discussion of the test procedure, sec a lso Pesaran and Pesaran 
(1987). If the computed F-statistic is larger than the critical value, then the hypothesis 
that there is no serial correlation is not accepted. 
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Testing the appropriateness of the functional form 
According to HOWfC)" Klein and McCaM)' (1974), although economic theory and a 
knowledge of the realities of the s),stem being modelled would provide a useful guide as 
to the variables which should be included, the)' do not indicate a priQri what the exact 
structure of the model should be. These authors proceed to argue that the exact fonn of 
the model can onl)' be obtained through experimentation. 
The most common specification used in economettic modelling is the log-linear 
function, which is nonlinear in the variables but linear in the coefficients. One of the 
critical assumptions inherent in such a specification is that contrary to the linear model, 
the elasticities and not the slopes are constant. 
To determine whether the functional form used is correct, a test developed b), 
Ramse), (1969, 1970) is used (see also Pesaran and Pesaran 1987). If the computed F-
statistic is larger than the critical value, then the hypothesis that the functional form is 
appropriate is not accepted. 
Testing for heteroscedasticity 
Tests for the presence of heteroscedasticity are conducted b)' regressing the the square 
of the residuals from the estimated equation on the square of the filled values and a 
constant term (see for example Pesaran and Pesaran 1987). This can be illustrated as 
follows: 
where: )'1 is the square of the fined values; 
C is a constant term; 
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~ is defined above. 
The nun hypothesis that. '" 0 is tested against the alternative hypothesis that $ ~ 0, on 
the basis of an p ·test. If the computed F-statistic is less than the tabulated value, the 
null hypothesis that the errors are not heteroscedastic is accepted. 
8.3 The estimated results 
The demand for money 
The estimated demand for real money balances is presented in Table 8.1. 1lle signs on 
all the coefficien(s are as expected, and based on t-tests, they are all statistically 
significant. Real GDP, Dum74 and the rate of interest are all statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level. The lagged rea] money supply is significant at the 10 per cen( 
level. Based on the Durbin-Watson statistic, the hypothesis that there is no serial 
correlation cannot be rejected. The computed Durbin-Watson statistic leads to the 
acceptance of the null hypothesis that serial correlation is not a problem. 
Strictly speaking, the Durbin-Watson test statistic is valid only when lagged values of 
the dependen( variable are not included amongst the regressors. If the equation contains 
lagged values of the dependent variable, the computed Durbin·Watson Statistic is likely 
to be biased towanls 2. This can lead to the hypothesis that there is no serial correlation 
not being rejccted when it should have been. However, the computed F·value for the 
Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation is 0.08. This is much less than the critical 
F (1, II) value of 4.84 at the 95 per centleve\. Thus, the hypothesis that there is no 
serial correlation, based on this test, is not rejected. 
Ramsey's RESET test suggests thaI there are no problems with the functional 
fonn used. Also, heleroscedasticity is not a problem. 
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Table 8.1 ~~mated regressioo results for the demand for mooey: Grenada, 1972· 
Parameter estimates 
Regressor Coefficient 5randaroerror T-ratio 
Constant 2.267 0.765 2.964 
In(Y) 0.275 0.146 1.887 
mer) -<}.407 0.221 -1.841 
Dum74 -0.232 0_099 -2.352 
In(M l (-l)/Pg(- I)) 0.276 0.169 1.631 
Diagonostic tests 
R-squared 0.759 F-sratistic F( 4, 12) 9.437 
R-bar-squared 0.678 S.E. of regression 0.074 
Res sum square 0.065 Mean of dep. var. 3_825 
S.D. of dep. var. 0.130 Max of log·likelihood 23.173 
~'X;t~~fation fiAgl Durbin's h-sratistic -8il1~ Functional fonn 
(Lo~emul~rF(] , tl)) (Rmnsey', RESETF(t.tl)) 
Heteroscedasticity FC I,15) 0.002 
The short-run income elasticity of the demand for money balances is 0.28, while 
in the long run the elasticity is 0.38.1 This suggest that if income is increased by 1 per 
cent, the real demand for money balances, narrowly defined, is expected to increase by 
0.28 per cent in the short run. In the long run, the expected increase in the real demand 
for money balances is expected to be 0.38 per cent The interest mte elasticity of the 
demand for money balances is -0.41 in the short run, and 0.56 in the long run. The 
implication is that if the deposit rate of interest were 10 be increased by I per cent, the 
non-bank public would respond by decreasing ilS demand for real money balances by 
0041 per cent in the short run. In the long run, the demand for real money balances is 
expected 10 be decreased by 0.56 per cent as a result of the 1 per cent increase in the 
deposit rate of interest. 
1 The long.run e\ru;ticily is comPUled by the following formu la: £1'" £,/(1 • 0), wllere E] is the Iong·run 
elasticity, f , i~ the short·run elasticity on the variable of intcrc5t, 0 is the coefficient on the 13gged· 
dcpcndcntvariable. 
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The mean adjUSUTJeni time for- the non-bank public to achieve desired real 
money balances is approximately 4.6 months.2 II does not seem unreasonable that the 
non-bank public can achieve desired real money balances in a relatively shon time 
period. 
The estimated magnitude of the income and interest rate elasticities of the 
demand for real money balances is within the range obtained in money demand studies 
(Ml definition) of other developing counlries, including Caribbean countries. See for 
example Adekunle (1968), Fan and Liu (1971), Howard (1979), Wong (1977), 51. Cyr 
(1979), Darra! (1985), Hague, Lahiri and Montiel (1990) 
The rate of inOation 
Grenada's price inflation model is presented in Table 8.2. This equation has been 
estimated by lhe Cochrane-Orcun iterative method to correct for the presence of fll'Sl 
order serial correlation.] The imponed inflation parameter is statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. However, the deviation of real output from irs trend level as a 
proxy for excess demand pressures was nor statistically significant in detennining 
domestic price inflation, although it was correctly signed. 
The parameter of the first order autoregressive error specification is negatively 
signed. and statistically significant based on t-tests at the 5 per cent level. This 
indicates the presence of serial correlation. thus requiring an estimation technique other 
than OLS. 
According to the results, foreign prices and the exchange rale exen a very strong 
effect on domestic consumer prices. If the domestic price of impons increases by I per 
cent, consumer prices are expected to be increased by 70 per cent in the shon run. The 
2 The mean adjustment time can be: computed by !he following formula: T:o y/(1 • y). when: T is the 
mean adjUStment time, y is !he esUllUI\ed coefficient on !he lag-depcndcnt variable. 
3 The equation was initially estimated by OLS. bOl was found to be: affocted by serial correlation. 
Lagrange multiplier tests ICYC3lcd that the serial oorrclatiorl was of the first order. 
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imposed parameter on the lagged dependent variable would be 0.303. Therefore, the 
mean adjustment time is assumed to be just over five months. Thai is,.import prices are 
passed on to domestic prices quite rapidly. 
Table 8.2 ~mated regression results for the rate or inflation: Grenada, 1972 -
Parameter estimates 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error 
Constant -0.007 0.007 
bln(e+lnPim,) 0.697 0.Q71 
InY,·lnye 0.056 0.074 
.6Jn(P\.lj) 0.303 
Diagonostic Tests 
R-squared 0.914 F-statistic F(3, 12) 
R-bar-squared 0.892 S.E. of regression 
Res sum square 0.QI8 Mean of dep. vac 
S.D. of dep. Vat. O.1I4 Max of log-likelihood 
DW-statistic 2.252 Durbin's h-Slatistic 
Parameters of the autoregressive error specification 
~ = ·0.555~., + , 
(-2.256)' 
• T-raLio of autofegressive etrof spcdrlClltioo based on asymptotic standan:l cmJrs. 
T-ratio 
-0.917 
9.835 
0.761 
42.267 
0.039 
0.001 
31.706 
" 
These findings do not seem unrealistic considering the high degree of openness 
of the economy in terms of the ratio of imports to GDP, and the high ratio of imports to 
expenditure. In addition, the smallness of the economy means there is little possibility 
of substitution away from imponed intermediate to domestic production when impon 
prices are increased. These conditions are to a large extent responsible for the 
dominance of import prices as a detenrunant of domestic price inflation. The high 
degree of transmission of foreign inflation to the Grenadian economy is consistent with 
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the resuhs of other studies on Caribbean inflation. See for example Allen (1977) and 
Downes (1985). 
The coefficient on the excess demand proxy was 0.056, suggesting thai if the 
gap between real output and trend real output increases by 1 per cent, domestic price 
inflation will be affected by Jess than one tenth of 1 per cent. However lhis variable 
was found not to be statistically significant. This is not surprising, because the price 
inflation model is estimated with annual data and the sample size is relatively small. 
The unavailability of data on other possible detenninants of inflation, such as wage 
rates and commercial bank loan rates, precluded using other specifications. It is 
doubtful whelher statistically significant regressors other than import prices would be 
obtained. See for example Allen (1977). 
Exports of goods 
The results of the equation explaining Grenada's supply of merchandise exports is 
presented in Table 8.3. All the coefficients are correctly signed. The price of exports in 
domestic currency relative to domestic prices. the dummy variable capturing the effects 
of favourable weather in 1976, and rea] merchandise exports lagged one period are all 
statistically significant at the I per cent level. based on one-sided t-tests. The time 
trend, the dummy variable capturing the effects of weather in 1980. and the variable 
Dum845, capturing the effects of policy are statistically significant at the 5 per cent 
level. The Durbin-Watson statistic and the Lagrange multiplier lest indicate that serial 
correlation is not a problem. Ramsey's RESET suggest thai ther~ ~ no problems wilh 
the log-linear functional fonn used. Heteroscedasticity is also not a problem. 
The trend coefficient suggests that merchandise expon s grow at an average rate 
of l.8 per cem per annum. The coefficiem of the price of expons relative to domestic 
prices is 0.47. suggesting that if the relative price increases by I per cent, the volume of 
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c:xpons is expected to increase by just under 0.5 per cent two years later. The long-run 
price elasticity of exports is 7.72. Thus. if export prices relative to domestic prices are 
increased by 1 per cent, the volume of exports can be expeclai to increase in the long 
run by 2.72 per cent. According to the results, both good weather conditions caplUred 
by Dum76, and policy as DumS45, exerted a significant positive effect 0f1 the volume of 
merchandise exports. 
Table 8.3 Estimated regression results for merchandise exports: Grenada, 1972 • 
1988 
Parameter estimates 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ralio 
Constant 0.489 0.535 0.913 
~;(~~)+lnPxf('l)- InPg{.2) O.ot8 0.008 2.206 0.474 0.127 3.740 
Dum76 0.340 O.116 2.932 
Dum80 -0.253 0.102 -2.473 
Dum845 0.184 0.083 2:214 
In(Ex~.I)) 0.826 0.153 5.416 
Diagonostic tests 
R-squared 0.922 F-staristic F(6,1O) 19.634 
R-bar-squared 0.875 S.E.ofregression 0.095 
Res sum square 0.090 Mean of dep. vat. 3.948 
S.D. of dep. var. 0.268 Max of log-likelihood 20.419 
OW-statistic 1.822 Durbin'sh-statistic 0.471 
Serial correlation 0.096 Functional fonn 2.890 
(Lo, ... .., ... ultiplierF(I.9)) (RItN.y.RESIIT F(I,9j) 
HeteroscedasticityF(1,15) 1.415 
The volume of merchandise expons shows a mean adjustment time of 
approximate ly five years. The implication is that if there is a change in the relative 
price of exports, about five years are required before the level of rea1 exports adjusts 10 
176 
the desired level. This adjustment time seems reasonable since merchandise exportS 
consist mainly of tree crops. 
The results are consistent with other studies of developing countries. In 
particular, the price elasticity is within the range obtained by other researchers (see for 
example Khan 1974). 
Export of services 
The estimated equation for Grenada's exports of services is presented in Table 8.4. The 
coefficients possess the signs predicted by economic theory. Foreign consumer prices 
relative to domestic consumer prices, the dummy variable capturing the effects of 
political instability in Grenada in 1974, and expons of services lagged one period are all 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. The dummy variable which captured 
promotional effects overseas in 1985 was statistically significant at 5 per cent, while 
foreign income was significant at 10 percent 
The Durbin-Watson statistic is within the inclusive region, although the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable makes it biased towards 2. The Lagrange 
multiplier test allows us to accept the hypothesis that serial correlation is not a problem 
with the estimated results. In fact, the F-statistic for the Lagrange multiplier test is quite 
low, leading to acceptance of the hypothesis. that there is no serial correlation. with a 
high degree of confidence. The F-statistic for the test of the functional fonn is also very 
low, indicating that the functional form was appropriate. The test for heteroscedasticity 
allows us to accept the hypothesis that the errors were nOl helerosc~astic. 
The shon-run foreign income elasticity of service expons is 0.82. The 
implication is thaI if foreign real GOP is increased by 1 per cent, Grenada's expons of 
services can be expected 10 increase by 0.82 per cent. The long-run elasticity is 1.13. 
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The response of expons of SCJVices is elastic with respect to foreign consumer prices 
(denominated in domestic currency), relative to domestic 
Table 8.4 l~mated regression results for eJ:ports of services: Grenada, 1972 • 
Parameter estimates 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio 
Constant -1.943 2.362 -0.823 
In(y0 0.821 0.461 1.783 
lne+lnP'"-InP'= 1.084 0.392 2.767 
Dum74 -0.958 0.160 -6.009 
Dum85 0.280 0.140 2.006 
In(Ex~.I)) 0.271 0.098 2.761 
Diagonostic tests 
R-squared 0.898 F-statisticF(5,11) 19.303 
R-bar-squared 0.851 S.E.ofregression 0.127 
Res sum square 0.178 Mean of dep. var 3.920 
S.D. ofsep. Var. 0.330 Max or log-likelihood 14.624 
DW-statistic 2.463 Durbin'sh-statistic -1.043 
Serial correlation 1.176 Functional fonn 1.179 
~""elll"lIlplierF(1.I0» (Ron>oey·, RESETF(I.IO) 
HeleroscedasticityF(I,15) 0.488 
consumer prices. In Ihe shoo run, if foreign prices increase by I per cent, Grenada's 
exports of services are expected to increase by 1.08 per cent. In the long run, the 
increase in foreign consumer prices relative to the domestic consumer price index is 
expected 10 cause expons of services to increase by approximately 1.5 per cent. 
The petroleum price increase of 1973n4, and the political evenls of 1974 in 
Grenada exened a strong negative influence on the export of services. The coefficient 
on the variable was -0.958. Actively promoting Grenada as a tourist destination in 1985 
resulted in an increase in service exports. The coerficient on the dummy variable 
capturing this policy effects was 0.28. 
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The exports of services coefficient lagged one period was relatively small. The 
mean adjustment of actual exports of services to the desired level is approximately four 
and a half months. This speed of adjuslmenl seems reasonable. 
Imports of goods and services 
The regression explained 83 per cent of lIle variation in Grenada's imports of goods and 
services based on the adjusted R2 coefficient. All the coefficients in the equation for the 
demand for imports of goods and services were of the postulated signs. Real GDP, 
lagged imports of goods and services and the dummy variable capturing the effects of 
the oil price increase and the political situation in Grenada in 1974 were all statistically 
significant at the I per cent level. based on one-sided I-tests. The price of imports in 
domestic cum:ncy relative to the domestic implicit GOP deflator was statistically 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Based on the Durbin-Watson test statistic, the hypothesis that scrial correlation 
is nOI a problem with the estimated equation cannot be rejected. The computed statistic 
lies in the inconclusive region. However, the Lagrange multiplier test indicates that the 
hypothesis that there is no serial correlation should not be rejected. The computed 
Ramsey's RESET F-statistic allows us to reject the hypothesis that the functional form 
used is not appropriate. 
The short-run income elasticity of the demand for imports of goods and services 
is 0.45, indicating that if income were to be increased by I per cent. the demand for 
imports or goods and services would be increased by just over 0.45 per cent. The long-
run income elasticity of demand for imports is 0.69. 
The demand for imports is inelastic with respect to prices. The estimated short-
run price elasticity of demand for imports of goods and services is -0.38, while the long-
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run price elasticity is -0.59. If the foreign price of imports is increased by 1 per cent, 
imports of goods and 
Table 8.5 Estimated regression results for Goods and Services: Grenada, 1972 -
1988 
Parameter estimates 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ratio 
Constant 0.911 0.809 1.126 
Jo(Y) 0.448 0.167 2.686 
Ine+lnPimr - loPt -0.381 0.l73 -2.198 
Dum74 '().440 0.102 -4.299 
In(Imgs(_LV 0.354 0.105 3.378 
Diagonoslic tests 
R-Squared 0.876 F-staristicF(4,12) 21.155 
R-bar-squared 0.834 S.E.ofregression 0.081 
Res sum square 0.079 Mean of dep_ var 5.093 
S.D. of dep. var. 0.199 Max of log-likelihood 21.589 
DW-statistic 1.285 Durbin'sh-statistic 1.635 
Serial correlation 2.299 Functional Conn 3.252 
n..P"',~mWtiptie,F(1.I1» (Romsey'.RESETF(I.II» 
Heteroscedasticily F(l.IS) 0 .062 
services are expected to decrease by 0.38 per cent in the short run, and by 0.59 
per cent in the long run. The oil price increase and the political situation which existed 
in Grenada in 1974 both had a negative effect on the demand for imports of goods and 
services. The coefficient on the dummy variable capturing this effect is -0.44. 
Rea] imports of goods and services shows a mean adjustment time of six and a 
half. This result suggests that importing firms are able to meet their domestic demand 
in a relatively short time. This is not surprising given the proximity and accessibility of 
Grenada to highly competitive US sources of supply. It is also consistent with the 
finding that the excess demand variable was not a strong determinant of domestic 
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inflation, even in the shon run. One implication is that any monetary disequilibrium 
can be quickly corrected through the balance of payments. Thus,. if the monetary 
authorities were to finance government expenditures by cencral bank credit, a balance of 
payments deficit could quickly develop. 
The overall results for imports of goods and services do not seem unreasonable. 
The elasticities are within the range obtained for other developing countries (see for 
example Khan 1974). 
Real private expenditure 
The results of the econometric estimation of real private expenditure are presented in 
Table 8.6. The equation fitted reasonably well, explaining 92 per cent of the variation 
of private expenditure according to the adjusted Rl. All the coefficients posessed the 
expected signs. Based on one-sided t-tests, all the explanatory variables except the rate 
of interest were statistically significant at 1 per cent; the rate of interest was not 
statistically significant. 
The Durbin-Watson test of the hypothesis [hat there is no serial correlation, and 
a two-sided alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected because the computed Durbin-
Watson statistic of 1.55 fal1s within the inconclusive region. However, the Lagrange 
multiplier test suggests that the hypothesis that there is no serial correlation should not 
be rejected. The computed F-statistic of 0.44 is much less than the critical va1ue. Also, 
heteroscedasticity was not a problem. 
Based on Ramsey's RESET test, the hypothesis that the functional fonn is 
appropriate is not rejected with a fair degree of confidence. 
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Table 8.6 Estimated regression results for private expenditure: Grenada, 1972 • 
1988 
Parameter estimates 
Regressor Coefficient Standard error T-ralio 
Constant ·1.387 0.589 -2.354 
In(Yd) 1.026 0.143 7.175 
IIl(r) -.209 0.169 -1.236 
OumS3 -0.198 0.068 -2.927 
In (PDEM(_ I ~ 0.324 0.102 3.171 
Diagonostic tests 
R-squared 0.941 F-statistic F(4,11) 47.516 
R-bar-squared 0.921 S.E. of regression 0.061 
Res sum square 0.045 Mean of dep. var 5.154 
S.D. of dcp. var. 0.218 Max of log-likelihood 26.270 
DW-statistic 1.554 Durbin's h-statistic 1.013 
Serial correlation 0.440 Functional fonn 0.851 
(Lo~ran l< ""dl;plictF(1.1l )) (Ra ..... y" , KESETF(1.1 1)) 
Heteroscedasticity Fel.I S) 0.204 
As real disposable income increases, private expenditure is expected to increase. 
The disposable income elasticity of private expenditure is 1.03 in the short run. The 
implication is that if disposable income is increased by I per cent, private expenditure 
increases by just over 1 per cenl in the shan run. In the long run, private expenditure 
can be expected to increased by approximately 1.5 per cent for a 1 per cent increase in 
disposable income. 
This estimated long-run income elasticity of private expenditure of 1.5 involves 
a violation of the private budget constraint. One approach to get round this problem 
could have been to resu"ictthe incOlT"IC elasticity to 1.0 in the long run. The main reason 
for not imposing this restriction is because private capital movementS are ellogenous 
and comprise an important component of expenditure income. 
Interest rates are not very significant in detennining private expenditure in 
Grenad:l. Although there are no formal credit rationing policies by commercial banks, 
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the small population makes it such that loan managers know their customers personally. 
Thus, the relationship between the customer and the loan manager. and the character of 
the customer also influence commercial bank credit. These other factors may have been 
responsible for the low significance of interest rates in detennining private cllpenditure 
in Grenada. 
As the interest rate increases, the private 5e(:tQr is expected to decrease ilS 
expenditure. However, the decrease in private expenditure is not expected to be large. 
For a 1 per cent increase in the rate of interest. private expenditure can be expected to 
decrease by 0.21 per cent in the shon run. In the long run a larger increase in private 
c)(pendilure can be expected. A I per cent increase in the rate of interest would result in 
private expenditure decreasing by n.3l per cem. 
Real private expenditure adjusts to the desired level relatively fast. The mean 
adjustment time is just under six months. This speed of adjustment is consistent with 
the relatively fast speed of adjustment of imports. The implication is that once 
expenditure decisions are made, their implementation is not subject to long delays. 
8.4 Conclusions 
The macroeconomic model of the Grenadian economy fonnulated in the previous 
chapter. and the estimation and examination of the individual equations through 
diagonostie testing in this chapter. suggest a relatively sound foundation for the 
simulation of the model and the policy analysis in the next chapter, Several 
observations can be made about the resulK 
The effects of interest rates on the demand for money ' is not very strong. 
However, the relatively low interest elasticity of the demand for money does imply 
relatively large adjustments in interest rates to changes in money supply or income. In 
tenus of the impact of changes in money supply on economic activity, it serves to 
compensate somewhat for the low interest elasticity of private expenditure. 
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Import prices are the main detenninant of the rate of change of the consumer 
price index in Grenada. Domestic influences on the movement of the consumer price 
index seem to be weak. This is hardly surprising given that the economy is very small 
and very open, and that the exchange rate is pegged. 
Grenada's merchandise expons are price inelastic. Because: they consist maioly 
of agricullural conunodities, a change in any or the detenninams is expected 10 be felt al 
least two years later. As the bulk of merchandise cxpons are cocoa and nutmeg, it is 
not surpri si ng that some five years were required before thcy were fully able to adjust to 
their desired level. 
Expons of services, which consist mainly of tourism, are somewhat inelastic with 
respect to foreign income. but elastic with respect 10 prices. Special events such as 
political instabil ity have a strong negative impact on service exports. On the other 
hand, promotional activities appear to have positively affe(;ted service exports, but to a 
lesser extent than political instability. Given the fact that changes in domestic 
consumer prices are mainly due to import price changes, there is little which can be 
done to increase service exportS, except to create a more stable political environment 
and to pursue promotional activities. A devaluation would have little effecl 
It is not surprising that imports are price inelastic. Because the e(;onomy is very 
small, there is not much scope for substitution to domestic products when the prices of 
impons increase relative to domestic prices. It is also not surprising that political events 
in 1974 reduced the demand for imports of goods and services since they adversely 
affected exportS of services which have a high impon content. 
Real private eKpenditure was found 10 be elastic with respect to real disposable 
income. The influence of the interest rate, however, is quite weak. That is, private 
expenditure is not very sensitive to interest r:lte changes. Too much should not be made 
of this poinl An interest elasticity of -.02 implies that a rise in the interest rate from 10 
per cent 10 12 per cent ( that is, an increase of 20 per cent) will cause a fall in total real 
private expenditure of 4 per cent. In absolute tenns Ihis could have quite substantia! 
effects on real GDP and impons. 
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CHAPTER 9 
DYNAMIC PROPERTIES OF THE MODEL 
9.1 Inlroduction 
The primary purposes of this chapter are to evaluate the explanatory power of the model 
and to determine the potential effects of alternative policy options and foreign shocks 
on the Grenadian economy_ The economic shocks provide the basis for testing the third 
hypothesis of the study. 
The model is solved and simulated using ESP: The Econometric Software 
Package by Mikros Corporation (1987). To tesllhe explanatory power of the model, a 
dynamic ex-post (historical) simulation is performed for the period 1973 to 1988. For 
this simulation, the observed values of exogenous variables are used for each year. The 
observed initial values of the lagged endogenous variables are used; but otherwise, the 
model uses its own predicted values of endogenous variables. It is evident, therefore, 
that Ihe simulation procedure makes strOng demands on the model. 
Funher examination of the properties of the model is undenaken by simulating 
the -model with a number of exogenous shocks. In effect, various exogenous policy 
variables are allowed 10 follow different time paths, and comparisons are made between 
what actually took place, and what would have taken place as a result of the alternative 
policies. First, the set of alternative policy options are detennined. Then, the model is 
resimulated incorporating the allemative policy options. The simulation results are 
reponed in tenns of percentage changes in the key endogenous variables from their 
baseline paths. 
Each simulation consists of solving the model with at least one exogenous 
variable changed. The shocks considered are a 10 per cent increase of the East 
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Caribbean dollar price of one US dollar, a 10 per cen! increase in real government 
expenditure on goods and services; a 10 per cent decrease in the foreign prices of 
merchandise exports with and without a 3 per cent devaluation of the EaSt Caribbean 
dollar, a 10 per cent increase in the foreign prices of imports of goods and services; a 
simultaneous 10 per cent increase in the foreign prices of merchandise expons, impons 
of goods and service prices. and foreign consumer prices; a simultaneous 10 per cent 
increase of the foreign prices of merchandise exports, imports of goods and service 
prices, and foreign consumer prices accompanied by a 10 per cent decrease of the 
domestic currency price of one US dollar. Each shcx:k is assumed to occur in the base 
year 1973, and to be maintained through to the final year of the simulation, 1988. All 
other exogenous variables talee their observed historical values. 
Since the increases of real govemmem expenditure must be financed, attention 
is given to two altemative means of financing: an increase in central bank credit to the 
government, and an increase in direct taxation. 
9.2 Within sample simulation and evaluation of the model 
Although each of the individual equations which comprise the model possesses 
excellent statistical propenies. the model could still perfonn very badly as a 
simultaneous system. This can occur if proper mechanisms are nOt built into the model 
to link the various sectors. Because the model is to be used for policy analysis, it is 
extremely imponant that it is ftnil evaluated. One method of evaluating macroeconomic 
models is to detennine how closely the endogenous variables of the mOOel track the 
historical data series. Some of the statistical measures which are commonly used to 
judge the perfonnance of endogenous variable simulations are the rOOt-mean-square 
error (RMSE), the root-mean-square per cent error (RMSPE). and Theil's inequali ty 
coefficient (U) (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 198 1). 
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The root mean square error auempts to eva1uale the simulation of an endogenous 
variable by squaring the sizes of the simulation error. This method avoids the 
cancelling of negative and positive errors. An attractive feature of this approach is that 
by squaring the errors, larger weights are given to large errors. The RMSE can be 
expressed as follows: 
RMSE = [~.l:(Y ... Y,")']' 
T",t 
where: y. and y . are the simulated and actual values respectively; 
T is the number of observations in the sample. 
(9.1) 
A weakness of this statistic is that it focuses on absolute deviations of a 
simulated variable from its acrual path, and is thus unsatisfactory for comparisons 
involving variables with differenl units of measurementS of different average values. 
To overcome this deficiency, the rool mean square percent error (RMSPE) can be used. 
It measures the deviation of the simulated variable from its aClUai time path in 
percentage ICons. The RMSPE can be expressed as follows: 
[ 1 (Y"Y"]'j' RMSPE = . 1: -'--' 
T o-I YI " 
(9.2) 
where: Y'; y. and T are defmed above. 
Another commonly used measure for evaluating tne simulation properties of 
macroeconomic models is tne Theil's inequali ty stat istic (U). This is defined as follows: 
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[ '-i(Y,'-Y,,~ ]' T·' u (9.3) 
[ '-i(Y,'~]'+ ['oilY,,),]' 
T I=I T l>ol 
where: Y'; y. and T are defined above. 
As defined, U can lie between 0 and 1. The smaller U is, the better is the fit. If 
for example U is equal to 0, lhen y. equals y. for all t. This would be indicative of a 
perfect fil If on the other hand U := 1, then y. and y. are unrelated. 
Table 9.1 presents test statistics for the results of simulation of 12 of the 
endogenous variables of most interest 10 the study. To facilitate comparisons, actual 
mean values of the endogenous variables are also provided. The results suggest that the 
tracking ability of the model is quile reasonable. In faci the statistics are comparable 10 
those obtained for edler developing country models. See, for example, Lipumba et at. 
(1988), Ikhide (1988), Kwack et al. ( 1989), Ghartey and Rao (1990). 
Table 9.1 Measures of forecast accuracy of selected endogenous variables 
Endogenous variables 
Merchandise exports 
Service exports 
Imports 
Tradeba1aJlce 
Consumer prices 
GDPdenalOr 
Private expenditure 
GOP 
Government revenue 
Interest rate 
Government foreign borrowing 
and grant aid 
Nctforeign assets 
Root Mean 
Square Error 
Mean value (RMSE) 
54. 14 7.3 
5 1.53 4.9 
163.54 8.0 
-62.93 7.2 
1.00 0.D2 
0.99 0.06 
175.40 21.1 
202.67 24.9 
62.13 6.7 
10.17 2.3 
18.18 2.5 
22.49 7.9 
188 
Root Mean 
Square 
Percent 
(RMSPE) 
12.7 
9.9 
5.' 
12.8 
2.8 
5.7 
13.6 
13.0 
lOA 
21.8 
20.6 
25.5 
Theil's 
Inequality 
Coefficient 
(U) 
0.06 
0.05 
0.02 
0.05 
0.01 
0.Q2 
0.06 
0.06 
0.05 
0.11 
0.05 
0.14 
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The consumer price index was tracked extremely well, exhibiting the lowest root 
mean square per cent error, as well as the lowest Thei:'s inequality 'coefficient. The 
worst performer was net foreign assets. A possible explanation is that errors from 
merchandise exports, service exports, imports of goods and services, and government 
foreign borrowing and grant aid all feed into net foreign assets, an identity largely 
detennined by these variables. Real private expenditure and real GOP did nOI simulate 
very well. 
The main results for the key endogenous variables of the historical simulation 
are presented graphically in Figures 9.1 to 9.3. An interesting feature of the results is 
that the model reproduces the general trends for mOSt variables, including sharp upturns, 
and downturns. In particular. consumer price and the implicit GOP deflator behaviour 
are reproduced extremely well. 
9.3 The effects of exogenous shocks to the Grenadian economy 
Experiment 1: Devaluation of the East Caribbean dollar 
The objective of this experiment is to analyse the likely impact of devaluation on Ihe 
Grenadian economy. Since, in fact. one consequence of membership of the EeMU is 
that the exchange rate cannot be used as an insuument of policy by individual member 
countries, the experiment should help to shed light indirectly on the implications for 
Grenada of this loss of autonomy. The impact of this experiment on selected variables 
is presented below. 
For a country which is a price-taker in international markets, a devaluation will 
cause the domestic prices of exponables and imponables to rise by an amount 
proponionately equal to the devaluation. According to the traditional literature on 
devaluation, domestic supply and demand responses to these price changes should lead 
to an improvement in the balance of trade and a boost to aggregate demand. 
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If there is surplus productive capacity, this will result in an expansion of real 
GDP. However, it is recognised thai to the extent that a devaluation exens upward 
pressure on the cost of living and money wages, these positive effects may be lost. 
There have also been lively debates about whether a devaluation may actually 
lead to an economy's contraction. For a comprehensive discussion of these issues, see 
for example Oiaz-Alejandro (1965), Cooper (1971), Krugman and Taylor (1978). 
Gylfason and Rasager (1984), van Wijnbergen (1986) and Branson (1986). One reason 
for contractionary consequences of devaluations is thai by reducing real balances, a 
devaluation can cause a reduction in aggregate demand. Funhennore. it has been 
argued thaI a devaluation may cause income redistribution from groups in the economy 
with a low marginal propensity to save, to those with a high marginal propensity 10 
save, thus reducing aggregate demand and output. Another channel through which a 
devaluation may be comractionary is through its positive effects on the prices of 
intennediate goods. These can cause an upward shift of the aggregate suppLy schedule, 
and thus a fall of output. 
In Grenada, the initial impact of the simulated devaluation is to increase the 
local currency price of ex.poned and imponed goods and selVices relative to domestic 
prices generally. Domestic consumer prices increase by approximately 7 per cent, 
while the GDP deflator increases by just over 5 per cent in the year of the devaluation. 
Since Grenada is a price4taker in international markets, expon and impon prices 
increase by the full amount of the devaluation, resulting in an increase of foreign 
consumer prices (convened to EaSt Caribbean dollars) relative to domestic consumer 
prices of 3 per cent, and an increase of merchandise expon prices. and impon prices 
relative to the implicit GDP deflator of JUSt under 5 per cent. As a result, service 
expons increase by approximately 3 per cent, and impons fa ll by JUSt over I per cent. 
Due to the lagged effects of prices on merchandise expons, there is no impact on reaL 
merchandise expons in the year of the dcvaluation. 
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As a result of the initial increase in the volume of service expons and the fall in 
volume of impons of g~s and services. the trade ba1ance $hows an initial 
improvement of just over 4 per cent. As expons of services fall. and real impons of 
goods and services increase. the improvement of the trade balance is diminished. When 
merchandise expons respond two years later to the devaluation. the trade balance again 
improves relative to the previous year. Thereafter, as merchandise expons and service 
expon s decline to their pre-devaluation levels. and imports of goods and services 
increase to their pre-devaluation levels. and as higher domestic prices offset the positive 
effects of the devaluation. the trade balance continues to fall. 
By increasing the domestic currency value of impons of goods and services. the 
base for impon taxes is increased. In addition. because of general price increases. 
nominal GOP is increased. Thus. government revenue. which depends on the level of 
nominal GOP and the domestic currency value of imports, is increased because of the 
devaluation of the East Caribbean dollar. Initially. government revenue increases by 
just over 6 per cent. reaching a maximum increase of approximately 12 per cent two 
years later. At the end of the simulation period. nominal government revenue is 
increased by 10 per cent. 
As its revenue increased. the government became less dependent on foreign 
borrowing and grant aid to finance its expenditure. Foreign bonowing and grant aid 
(denominated in US dollars) initially fell by 2 per cent. As a result. net foreign assets 
initially fell despite the initial improvement of the trade balance. By the end of the 
simulation period. foreign borrowing and grant aid relUrned to the pre·devaluation level. 
The initial increase in service expons. and the fall in impons of goods and 
services results in an initial increase of real GOP of just over I per cent. Real private 
expenditure fell by just under I per cent, as real disposable income fell, possibly due to 
a fall in real government transfer payments, (which was not indexed) to the domestic 
private sector. 
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Within two years of the devaluation. both the domestic consumer price index 
and the GOP deflator increase by the full extent of the devaluation. thus eroding the 
initial gain in competitiveness. Service exports and impons of goods and services thus 
return to their pre-devaluaoon levels. Afler their initial lagged increase. men;:handise 
exports slowly decline to their pre-devaluation level. 
Simulation of a devaluation of the East Caribbean dollar resulted in a temporary 
increase in real variables such as merchandise expons, expons of services, and real 
GOP, bUI these variables returned 10 their prc-devaluation levels by the end of the 
period. Nomina] variables such as consumer prices. the implicit GOP deflator and 
government revenue increased by an amount proportionately equal 10 the devaluation, 
and remained at the new levels. 
Experiment 2: An ECeB financed fiscal expansion 
The likely impact of financing increased government expenditure by central bank 
credit, is analysed in this experiment. As one of the consequences of membership of the 
ECMU is that Grenada (as well as the other members) is tightly restricted in its access 
to credit from the central bank, the counter·factual exploration of a large 
fiscaJImonetary shock should help indirectly to assess the implications of this loss of 
monetary autonomy for Grenada. 
To facilitate this experiment. the closure of the model was modified. Central 
bank credit to the government was made endogenous so that it accommodated the 
revenue requirement for financing the increased government expenditure. Fore ign 
borrowing and grant aid which were endogenously detennined by the model were made 
exogenous. The changes required involved modifying equation (6.30) as illustrated by 
(9.4). 
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(e.FAB) (9.4) 
The initial effect of the increase in govemmenl expenditure is to increase real 
GOP relative to the actual 1973 level by approximately 6 per cent, although before the 
end of the l6-year period real GOP relUms to its actual or pre-shocked levels. Increased 
central banIc credit to the government bank directly increases total central bank credit, 
the monetary base, and the nominal money supply. The increased money supply works 
towards causing interest rates to fall. Increased GOP, however, exens an opposite 
effect on interest rates. As the demand for money increases, interest rales tend to 
increase. The net effect is an increase in interest rates of approximately g per cent 
above the base leveL 1 The net increase of imerest rates exens a downward pressure on 
private expenditure. However, increased GOP results in increased disposable income 
which offsets the negative effect of interest rates, causing real private expenditure to 
increase by just over 4 per cent. 
Increased GOP exens upward pressure on prices. Steady increases in the 
consumer price index, and the GOP deflator occur, reaching 3 per cent at the end of the 
simulation period. Increased domestic prices cause loss of competitiveness and depress 
exports of both goods and services. Merchandise exports decrease by Just under 9 per 
cent by the end of the simulation period. Service exports fall by approximately 4 per 
cent by the end of the pericxl. At the same time real impons of goods and services 
increase, to just under 3 per cent above control, due to increased domestic prices and 
increased real GOP. As real GOP eventually faUs, so do impons o.f goods and services. 
Towards the end of the simulation pericxl, importS of goods and services return to the 
control level. 
I Bybeing8pcrccntabovet/1.ebasele~cl,iflheintcrestnl1cwasinilially 10 pcr cent. the ncw Icvei 
wouldbc IO.8perccnt, not 18pcrcent. 
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The fall in exports, and increase in impons, cause the trade balance to 
deteriorate, leading to losses of net foreign assets. By the end of the simulation period, 
the trade balance deteriorated by approximately 12 per cent relative to the control level. 
while net foreign assets fell by approximately 300 per cent relative to the control level. 
Because the increased government expenditure 'crowd~ out' real net exports 
through increased inflation, real GOP returns to its pre·shocked level. Clearly, the 
central bank fmanced fiscal expansion has no real lasting effect on real GOP. However, 
it does worsen the trade balance which has adverse implications in tenns of dependency 
on aid and foreign borrowing. 
Experiment 3: A direct tax financed fLScal expansion 
The governmcnt can increase taxes to finance an increase in expenditure. This 
experiment is designed to investigate the impact of a sustained 10 per cent increase in 
real government expenditure on goods and sclVices, financed by direct taxes. 
To facilitate this experiment, the closure of the model was again modified. The 
direct tax rate was made endogenous so that it accommodated the revenue requ~ment 
for financi ng the increased government expenditure. Foreign borrowing and aid, which 
were endogenously determined by the model were made exogenous. The changes 
required involved modifying equations (7.25), (7.26) and (7.30) to (9.5), (9.6) and (9.7) 
respectively. 
To finance the increased real expenditure on goods and services, the direct taxes 
relative 10 nominal GOP increased initially by approximately 75 per cenL It remained 
between 50 per cent and 75 per cent above the pre-shocked level through to 1985. It 
reached a peak of approximately 225 per cent above the historical rale in 1986. This 
high peak is as a result of the abolition of personal income taxes in Grenada in 1986. 
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By the end of the simulation period. the rate falls to approximately 150 per cent above 
the historical rate in 1988. 
A sustained increase of 10 per cent in government expenditure on goods and 
services by itself has the potential effect of increasing GOP. However. since the 
expenditure is financed by increasing di rect taxes, disposable income is reduced by the 
amount of the increase in taxes. The initial effect of the reduced disposable income is 
to reduce real private expenditure by approximately 5 per cent. In effect, it involves a 
'crowding-out' of private expenditure by taking away resources from the private sector. 
By the end of the simulation period, real private expenditure returns to the control level. 
The initial effect of the reduction in private expenditure and the increase in 
government expenditure was a reduction in real GOP by approximately 0.7 per cent. 
However, at the end of the simulation period, GOP is 2 per cent above the control level. 
The initial fall of real GDP leads to the consumer price index falling by about 0.5 per 
cent. This causes exports of services to increase by approximately 0.05 per cent. The 
fall in GDP also causes imports of goods and services to decrease slightly. As a result 
of the increase of exports of services, and the fall of imports, the trade balance initially 
improves by about 1 per cent. Net foreign assets also increase. The increase in exports 
and the corresponding decrease in imports during much of the rest of the simulation 
period cause net foreign assets to accumulate. 
They reached a maximum of 20 per cent above the control level in 1982. At the 
end· of the period. net foreign assets are 5 per cent above control. 
An interesting observation of the simulation results is the inverse relationship 
which exists between the path of net foreign assets and the nlte of interest. As net 
foreign assets are increased they directly feed into the monetary base and the money 
supply. impacting on interest rates. 
The outcomes of experiments 2 and 3 show imponant differences. Experiment 
2, for example. resulted in a much larger worsening of the trade balance than 
experiment 3, by causing imports to increase and exports to decrease through its effect 
on relative prices. Experiment 2 also resulted in large losses of net foreign assets. 
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If experiment 3 can be taken as indicative of how an increase in government 
expenditure might be financed within the constraints imposed by membership of the 
ECMU, the comparison betwocn the two experiments 2 and 3 suggest that the limits 
that ECMU membership places on access to central bank credit docs not lead 10 any 
reduction in the long-run effectiveness of expansionary fiscal policy. In fact, the long-
run effectiveness is grealer than that of the credit-financed type of expansionary fiscal 
policy precluded by ECMU membership. 
Experiment 4: A fall in export prices 
This experiment is divided into two pans. lbe first part investigates the effects on the 
Grenadian economy of a fall in merchandise export prices. In the second pan, the fall 
in export prices is accompanied by a 3 per cent devaluation of the East Caribbean 
dollar. Three per cent is chosen so that the devaluation offsets the fall in domestic 
consumer prices which resulted from the 10 per cent faU in merchandise export prices. 
Although the rationale for the first part of this experiment docs not stem from 
membership of the ECMU, it is nevertheless of interest in terms of the likely impact on 
the Grenadian economy. At present, the prices which Grenada (like some of the other 
members of the ECMU) receives for its merchandise exports are boosted through 
special trading arrangements with the United Kingdom. One of the potential effects of 
the single European market after 1992 is that Grenada may lose its special trading 
arrangements. 
The rationale for the second part of the experiment is ~t1y related to 
membership in the Union. This is because (as was indicated above), one of the 
implications of joining a monetary union is that individual countries are no longer froc 
to alter their exchange rate vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Thus, the exchange rate 
cannot be used to regain competitiveness. In this experiment, a scenario is envisaged in 
which thc foreign price of merchandise exports falls by iO per cent in each year. In the 
second part of the experiment the exchange rate is devalued by 3 per cent in response to 
the hypothetical fall in merchandise exports prices. 
If merchandise export prices fall by to per cent. the effect is an immediate 
decrease in the relative price of expons and, two years later. a fall in real merchandise 
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exports of approximately 4 per cent below the control level. Merchandise exports then 
continue to fall, reaching approximately 13 per cent by the end of the period. 
The fall in merchandise export prices exertS downward prcss~ on domestic 
prices. The GDP deflator falls by around 2.5 per cent, leading to an initial fall in real 
imports of goods and services of around 1.5 per cent 
As prices fall, an increase in real money balances occurs, which tends to lower 
interest rates. Although real imports of goods and services fall by about 1.5 per cent, 
the reduction in merchandise export prices causes the trade balance to deteriorate by 
approximately 6 per cent. Net foreign assets fall by approximately 4 per cent, although 
government borrowing and aid increase by around 10 per cent The reduction in net 
foreign assets causes the money supply to fall, and puts upward pressure on interest 
rates, which rise about 2 per cent above the conb'o11evel. 
Lower export prices lowers nominal GOP and real disposable income, which 
together with the small increase in interest rates cause real private expenditure initially 
to fall by around 3 per cent. Notwithstanding the fall in real imports of goods and 
services, lower real private expenditures cause real GOP to fall by just over 1.5 percent. 
As real GOP falls, this pUIS downward pressure on prices, leading to an inc~ase in 
exports of services. By the end of the simulation period. real service exports increase 
by approximately 5 per cent relative to the control level. 
Beginning two years after the fall of export prices, real merchandise exports 
decline by around 4 per cent, causing the trade balance to deteriorate to about 20 per 
cent below the controllevel. However, as imports eventually fall by about 5 per cent, 
and exports of services increase by about 5 per cent, the trade balance returns to about 2 
per cent below the control level at the end of the simulation period. 
By the end of the period, the economy has contracted. Real GOP has fallen by 
about 1.5 per cent and real private expenditure by approximately 3 per cent. The GOP 
deflator has fallen by about 6 per cent, consumer prices by about 3 percent, government 
revenue by about 8 per cent. and interest rates by about 10 per cent, all relative to the 
controlleve1. 
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The initial effect of a 3 per cent devaluation accompanying the fall of 
merchandise export prices is to increase the local currency price of exports and imports 
relative to the situation where there was only a fall in merchandise export prices. 
ExportS of services increase by around I per cent However, within twO years, as 
domestic consumer prices increase by the full amount of the devaluation, the positive 
effects of the devaluation on exports of scl"lices is completely negated. 
Imports of goods and services fall by around 0.5 per cent, but quickly return 10 
the level which prevailed without devaluation. The initial increase in exports of 
services and the fall in imports of goods and services cause the trade balance to improve 
slightly relative to the no-devaluation case. A further temporary improvement occurs 
when merchandise exports increase slightly twO years after the devaluation. However, 
the trade balance is still worse than it was prior to the export price shock.. 
Although the trade balance improves relative to the no-devaluation scenario, net 
foreign assets initially fall due to the small decrease in foreign borrowing and grant aid 
as government revenue increases. From 1974, the improved uade balance causes net 
foreign assets to accumulate. The 10 per cent jump in net foreign assets (denominated 
in US dollars) in 1982 relative to the no devaluation shock. is the result of two factors. 
One is the accumulation of net foreign assets due to the shock. The other factor is the 
low level of net foreign assets in 1982. As can be observed from Table A6.1, there was 
a fall in the historical stock of net foreign assets in 1982. This created a smaller base 
on which percentage changes were computed. 
As exports of services initially increased, real GOP showed a small increase 
relative to the no-devaluation scenario. A further small temporary increase occurred 
when merchandise exports increased. The paths of real private expenditure and real 
imports of goods and services reflects the behaviour of real GOP. 
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Experiment 5: Increase in imporl prices 
Being a small country, Grenada cannot influence the price it pays for its imports. It also 
has a very open economy with imports being equivalent to about 17 per cent of GDP at 
current prices. Therefore, this experiment is of interest in that increases in the foreign 
prices of imports are likely to impact severely upon the Grenadian domestic price level. 
Like the previous scenario, this one does not by itself offer insights into the implications 
of membenhip of the ECMU, but is of interest in terms of providing an indication of 
another likely fonn of external shock. 
Initially, as import prices rise, real imports of goods and services fall by just 
over S per cent relative to the base control leveL At the same time, the consumer price 
index increases by about 6.S per cent, causing exports of services to become more 
expensive. As a result, exports of services fall by approximately 6.S per cent. 
Despite the fall in real imports of goods and services due to the increase in 
import prices, the low price elasticity of demand for imports plus a fall in revenue from 
exports of services causes the trade balance to deteriorate initially by about 13 per cent 
relative to the control level. As real merchandise exportS begin to fall two years later, 
the trade balance deteriorates further to approximately 30 per cent below the control 
level. 
Real private expenditure initially falls because of a decline in real disposable 
income brought about mainly by the rise in consumer prices; and this contributes 
heavily to the fall in real GOP. As both imports and GOP fall, government revenue 
dec'lines by about 2.S per cent. As a result, there is an increased need for foreign 
borrowing and to finance government deficits. Thus, net foreign assets increase by 
around S per cent, despite the wonening trade balance. 
At the end of the simulation period, the economy has contracted. Real exportS, 
imports, private expenditure and GDP are all below their control levels. Consumer 
prices are higher, and government revenues and interest mtes are lower. Foreign 
borrowing and aid are about IS per cent higher; while net foreign assets arc around 20 
per cenl higher, due to increased foreign borrowing and grant aid, although their real 
purchasing power over imports is only 9 per cent higher because of the rise in impon 
prices 
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Although experiments 4 and 5 both involve exogenous alternations of the tenns 
of trade, there are some important differences in the outcomes. The illCfeaSe in import 
prices causes domestic consumer prices to increase while the decrease in merchandise 
export prices causes prices to (all. Second, although both experiments caused real GOP 
to decline, the fall was more drastic for the import price increase. Third, after the 
increase of import prices. the GOP deflator returned to the conlrOlJeveilowards the end 
of the simulation period. In the case of the export price fall. the GOP deflator remained 
lower. Fourth, the increase of import prices resulted in an accumulation of net fore ign 
assets while the export fall caused the level oC net foreign assets to fall. 
Experimenl6: Increase in all foreign prices 
Although a small very open country may nOI be able to use the exchange rate for 
balance of payments purposes, exchange rate appreciation is a very useful instrument 
for combating imported inflation. With a fIXed exchange rate, an increase in all foreign 
prices of 10 per cen! causes real exports of services to increase by just over 3 per cent, 
due to an increase in foreign consumer prices relative to domestic consumer prices. As 
domestic consumer prices increase, exports of services return to the base level. Imports 
of goods and services initially fall by just over 2 per cent, but increase later as prices 
increase. However, the trade balance deteriorates by around 1.5 per cent because the 
nominal value of imports is greater than the nominal value of the increase in exports of 
services. When merchandise exports increase, this causes the trade balance to improve 
relative to the base period. When exports fall and imports increase, the trade balance 
As the increa.-.e in foreign prices is transmitted to the domestic economy, 
consumer prices and the GOP deflator increase. Consumer prices initially increase by 
approx.imately 7 per cent. Within twO years foreign price i.ncreases were fully 
transmitted to consumer prices. 
The GOP deflator was similarly affected. Despite the initial worsening of the 
trade balance, net foreign assets increased because foreign borrowing and gran! aid was 
increased. 
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If the mone tary authorities revalue the currency by to per cent in response to the 
foreign price increases. consumer prices remain at their base levels. The authorities can 
be successful in offselting imponed inflation. The paths of the other variables can be 
obseTYed in Figures 8.1910 Figures 8.21. 
The second pan of the experiment suggests that membership of the ECMU can 
impose costs on Grenada by preventing it from combating imported inflation through 
exchange rate appreciation. 
One aspect of inflation is that it reduces the real money balances of individuals. 
That is, the level of real balances is negatively related to the rate of inflation. The 
reduction of real money balances can be expected 10 result in welfare losses as more 
time would be spem by consumers shopping around to obtain their desired basket of 
goods. Conversely, if prices fall, welfare should increase as money balances increase. 
The welfare cost of inflation (benefits of disinflation) for Grenada can be 
computed using the approach by McCaUum (1989). This approach utilizes the estimated 
demand for money. For a full description of the methodology see McCallum (1989). 
If a plot is made of real money balances and nominal interest rales. (money 
balances on the horizonlal axis and interest rates on the vertical axis), Ihe welfare 
effects of price changes can be obtained. For a given change in the level of real money 
balances, the welfare effects are equivalent to the area under the demand curve between 
the initial and final positions. 
As discussed above, one of the consequences of Grenada's membership in Ihe 
ECMU is the loss of the ability to change the exchange rdte 10 off-sel imponed 
inflation. This could result in a welfare loss to society. 
From the money demand estimate. long-run income and interest rate ela~ti cities 
of demand of 0.38 and 0.56 respectively were obtained. 
We can therefore express the demand for money balances as: 
M~nlyn2r<O = en1 yO.3SrO·56 
where: M represenl~ real money balances 
yrepresentsrealGDP 
risas defined above. 
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Solving (9.8) for the interest rate: 
[ ] 
1.786 
r= C(J.I(y{M)O.38 (9.9) 
Taking the sampLe period 198210 1988, the average interest rate (prime lending 
rate) was 0.109 (10.9 percent). For that period, the average of yfM (calculated from the 
data in Appendix B2) was 0. 14. Therefore, the value of ea.l which satisfies (9.9) is 
1.97. 
During the sample period. the average annual rate of inflation was 0.04 (4 per 
cent). If the Grenadian authorities had been able to use the exchange rate to offset 
imported inflation, the nominal prime lending rate may have been 0.07 (7 per cent). At 
that interest rate yIM would fall 100.11. 
Arbitrarily setting y equal 10 1 will express welfare gain as a percentage of one 
year's GOP. By this rule the initial value of real money balances is M :::: 7 .08 and the 
final value is M = 8.98. The potential welfare gain from offsetting imported inflation 
can be computed by evaluating the defUlite integral as follows: 
(8.89 [~]I.786dM 
J 7.08 M 
f'·98 =(0.197)1.786 M-L786dM 
1.08 
:= (0.197)1.786 [ 8.98-0·786 _7.08-0.786 
·0.786 
:= 0.1 5682 
(9.10) 
These calculations suggest that if the Grenadian authorities were able to revalue 
the exchange rate 10 offset all imponed inflation (average annual revaluations of about 4 
per cent), this could have resulted in a social benefit equivalent to-jUSI over 15 per cent 
of GDP. In reality. however, actual welfare benefits would be much lower. It is 
doubtful whether the authorities would have been disciplined enough to manage a 
national central bank and pursue appropriate monetary and exchange rate policies. As 
results above have shown, even with the d iscipline imposed by the ECMU, the 
Grenadian government requested larger quantities of bank credit Ihan amounts 
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stipulated in the ECCB Agreement. Given the openness of the economy, and the 
potential for domestic money creation to lead to huge losses of foreign reserves. a 
domestic central bank may have instead resulted in an inappropriate use of bank credit, 
losses of foreign reserves and pressures on the exchange rate leading to subsequent 
devaluations and welfare losses. 
9.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, the theoretical model developed and estimated in Chapters 7 and 8 
respectively was solved. Based on statistical criteria for model evaluation, the model 
perfonned moderately well. The computed statistics were similar to those obtained 
from models of other developing countries. The graphical analyses also revealed that 
the model was able to track historical data reasonably well, including upswings and 
downswings. 
Subjecting the model to exogenous shocks provided valuable insights into the 
Grenadian economy. It penrolled investigation into some of the consequences of the 
loss of autonomy of exchange rate and monetary policy as a result of ECMU 
membership. 
The experiments suggest that the loss of the ability to conduct separate exchange 
nlte policies cannot be considered a cost to the economy in tenus of balance of 
payments adjusunent because prices in Grenada are highly influenced by developments 
abroad and by exchange rate changes. Inflation is largely imported. The positive 
effects of a devaluation are nullified within twO years and there is no lasting effects on 
real activity. On the other hand. the loss of the exchange rate as a policy instrumem 
means that imported inflation cannot be offset by currency appreciation. This loss can 
be considered a cost to the Grenadian economy. 
The loss of the ability to conduct independent mon~tary policy can be 
considered beneficial because it restricts the use of cem:ral bank financed government 
deficits. which could result in large losses of net foreign assets. 
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CHAPTER 10 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Summary ofthe main research findings 
The ECMU member countries share a number of characteristics which have made them 
suitable partners for a monetal)' union. One is their common historical background; 
they were all British colonies, and have always used a common currency. Another is 
their snull size (both in terms of land area and population); and a third is proximity to 
each other. The latter two mean that they often tend to experience similar problems. 
making it casy for the central bank to conduct common monetary and exchange rate 
policies. 
Economic performance. as measured by rates of growth of GDP, has varied 
considerably both among the countries and over time. Generally. however, real rales of 
growth have been positive in most years. Despite the constraints due to small size, 
narrow resource bases, and the influence of hurricanes, the economies of the ECMU 
members have on average performed moderately well during the period 1978 through 
1988. 
During the period 1981 to 1988, the ECMU countries experienced much lower 
inflation rates than most other Caribbean countries (an exception is Barbados which 
experienced similar inflation rales). In fact, the innation rates of Jamaica, Trinidad, and 
Guyana were at least twice as high as those in the ECMU member countries. Compared 
with most other developing country regions. the ECMU member countries also 
experienced low innation rates during the 1980s. Their average innation rates 
resembled those observed in East Asian developing countries and the industrial 
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countries, a possible indication that the union provided tighter monetary policies than 
other developing countries. 
Although revenues have lagged behind expenditures, relatively small 
percentages of government deficits were financed by central bank credit. Allhough the 
ECMU countries lacked developed financial markets in which their governmentS could 
obtain funds to finance their deficits. on average the proportion of deficits financed by 
central bank credit was no larger than 13 per cent. This was much lower than that 
observed among developing oountties other than the rapidly growing East Asian 
oountties. It resembled the percentage of deficits financed by central banks in industrial 
countries which have well developed domestic fmancial markets. The restrictions 
imposed by the monetary union were the main reason. Governments werc forced to 
tum to foreign sources of finance, panicularly concessional assistance. 
Given thai member governments are likely to have widely divergent objectives 
and may each attempt to exert pressure on the central banking authorities 10 achieve 
their particular objectives, the implementation of the policies of the common central 
bank are greatly facilitated by the common standards oudined in the Bank Agreement. 
These binding rules have assisted policy decisions, and have caused dissenting opinions 
to converge around the rules. Equal representation on the Monetary Council and the 
Board of Directors has also reduced potential conflicts. 
In short, the ECCB Agreement has provided a comprehensive framework within 
which central banking activities in the ECMU are conducted. Where conflicts arise, 
and/or members wish 10 lennina!e their membership, the Agreement explicitly lays 
down the procedures to be followed, thus reducing uncertainties about the Union. An 
important aspect of the Agreement is that sufficient flexibility in policics is allowed if 
unanimous agreement can be obtained. 
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Because the level of credit genenlly available from the central bank is directly 
related 10 a government's ability to generate its own domestic revenue, this can be 
benefICial in forcing the governments to improve the efficiency of taxation. 
Despite the fact that the Bank. Agreement has specified fixed percentages of 
credit which may be extended to the governments, the limits varied with respect to 
individual member country governments. AeJtibility provides special consideration for 
member CQUntries in times of need. Although approval of any variation must be 
unanimous, in special circumstances, for eumpie when a country is devastated by a 
hurricane, such approval is likely to be obtained.. 
The joint institution saved overhead COSts of individual counnies compared with 
a hypothetical silUation in which each had its own central bank. Assunring a central 
bank of the same size and scope as the ECCB for each member country. potential 
annual savings from lower overhead costs may have ranged from 0.5 per cent of GOP in 
Antigua to approximately 3 per cent in Montserrat over the period 1975 to 1988. A 
more moderate assumption that a central. bank of one-haif the size of the ECCB would 
have been required in each country. suggests potential annual savings ranging between 
0.2 per cent in Antigua to just over I per cent of GOP in Montserrat. Clearly. 
membership in the ECMU has been beneficial in this respect. 
The similarity of production and demand struclUres have limited intra-union 
trade so that it has not become a very significant component of total trade. Thus, 
despite the geographic proximity of the ECMU member counoies. and the use of a 
single currency, the level of intra-union trade is extremely small. Grenada. for example, 
on average imponed less than 3 per cent of its total impons from intra-union markets. 
and sold less than 2 per cent of its expons to its union partners from the period 1970 to 
1988. The average annual potential benefits from the elimination of the need for 
foreign reserves ror intra-union trade wert thus much less than two-tenths of one per 
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cent of GOP. Potential benefits from the elimination of the cost of money conversion 
are also likely to have been very small 
Although it was not possible to quantitatively estimate potential benefits from 
the elimination of exchange risks. the low level of intra-union trade suggests that the 
benefits are presumably also very small. 
ExportS from the ECMU countries are concentrated in a few primary 
conunodities (banana. cocoa, nutmeg and sugar), and tourism. Expon earnings are 
highly correlated. The high degree of concentration of exports and correlation of expon 
earnings of the ECMU member countries limits the benefits which can be derived from 
a monetary union through economising on foreign n:serves held as a buffer against 
inlcmational instability transmiued from third countries. Economic shocks in a 
panicular market, especially with respect 10 tourism, are likely to affect most ECMU 
countries. Thus. there seems to be linle scope for benefits from the reduced need for 
foreign reserves in relation to transactions with the rest of the world. 
The EeMU seems to have contributed to the stability of the East Caribbean 
dollar. Since its introduction in 1965, the only major exchange rate policy occurred in 
1976 when the benchmark to which the East Caribbean dollar was pegged changed 
from the pound sterling to the US dollar. Even then, the exchange rate was not 
changed. The East Caribbean dollar was pegged to the US dollar at the cross rate which 
existed at the time. Since 1976, the East Caribbean dollar has remained pegged at the 
same rate. The difficulty of obtaining unanimous agreement has contributed to the 
exchange rate not being used as an instrument of policy. 
Trading patterns suggest that because of differences in the percentages of 
exports, imports, and total trade of the member countries with respective trading 
partners, it would be impossible to obtain a single sel of weights appropriate for all 
members if they decided to peg the exchange rate to a basket. Although pegging to the 
SDR eliminates the problem of selecting weights, because the weights of the currencies 
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which comprise the SDR are different from those the ECMU countries would have 
chosen, there ,":,ould be difficulty in obtaining unanimous agn:ement for an SDR peg. 
The high share of transactions of the ECMU countries with the United States and 
countries which have pegged their currencies to the US dollar makes pegging the East 
Caribbean dollar 10 the US dollar a reasonable policy option. 
Exchange and trade restrictions have been used relatively little by the ECMU 
countries. The major reason seems to be the constraints on credit-financed fiscal 
deficits imposed by the Union. Simulation of the model of a central bank financed 
fiscal expansion suggests that this Conn of finance would worsen the trade balance and 
result in large losses of nct foreign assets. A second reason for the lack of tight 
exchange and trade restrictions in the ECMU countries is the impossibility of having the 
restrictions binding if aU membe~ do not have the same degree of strictness. The use 
of a common currency means that restrictions could easily be evaded by channelling 
transactions through the country with the least stringent restrictions. Because the 
imposilion of exchange and trade restrictions also resuhs in welfare lo~, their 
absence is clearly a benefit of the ECMU. 
Money supply changes which occurred in Grenada and the union as a whole 
from 1973 to 1988 are altributable both to changes in !he monetary base and in the 
money multiplier. Of the approximate 11 per cent annual average increase of the 
money supply in Grenada, growth of the monetary base contributed 13 percentage 
points, while contraction of the money multiplier caused a partially offsctling 
downward movement of 2 percentage points. For the union as a whole, money supply 
changes were also mainly due to the changes in the monetary base. 
A more detailed analysis of money supply changes resulting from changes in the 
monetary base revealed that in Grenada, a greater percentage of changes were induced 
by changes in central bank credit to the government than by changes in net foreign 
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a.~ts. However. for the union as a whole, money supply changes due to changes in the 
monetary base were mainly caused by changes in nct foreign assets. 
Although the money multiplier induced smaller average annual changes to the 
money supply in Grenada, as well as in the Union as a whole, than did the monetary 
base, the changes have been extremely variable. 
Because the exchange rate has been pegged, the net foreign assets effect on the 
money supply can be considered uncontrollable by the monetary authorities. In 
addition, because the monetary authorities could not have imposed legal reserves on 
corrunercial banks in the ECMU member countries prior to 1984. money supply 
changes due to changes in the money multiplier (total reserve to deposit ratio. and the 
currency to money ratio) are also considered uncontrollable. Only money supply 
changes caused by central bank credit can to some extent be considered to have been 
controllable by the monetary authorities. Overall money supply changes can therefore 
be considered to have been beyond the control of the monetary authorities. 
Throughout the period, the monetary authorities have not pursued · active 
monetary policies to any great extent. The imposition of the 6 per cent reserve to 
deposit ratio in 1984, cannot be considered as an effective means of monetary control 
because commercial banks' actual reserve to deposit ratio is much higher man 6 per 
cent. In addition, no attempt has been made to change the required reserve percentage. 
A simple macroeconomic model consisting of six: stochastic equations and 15 
identities was developed to test some of the hypotheses relating to Grenada's 
membership in the ECMU. Money demand was postulated to be a function ofrea! GDP 
and the prime lending rate of inlCrest. and a dummy variable for caplUring the effects of 
pell"oleum price increases in 1973{74 and political instability in Grenada in 1974. 
Estimation of this equation indicated that the effects of interest rates on the demand for 
money have not been very strong. The petroleum price shock and political instability 
negatively affected the demand for mon.cy. 
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Consumer price innation rates were postulated to be functiona1ly related to 
imported prices and excess demand was represented by the deviation of real GDP from 
its trend level. Econometric estimation indicated that the main detenninant of the rate 
of change of the consumer price index in Grenada is the rate of change of import prices. 
With a 1 per cent increase in import prices, the consumer price index inunediately 
increased by 0.7 per cent. Excess demand had little influence on consumer prices. This 
was hardly surprising given that the economy is small and very open in tenns of the size 
of expQrts and imports relative to GDP. 
Grenada's merchandise exports were modelled in tenns of the domestic prices 
of exports relative to the domestic GOP deflator, a time trend and dununy variables to 
capture the effects of weather and policy. Merchandise e)lports are price elastic in the 
long run. Because they consist mainly of agricultural commodities, a change in any of 
the determinants is not expected to be felt until twO years later. Favourable weather in 
1976 and the policy decisions in 1984/85 positively affected merchandise exports. 
Exports of services, which consist mainly of services sold to touris~, were 
postulated to be determined by foreign income and foreign consumer prices relative to 
domestic consumer prices. In addition, petroleum price increases in 1973n4 and 
political instability in Grenada in 1974, ""-ere postulated to have negatively affected 
tourism. Promotional activities were postulated to affect tourism positively. The results 
indicated that tourism exports are inelastic with respect to foreign income, but elastic 
with respect to prices. Special events such as petroleum price increases in 1974, and 
political instability in Grenada during that year, had a strong negative impact on service 
exports. The results also confirmed that promotional activitie.s positively affected 
service exports. Because domestic consumer price changes are mainly the result of 
import price changes, there is not much which the Grenadian government can do to 
increase service exports, except to create a stable political environment. and 10 embark 
on a stronger program of promotional activities abroad. 
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The detenninants of imports were postulated to be real GOP, import prices in 
domestic currency relative to the GDP deflator and a dummy va,riabie reflecting 
political instability in Grenada in 1974. The results indicate that imports are price 
inelastic. This is hardly surprising given that the economy is very small and that there 
is limited scope for substitution to domestic products when Ihe prices of imports 
increase relative to domestic prices. It was not surprising that the events of 1974 
significantly reduced the demand for imports of goods and services, having affected 
exports of services which have a high import content. 
Private expenditure was postulated to be influenced positively by real disposable 
income, negatively by the rate of interest and negatively by political instability in 
Grenada in 1983. The results showed that private expenditure was elastic with respect 
to rea1 disposable income, and that the effect of interest rate changes was rather weak. 
Political events in 1983 were found to have negatively affected private expendirure. 
Tests to determine the overall perfonnance of the model revealed thai it 
perfonned reasonably well in terms of its ability to track the historical data and other 
statistics of model evaluation. Simulation of the effects of exogenous policy shocks to 
the model suggest the following: 
(1) The the loss of the ability to conduct separate exchange rate policies in 
Grenada cannot be considered a cost to the economy in tenns of achieving 
an improVed balance of payments. This is because the domestic price level 
in Grenada is highly influenced by exchange rale changes. More generally, 
inflation is to a large extent imponed. If the currency is devalued, domestic 
prices immediately increase by approximately 70 per cent of the rate of 
devaluation. Within two years, prices increase to th: same extent as the 
devaluation. Any gain in competitiveness is quickly lost. 
(2) Correspondingly, although thcre is little scope for correcting balance of 
paymcnt~ imbalances using the exchange rate, membership in the ECMU 
has denied Grenada the ability to use revaluation of the currency to combat 
imponed inflation. 
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(3) The constraints imposed on using bank-financed fiscal deficits is definitely 
beneficial to Grenada. The very openness of the economy means that any 
increase of central bank credit has no lasting effects on real activity but does 
translate into losses of net foreign assets. This was demonstrated by the 
large losses of foreign reserves following the simulated central bank 
financed increase in government expenditure. If the tendency for Grenada 
to use higher amounts of central bank credit than stipulated in the Bank 
Agreement is indicative of its willingness to use central bank credit, with 
monetary autonomy a much higher percentage of deficits may have been 
fmanced through its central bank. 
(4) If the government resons to raising taXes to finance its increased expenditure 
(a feasible option for members of the ECMU). crowding-out of real private 
expendirure occurs as disposable incomes are reduced. However, by the end 
of the simulation period. this crowding out has diminished greatly and real 
GOP is performing better than under the scenario where increased 
government expenditure is financed by the central bank. 
(5) The other shocks relate to tenns-or-trade shocks. They illustrate the .highly 
sensitive reaction of the domestic economy to these shocks, and the little 
which the Grenadian government could do to combat them, except to offset 
imported innation by a revaluation of the exchange rate in response to 
foreign price increases. 
A summary or benefits and costs (as computed in the earlier chapters) to 
Grenada arising from membership in the ECMU is presented in Table 10.1. Although 
the welfare cost of inflation seems to outweigh the benefits, the assumptions under 
which this cost was computed are unrealistic. It is highly unlikely that the authorities in 
Grenada could exercise very tight discipline and use monetary and exchange rate 
autonomy to only offset imported inflation. A more likely outcome of autonomy 10 use 
monetary and exchange rdtc policies would have been increased central bank credit to 
govenunent. The imposition of exchange and trade restrictions and higher inflation 
rates would have been very costly. The avoidance of the cOSt of inappropriately using 
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monetary policies would more than offset any benefit which could have resulted from 
monetary amonomy. 
Table 10.1 Summary of annual beneritslcosts to Grenada from EeMU 
membership 
Type of benefit/cost 
Benerit 
Elimination of reserve need for intra-union trade 
Elimination of cost of money conversion 
Savings in overhead costs due to EeeB 
"Tighter" credit controls (ECCB credit) to government 
Lower inflation rates as a result of ECCB 
Lack of binding exchange and trade restrictions due 
to restrictions on inappropriate use of monetary and 
exchange rate policies 
C"'( 
Computed welfare costs of inflation (not being able to 
offset imported inflation by revaluations) 
10.2 Limitations of t he analyses 
Magnitude 
(per cent of GDP) 
0.001-0.014 
0.08 - 0.20 
0.55- 1.06 
." 
." 
15.6 
A number of issues already discussed limited the usefulness of the study mainly in 
relation to its macro-modelling components. 
(1) In Grenada, and the ECMU countries, adequate time-series data on 
macroeconomic variables relating 10 the labour market (such as employment 
and wages) and capital are lacking. These deficiencies are reflected in the 
very simple structure of the macro model for Grenada. One panicular 
manifestation of this simplicity is that output is treated as entirely demand-
determined in the absence of the information requ.ired to estimate an 
aggregate supply function. 
(2) For those variables for which time-series data were obtained, they were only 
in annual form and the number of observations was limited. The availabili ty 
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of dala over a longer period. or quarterly data, would have provided the 
opportunity for better dynamic modelling. 
(3) Lack of adequate dala also prevented the construction of an inler-Iinked 
model of all the ECMU economies. Such a model would have allowed the 
examination of the transmission of economic shocks from one counu-y to the 
other. For example. the effects of an il'lCrease in the money supply in one 
economy on the other economies. could have been studied. Simulating such 
a model as a simultaneOus system would have contributed significantly to an 
underslanding of the effects of the common monetary authority. In addition, 
the use of an inter-related model would have greatly facililated the 
examination of the effects on the welfare of individuals in the various 
ECMU countries as a result of monetary union. 
(4) More extensive links between fiscal and monetary policies. involving in 
panicular a more realistic treatment of the determination of foreign 
borrowing and grant aid. could have provided an improved understanding of 
the effects of the ECMU on the Grenadian economy. As it stands, the 
model guarantees thai the govemment budget constraint will be met by 
foreign sources of fin ance. It suggests that the deficit leads foreign 
borrowing and grant aid. In small countries like Grenada the reverse may be 
true. The level of foreign aid received would lead the deficits. What may 
be needed, for example, is a clear representation of the effects of foreign 
debt and foreign aid on the economy. 
(5) The model could have been improved by treating priv!'-te consumption and 
private investment separately. They were aggregated into total private 
expenditure. There is no doubt that consumption and investment are 
affected differently by disposable income and interest rates; and more 
valuable infonnation may have been oblained had they been modelled 
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separately. Information on the separate elasticities may be important in 
terms of guiding policy decisions. 
(6) Since there were eight countries in the Union, a more complete analysis 
would have been obtained if data on Anguilla had been available. 
(7) The study analysed benefits to Grenada from membership in the ECMU as 
compared to having its own central bank. A more comprehensive treatment 
of monetary union would have been obtained by also analysing in more 
detail the implications to Grenada of using the US dollar. 
10.3 Implications of the research findings and conclusions 
As a result of the study, the following conclusions regarding the ECMU in general, and 
in panicular Grenada's participation in the Union. are drown. 
(1) The similarity of the ECMU economies has faci litated the conduct and 
effectiveness of unified monetary and exchange rate policies. 
(2) Under the ECMU the counoies have enjoyed exchange rate and price 
stability because of the restrictions which the union has imposed.. 
(3) The lower cost of the ECCB to each member counlI)' relative to having 
individual central banks is beneficial. 
(4) There is little scope for economically increasing intra-union trade. Any 
attempts to do so are likely to result in goods with higher costs than 
substitutes imported from world markets. 
(5) The low volume of intra·union trade relative to total trade has reduced the 
potential of the ECMU countries to benefit from the elimination of 
exchange risks. the elimination of the cost of money conversion and the 
need to hold less reserves. because intra·union trade does not require fore ign 
reserves. These benefits are minor. 
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(6) The countries would do better to promote and develop exports of services. 
panicularly tourism for which they appear 10 have a comparative advantage 
because of their tropical climate and beaches, rather than to attempt to 
increase intra·union trade. 
(7) The loss of autonomy for monetary policies in Grenada can be considered 
beneficial in preventing excessive financing of government deficits with 
central bank credit and the depletion of net foreign assets. The imponance 
of the loss of autonomy can be seen from the faci thai the Grenadian 
governments used larger amounts of centra1 bank credit than specified in the 
Bank Agreement. Had there been no restrictions, there is little doubt that 
larger proportions of budget deficits would have been financed using central 
bank crediL There is no evidence 10 suggest that with individual central 
banks monetary polic ies would have been tighter. 
(8) The openness of the ECMU economies, the high import propensities and lhe 
limited possibilities for import substitution limit the potential for effectively 
using currency devaluations to pursue eKtemai balance. 
(9) The ECMU countries have made very little use of exchange and trade 
restric tions. probably because of the restrictions imposed by lhe monetary 
union. This is definitely beneficial. 
(10) Allhough the ECMU has prevented Grenada from using the eKchange rate 
policies to combat imported inflation, the benefits from being a member of 
the union secm unambiguously to outweigh the costs. 
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APPENDIX A 
Al Derivation of formulae for computing money supply changes 
The money supply can be expressed as follows: 
M:).1MB 
where: M is the money supply; 
MB is the monetary base; 
jJ. is the money multiplier. 
Totally differentiating (Al.l) for the money supply, we obtain: 
dM = ~B + MB.djJ. 
(AI.l) 
(A1.2) 
where: dM is the net change of the money supply over the one-year unit 
interval; 
dMB is the net change of the monetary base over the one-year unit 
inlerval; 
dll is the net change of the money multiplier over the one-year unit 
interval. 
The money multiplier can be represented as follows: 
I 
-----" 
(A 1.3) 
y+a,.(I - y) 
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Tota11y differentiating expression (A1.3): 
[ (I - ",)dy+ (I - y)d", dl!= • 
(y+<Jr{I_y)l 
Substituting (A 1.4) into (At.2): 
[ (I - o,).dy+ (I-ll·do, 1 dM =)l.dMB -MB . 
[y+lJr(I-'Y)]1 
where: M,)l. MB, 0, and 'Yare defined above. 
(Al.4) 
(AU) 
Because changes in the money supply may originate from changes in the 
moneuuy base, changes in the currency to money ratio, and changes in the reserve to 
deposit ratio, the changes can be decomposed as follows: 
I): 
(A 1.6) 
where: 6MMII is the change in the money supply attributable to changes in the 
monetary base; 
aMy is the change in the money supply anributable to changes in the 
currency to money I1ItiO; 
.1Mc is the change in the money supply attributable to changes in the 
reserve to deposit ratio. 
Integrating (AJ.5) between the previous and present pt:riods (denoted as 0 and 
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fdM d• = rO-dMBd •. J1MB,(I-OT) .~ . dt-
o dt 0 dl 0(),+0..{1.)')]2 dt 
JIMB.O -y) dOT ---- - dt (AI.?) 
o[y+ay(l-iJ)2 . dt . 
The fits! term of the right hand side of (A 1.7) represents the change in the 
money supply due to the change in the monetary base, the second term represents the 
change in the money supply due to the change in the currency to money ratio, while the 
third term represents the change in lhe money supply due to the change in the reserve to 
depositralio. 
Since ~ = M/MB; M = M'.l + 6M ; and MB = MB'.1 + 6MB, the first term on the 
right hand side of (Al.8) can be written as: 
. 
J (M,.! + aM.t) .1.MM8= .1.MB .dt 
o (MS,.! + MiS. I)] 
(AL8) 
It is known that: 
. (Hb"'] 
- = lfb -
a+bt a+bt 
llb [ l·~l 
a+bt 
(AL9) 
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Therefore; 
o+b 
= llb- a/bl.iog-
(A 1.10) 
(AUl) 
By analogy, integrating me components of the first tenn of (AL7). using the 
relationship that I.l = M/MB: 
II 6M.t .dt = ~ 
o MBo+6MB.t 6MB 
MBo MBl 
--.Iog-
(6MB)2 MBo 
where: subscript I represents the present period; 
subscript 0 represents the previous period. 
Hence, 
6MB _ II 6M.t . dt = 6M _ 
o MBo+6MB.t 
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MB, 
11MB 
log 
MB, 
MB, 
(AUla) 
(A 1.1 2b) 
We also have, 
Hence, 
, f--M.,-'----- .dt = ~. IOg ~ 
o MBo + .6.MB.t .6.MB MBo 
f' Mo AMB. ____ .d' MB, Mo log - -
MBo o MBo+6.MB.t 
(AI.l3a) 
(A1.l3b) 
From equations (ALl2b), and (A1.l3b), changes in the money supply arising 
from changes in the monetary base can be separated according to the foliowing 
expression: 
[ Mo . .6.MB' MBo-AM 1 MB, dMMB:::AM + log-
6MB MBo 
(A1.l4) 
The monetary base is the sum of net roreign assets (NFA), and net central bank 
credit (CBC). Thus, changes in the money supply can result from changcs in the 
monetary base due to changes in net foreign assets, and/or changes in net domestic 
assets or the central bank. By analogy with the expression ror the change in the money 
supply due to changes in the monetary base, changes in the money supply due 10 
changes in net roreign assets and domestic credit of the cenrral bank can be decomposed 
according to the following expressions: 
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[ 6NFA (MoAMB - MBo-dM) 1 l\MNFA ::::: 6M + ----. . iog (MB1/Ml3o) 
6NFA+6CBC ~B 
(A 1.1 5) 
[ 6CBC (M,.6MB - MB,AM) 1 
.6.Mcec = 6M + ----. . log (MBdMBo) 
t.NFA+6CBC 11MB 
(A 1.16) 
where: AMNFA is the change in the money supply due to changes in net foreign 
assets; 
6Mac is the change in the money supply due to changes in central 
bank credit. 
The money supply can change if the currency to money ratio in the economy 
changes. The change in the money supply due to the change in currency to money ratio 
can be represenled as follows. 
(I - O"T}dy 
-M<, = MB. (y+ot<I -y)2 
But since 
y+O..(I-y)=MBfM 
and by definition 
Y= Cp/M 
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«AU?) 
(AU8) 
(A I.l9) 
Therefore, 
d1 
M.dO - O.dM 
M' 
(AI.20) 
Therefore, the change in the money supply arising from a change in the currency 
to money ratio can be written as follows: 
(I - a,) . (M.dO - O.dM) 
MB 
(0 - R) (M.dO - O.dM 
MB.D 
(Ai.2l) 
(AI.22) 
If it is assumed ma! currency, deposits and the monetary base exhibit linear 
growth rates, me levels in the period in terms of their levels in the previous period can 
be expressed as follows: 
0, =O'o +al 
0, = On+f3t 
RI ""Ro+ pt 
MBI "" MBn+ (a + p)1 
M, ""Mo +(a+j3)! 
where: a = 0, - On =.1.0 
j3=01-On=.1.0 
p=R,-Rn=.1.R 
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(A1.23) 
(AL24) 
(AL25) 
(AL26) 
(AL27) 
This assumption docs nOI seem too restrictive. If inslead of linear growth. 
e)l;.potential growth had been assumed, the division of the period ill to smaller sub-
periods would allow the application of the formulae to the sub-periods. 
(D - R) = (Do - ~+(13 + p).1 (AUg) 
And. 
M.dO O.dM 
= a{Mo + (n + P)t]- (0)0 + al).(n + 13) (AU9a) 
dt dl 
'" a(M.· (0) - 1lO'0 '" aDo - pCPo (A1.29b) 
Therefore, 
(D - R).(M.dO> - O>.M) = [D, - R, + (~- p).].(aD, - ~O>~ (Al.30) 
Hence; 
f(Do- Ro) +(60 -AR). I -6M, = [aD,-~,]. . d. (MBo + AMB.t) (~+ AR.t) (AUI) 
f(O.- RJ+(AD-AR).I . = (O~A{». O>~AD) . dl (ME. + tl.MB.t). (~ + tl.R.t) (AU2) 
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-t.\My f (Do-Ro)+(W - t.R).t = . dt 
o (Do -l!.D.t) + (MBo - AMB.t) 
(AI.33) 
It is known that: 
(ad-be)t (AU4) 
(a+bt)(c+dt) a+bt c+dt 
By defining 11: = ad - be (A 1.34) can be written as: 
Therefore, we have: 
nf' _'od_' _ : [alb log(a+bt) - cld log(c+dt) ],1 (AL35) 
o (a+bt)(c+dt) 
Hence 
fl t.dt = [afb.10g(a:b]_ C/d. lOg('~)]. 1 /1l: (AL36) 
o (a+bt)(c+dt) .. ... 
Similarly, 
(rul-oc) (A 1.37) 
(a+bt)(c+dt) c+dt a+bt 
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Therefore: 
r dl = [ log (c+dt) 
, 
1'[ 0 (a+bt)(c+dl) 
log (a+bl) 1, (AI.38) 
0' 
r dl [ (0.0)/0 1 
- I'" --- (A 1.39) 
o (a+bt)(c+dt) l (a+b)/a) 
Integrating the twO components of the right hand side of (A 1.33) separately: 
r (D,. R,) (D,. R,) ( Mil,IMB, ) 
.dt = .Iog ---
o (Do + 6D.t)(Bo + 6.MB.t) Do 6MB . MBoM> DIlDo 
(Al.40) 
and, 
r (""·6R)., (""·6R) 
. dl = 
o (Do + 6.0.1)(80 + 6MB.I) (Do dMB - MB06-D) 
[ D, 
aD . log 
~_MBo . log MB\ ] 
Do 6MB MBo 
(1\1.41) 
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Summing (5.32b). and (5.32c): 
( MS,IMS,) 
Do-dMB _ MBo-M) . log DIlDo + 
(Do- Rol 
(M) - dR) [ Do DI MBo 
. - Iog-- -log 
(Do.l1MB - MBoMl) M} Do dMB 
MS, ] 
MD, 
(Al.42) 
Simplifying (A 1.42) by collecting tenns, the following wxpression is obtained: 
[ D, D, (M}-.I1R) - log- -
Ml D, 
MD, ]l log 
.11MB MBo 
MB" 
(A 1.43) 
If the reserve to deposit ratio changes, the money supply may change as a result. 
The changes in the money supply due to changes in the reserve 10 deposit ratio can be: 
represented as follows: 
MS. (A 1.44) 
248 
But since 
y+O..( I -y)=MBIM (Al.4S) 
and by definition 
l-y=DIM (A 1.46) 
Or = RJD (A 1.47) 
Therefore, 
D.dR- R.dD 
OT =---- (AlA8) 
D' 
Therefore, the change in the money supply arising from the reserve to deposit 
ratio can be written as follows: 
fl (DdR/dt) (RdD/dt) o MB (DIM). D" (M>{MB') . dl (A 1.49) 
But by definition; 
249 
(D.dR/dt) - (R.dD/dt) s p(D. + PI) - (R" + pt) (Al.50a) 
' pD,- PRo (AUOb) 
(AUOc) 
Therefore; 
f M.+DM.t (D • ..1R - R".6D) . . dl 
(D. + ID.I) . MH. + AMB.t) 
(AUI) 
J ", .• M.t = .& 
o (Do - till.t) + (MBo · dMB.t) (Do .• R) - (R,W) 
(A1.52) 
By analogy with the method of derivation of (Al.42), Ihe following is obtained: 
-.a.MGr 
(Do 6MB - MB(JlID) 
[ Do Dl MHo 
-log- - - log 
ID Do 11MB ~ l MOo 
(A1.53) 
Collecting tenns and simplifying, the following expression for changes in the 
money supply due to changes in the reserve to deposit ratio is obtained. 
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log ::]} 
MB, 
6MB 
(AL54) 
By summing the expressions (Al.43) and (A 1.54). changes in the money supply 
due to the money mUltiplier can be written as follows: 
Mo(OO.1.R- Ro lID)} +[~ log~ . MBo log MB I ]. 
M) Do 11MB MBo 
{(Do-Ro) (00.1.0'-0'0.1.0) +Mo(Do.1.R-Ro.1.D)} 
= Do ~ .1.MB - MHo 6M) . log (MBI/MBo 1 + 
DIlDo 
(A 1.55) 
[ Do DI MBo MBI ] lID (Mo 6MB - MBo 11M). - log - - - log-
lID Do .1.MB MBo 
(A1.56) 
It follows that, 
(A 1.57) 
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Thus, the sum of changes 10 the money supply due to the money muiliplier can be 
delennined as follows: 
(~.I1MB • MBo-dM 1 MS, (MBo.6D - Do·I1MB 1 dMy+I1MCJ,-= log-
6MB MBo Do.6MB - MBo-6D 
(AI.58) 
Summing (A1.14), and (AU8), the lotal change in the money supply can be 
wriuen as: 
6MMO + aMy + I1MGr 
That is, 
( ~6MB • MB0-6M 1 MS, = I1M+ log- + 
6MB MHo 
( MBo-l1M . Mo·6MB 1 MS, log -
11MB MBo 
.:1MMB + dMy + 6M<>;- = 11M 
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(AI.59) 
(A 1.60) 
A2 Data used (or computing lIIoney supply changes 
TableA2.1 ThccurnncylomOOC)'ralio.~lodcposilratlo,moMymu lti p lier,totaldeposit5 
and mODe, supply (MJ): G renada and 1M ECMU, 1972 - 1988 
CIIITtI1C)'1O """,000 M~, Toul Mooey 
moneyrauo dcposil ratio multiplier deposits supp]y(M3) 
(ECSrn) (ECSm) 
G renada 
1972 0.14 0.0< 5.59 49.00 57.28 
]913 0. 14 0.05 5.41 51.98 60.31 
]914 0.]6 0.05 5.01 50.85 6036 
1915 0. 19 0.05 4.38 54.02 66.67 
1916 0.]9 0.17 100 63.96 7928 
1977 0.2] 0.10 3.46 69.13 88.06 
]978 0.23 0.10 3.29 80.46 1()4.13 
1979 0.23 0.1] 3.14 94.90 123.40 
1980 0.25 0.10 3. 11 98.38 130.96 
1981 0.27 0.15 2.66 103.74 141.1 5 
1982 0.27 0.05 3.25 106.65 146.60 
1983 0.28 0.06 3.10 105.60 146.96 
1984 0. 14 0.34 232 127.114 148.42 
1985 0.14 0.29 254 152.14 177.21 
1986 0.14 0.25 282 196.26 226.95 
1981 0.13 0.24 292 220.99 254.06 
1988 0.12 0.15 3.97 261.42 3Q2.55 
ECMU 
1912 0.1 2 0. 13 4.26 235.60 268.80 
1913 0.12 0.<19 5.03 213.20 3\0.00 
1974 0.09 0. 15 4.40 311.61 344.2] 
1975 0.09 0.23 3.34 382.04 419.40 
1976 0.08 0.33 259 45235 492.99 
1977 0.09 0.34 2.j() 496.97 543.99 
1978 0.\0 0.25 3.07 545.00 604.60 
1979 0.09 0.26 10< 632.60 695.70 
1980 0.09 0.26 299 149.40 827.50 
1981 0.09 0.23 3.41 874.90 956.60 
1982 0.08 0.20 3.81 995.80 ]085.20 
1983 0.09 0.17 4.09 1094.40 1204.10 
1984 0.08 0.22 3.61 1269.30 1312.50 
1985 0.08 0.21 3.64 1429.60 1553.20 
1986 0.08 0.17 4.21 1517.98 1656.54 
1987 0.08 0.25 3.26 \795.14 1951.19 
1988 0.08 0.28 2.98 2223.06 2412.79 
Sources: East Caribbean Cenu-al Bank:. Alllluol Rt!porlsallli Slalt!mt!1I1 af Accounts. SL KillS: IMF, 
III/aM/IoMI FilUlllcial S/ali.llicS; Grenada. Ministry of Finance (Statistical Depanrncm). 
Annual AbSlracl ofSWlisliC.l. various issues. 
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Table A1.2 The monetary baM, lid rort'ign tiSdS, ceakal bank credit, tolal restrvts and currency 
in a rculation: Grt'nacb and the l':e M U, 1971 . 1988 
M""""Y NCI Foreign 
"'""" 
ToW CWTCfICy in 
"'" """ 
bank credit ~ cin;ulation 
(ECSm) (EC$m) (EC$m) (ECSrn) (EC$m) 
G renada 
1972 10.24 9.54 0.70 1.% 8.28 
1973 11 .03 9.44 159 ' .64 8.39 
1974 12.09 10.20 1.89 238 9.71 
1975 15.22 9.69 S.S3 '3' 12.65 
1976 26.47 18.11 8.36 IU S 15.32 
197' 25.44 16.00 9.44 7.1 1 18.33 
1918 31.61 19.05 1256 7.95 23.67 
1979 39.35 23.35 1<0" 10.85 28,. 
1980 42. 15 25.1 1 17.04 93' 32.58 
198 1 52.98 18.23 34.75 15.56 37.41 
1982 45.09 13.61 31.42 5. 14 39.95 
1983 47.45 14.87 32.58 6.08 41.36 
19" 63.85 18.49 45.36 43.27 20.58 
1985 69.76 29.4t1 40.36 44.69 25.07 
1986 80.4 1 43.54 36.87 49.72 30.69 
1987 86.87 51.1 1 35.76 53.80 33.07 
1988 76.23 39.52 36.11 41.10 35.13 
ECM U 
1972 63.08 58.87 4.21 29.88 33.20 
1973 61.68 56.78 4.90 24.88 36.80 
1974 78.28 69.38 890 45.68 32.60 
1975 125.62 11 0.22 15.40 88.26 37.36 
1976 190.47 157.87 32.60 149.83 40.64 
1977 218.04 178.88 39.16 171.02 47.02 
1978 197.10 151.09 46.01 137.50 59.60 
1979 229.20 175.30 53.90 166.10 63.10 
1980 276.60 211.17 65.43 198.50 78.10 
1981 280.80 201.67 73.13 199.10 81.10 
198' 284.60 208.23 76.37 195.20 89.40 
19113 294.09 210.29 83.80 1114.39 109.70 
1984 380.74 277.08 103.66 21754 103.20 
1985 426.36 317.17 109. 19 302.76 123.60 
1986 393.67 287.03 106.64 255.1 1 13856 
1987 599.1 2 488.13 110.99 443.07 156.05 
1988 809.52 709.32 100.20 619.79 189.73 
Sources: East Caribbean Central B3nk,AnllUOi R~poriS aM Slaum~1II of AccoUnlS, SL Kius: IMF, 
I"urnalumal FlrtaJIciai SIOI/SlieS; Grenada, Ministry of Finance (Statistkal Department), 
ArtnuaIAbslraclofSlalislics.variousissllCS. 
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Bl The variables in the model 
Variable definition, variable type and data sources are presenled for each of the 47 
variables of Ihe m:xIei. arranged alphabetically by IIUlemonic. Endogenous behavioural 
variables are indicated by 'B(end),. endogenous identities are indicated by 'l(end)' and 
exogenous variables are indicated by 'Exo'. A number of variables which were not 
directly available were constructed using other variables. These are denoted by 'C. 
The following abbreviations are used to indicate data sources: 
IFS (lMF.lnternatiQfU1/ FiMncial Statistics) 
WB (World Bank) 
ECCB (East Caribbean Central Bank) 
GECS (Organisation of Easl Caribbean States) 
AAS (Grenada, Aflfluol Abstract 0/ Statistics) 
C variable consOlIcleO. 
TableSI.l The variables in the model 
Mnemonic Variable: definition 
CBC central bank credit 
CBCc central bank credi t to commercial banks 
CBeg central bank credillO the government 
COMg commercial banks credit to the government 
OTxr direct tax revenue 
OTlln averagedirecttax.ratc 
Dum74 dummy variable 1974 = 1: 0 otherwise 
Dum76 dummy variable 1976", 1: 0 o therwise 
Dum80 dummy variable 1980= I; 0 otherwise 
'55 
Variable Data t,,,, 
I(End) IFS 
E<o IFS/ECCB 
'<0 IFS/ECCB 
Em AAS 
((End) AAS 
'<0 C 
'<0 
'<0 
'<0 
TableB I .1 continued 
Variable D,u 
Mnemonic Variable definition 'YP' 
Dum83 dummy variable 1983 = I; 0 otherwise E" 
DlImS45 dummy variable 1984185 = I; o otherwise E •• 
the index of domestie eum:ncy price of one US dollar E •• ECCS 
the domestic currency price of one US dollar E •• ECCB 
E., expclIU of goods in cOl1SWlt prices B(end) AAS 
E~ exports of services in constant prices S(end) AAS 
FAB Soverrunent grant aid and. foreign borrowing 1(End) 
GEX real government expendirure on goods and services '"'. AAS 
GREV government nominal revenue l(End) AAS 
1m" imports of goods and services in constant prices 8(end) AAS 
ImTxr government revenue from import taxes I(End) AAS 
ImTxn average impon tax rate E •• 
InTxr indirect lax revenue other from imports 1(End) AAS 
InTxn average indirect tax rate other than on imports '"'. 
K' residual in the balance of payments (USS) E,. 
money multiplier E •• 
M money supply narrowly defined 1(E/"Id) IFSJECCB 
MB monctarybase I(End) IFSIECCS 
NFAf net foreign assets (USS) l(End) IFS/ECCB 
NT" l(End) AAS 
NT •• average rate of non-tax collection E •• 
'" 
consumer price index B(end) AAS 
POEM real private expenditure 8(end) AAS!OECS 
pf consumer price index of industrial countries ElIO IFS 
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Table B 1.1 continued 
Variablc D,,, 
Mnemonic Variable definition 
.," 
pi! implicit GDP dcflator 1(End) AAS 
Pm' an indelt of import price in US$ E" AAS 
Px' an indelt of the US$ price of merchandise exports "'0 AAsnFS 
py nominalGDP l(End) AAS 
prime1endingrateofimclest B(end) IFS/ECCB 
Roqp net private un~uiled transfer from abroad (USS) E" IFS 
Trnnd government transfer payments to the private sector E" AAS 
Trnn' government transfer payments made abroad E" AAS 
TRDBAL trade balance (US$) I(End) AAS 
T=d time trend E" 
realGDP l(End) AAS 
yC capacity (trend) real output E" 
yd real disposable inoome I(End) AAS 
y' an indelt of fOlCi/,'1l GDP E" IFS 
Construction of variables 
The money multiplier is constructed as: 
Kris constructed as: 
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, 
Foreign borrowing and grant aid is constructed as: 
FAB, '" «P<.GEX), + Trand, + Tranl,-
(CBeg. - CBCg. .• ) - (COMg, - COMg,.I»)/E,· 
Trend GDP is constructed as: 
yC,=Yae8'; 
where: Yo represents the base level; 
g represents the trend growth rate of real income. 
TIle aVC:l1Ige direct tax rate is constructed as: 
DTxrt=Dtxr/PY 
11leavc:ragediTttltax rate isconstnlcted as: 
InTxrt ::: lntxr/PY 
The average impon tax rate is constructed as: 
ImTxrt = Imtxr/(e.PmfJrngs) 
11le average non·tax rate is constructed as: 
NTxrt= Ntxr/PY 
Imports of goods and services and merchandise expons prices were obtained in 
domestic currency (Pm and Px). They were convened (0 US I;urrcncy prices (Pm f and 
Pxl) by dividing by the index of exchange rate (el. 
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82 natausedrorestimalillglhtlrlllMl 
Tablc82.1 Datausedrortstimatiogtltt .. ockJ 
CBe eBec CBe, CCM, DTxr 
EC$m EC$m EC$m EC$m DTm EC,m Dum74 
1911 0.70 0.00 0.10 2.29 0.08 4.40 0.00 
1972 0.70 0.00 0.70 4" 0.09 5.40 0.00 
1973 U9 000 1.59 .0.70 0.05 3.10 0.00 
1974 . ., 0.00 1.89 2.91 0.07 4.40 1.00 
1975 5'3 0.00 5.53 0.75 0.06 4.80 0.00 
1976 8.36 0.00 8.36 -0.20 0.05 5.20 0.00 
wn 9.44 0.00 9.44 .m 0.05 '.00 0.00 
1978 12.56 000 . 2.56 235 0.07 9.00 0.00 
1979 16.00 0.00 16.00 -033 0.09 \4.80 0.00 
1980 17.04 0.00 17.(M 3.00 0.09 18.00 0.00 
1981 34.75 0.00 34.75 0.70 OJlB 18.SO 0.00 
1982 31.42 0.00 31.42 12.1)6 0.09 ng, 0.00 
1983 32.S8 0.00 32.58 8.83 0.10 22.22 0.00 
1984 45.36 0.00 45.36 ~.04 0.08 ",.. 0.00 
1985 40.36 0.00 40.36 ", 0.08 24.10 0.00 
1986 36.87 0.00 36$7 -022 0.02 7.20 0.00 
1987 35.76 0.00 35.76 0.08 0.02 7.," 0.00 
1988 36.71 0.00 36.11 6.49 0.02 8.50 0.00 
E>, E" 
Dum76 D=80 0wnS3 0.m84' EC$m ECSm 
1971 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.97 37.88 75.99 
1972 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 \.92 42.12 68.61 
1973 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.96 ".06 54.15 
1974 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.05 28.89 17.35 
\975 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.17 31.99 43.48 
1976 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.61 53.94 45.32 
1977 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 270 00.36 65.65 
1978 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.70 54.85 69.69 
1979 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 270 57.86 61.82 
1980 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 270 46.95 59.95 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.70 58.63 46.12 
'98' 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.70 ".23 41.64 1983 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 2.70 65.08 39. 15 
1984 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 2.70 64.57 44.32 
1985 0.00 0.00 0.00 100 2.70 72.56 60.26 
1986 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.70 59.61 57,92 
1981 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 270 55.1 1 59.32 
1988 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 270 56.88 58.36 
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TablcB2.1 continued 
FABf GEX GREV 
'm" ImTKi ImTxrt InTxr 
USSm ECOm EC$m EC$m EC$" ECOm 
1971 ' .50 9 1.56 18.20 238.15 6.84 0.14 '.66 
I9n -1.42 83.01 21.10 199.48 6.00 0.14 6.80 
1973 20 ' 75.92 W . ., 164.56 '.60 0. 13 8.70 
1974 2", 49.08 15.20 93.17 3.82 0.10 4.48 
1975 2." ".66 18.30 12038 4.9 1 0.1» 5.39 
'976 6.1» 83.7 1 28.60 155.46 '.90 0.1» 13.40 
I9n 2.63 68.70 ".60 175.11 .16 0.1» ",. 
'978 '.99 85.86 45.40 184.14 9.83 0." 21.S7 
1919 8." 86.67 ".30 185.59 12.83 0.'" 21.S7 
1901 12.86 78.30 58.30 171.10 ' 206 0,07 22.34 
1981 21.81 101.85 62.70 176.08 11.04 0.05 24.76 
1982 33.64 110.94 74.45 177.74 11.78 0.05 31.02 
1983 31.22 102.65 8t.32 142.09 10.38 0.06 38m 
1984 28.54 90.10 87.30 134.48 12.15 0.06 39.35 
1985 36.73 101.36 100.44 166.07 17.81 0,07 47.19 
1986 37.07 103.85 93.80 180.62 21.89 0." 50.11 
1987 31.00 73.79 100.SO 199.03 "I» 0." 63.51 
1988 27.73 92.74 112.40 190.95 28.20 0.1» 60.30 
'" 
M MB NFAr NT" 
InTxrt uSSm ECOm ECOm USSm ECOm 
1971 0.1» 6" 1.10 11.87 10.78 5.12 2.30 
I9n 0.11 6.62 ' AO 1431 10.24 4.97 2.90 
1973 0.14 1.94 1.42 15.62 11.03 '.82 3.10 
1974 0.Q7 0.89 1.31 15.79 1209 '.98 2.50 
1975 0.07 -2.97 1.27 19.38 15.22 4.47 3.20 
1976 0.14 -2.51 1.01 26.70 26.47 6.94 4.10 
I9n 0.13 -1.33 1.1 6 29'" 25.44 5.93 510 
1918 0.15 -0.29 1.20 38.04 31.62 7.06 4.40 
1979 0.13 .... 1.16 45.65 39.35 8.65 7.10 
1901 0.12 1.77 1.1 5 48.45 42.15 9.30 '.90 
198 1 0.11 4.56 1.01 53.32 52.97 6.75 8.40 
1982 0.13 -1.70 1.32 59.57 45.09 '.06 8.80 
1983 0.17 -12.32 1.22 58.10 47.44 
, . ., 10.10 
1984 0.14 -1.23 0.79 SO.71 63.85 6.85 1330 
1985 0.15 0.42 0.78 54. 12 69.76 10.89 11.34 
1986 0.14 3.88 0." 69.34 80.41 ]6.13 14.60 
1987 0.16 ]1.14 0.86 74.43 86.87 18.93 11.70 
1988 0.13 6.59 1.1» 83.2 1 76.23 14.64 15.40 
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Table 82.1 rontinUM 
POEM 
tIT," pO EC$m P' p< Pm h 
1971 0.04 0.24 214.35 0.40 0.29 0.," 0.27 
1m O.OS 0.26 208. 11 0.43 0.29 0.22 0.2> 
1973 0.05 0.30 174.58 0.48 0.35 0.27 0.43 
1974 0.04 0.43 115.71 03' 0.49 0.43 0., 
1975 0.04 0.44 141.08 0<1 0.53 0.44 0 ... 
1976 0.04 0.49 139.38 0.63 0.59 0.43 0.63 
1m O.OS 0.57 151.<» 0.69 0.64 0.53 0.64 
1918 0.03 0.68 164.80 0.18 0.76 0.64 0.83 
1979 0.04 0.82 114.79 0 .. 0.87 0.83 1.00 I"" 0.03 1.00 175.40 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1981 0.04 1.19 173.21 1.07 1.10 1.18 0.88 
1982 0.04 1.28 166.64 1.11 1.17 1.22 0.78 
1983 0.05 1.36 12].03 us 1.20 1.31 0.80 
1984 O.OS 1.43 158.40 1.16 1.24 1.43 0.76 
1985 0.04 1.47 171.13 1.20 1.30 1.43 0.83 
1986 0.04 1.48 206.6) 1.21 1,42 1.50 1.30 
\987 0.03 1.49 216.75 134 1.52 1.46 133 
1988 0.03 139 267.82 1.44 1.58 1.59 1.56 
py 
.,,' Trand Tn,' TRDBAL Trend 
EOSm 
" 
US$m EC$m ECSm US$m 
1971 53.40 2.51 0." 1.24 -\9.10 3.00 
1m 59.70 8.20 3.15 0.89 0.88 -15.70 4.00 
1973 61.3(J 9.30 3.35 1.12 1.78 -13.60 '00 
1974 67.00 10.50 3.86 1.40 1.01 -13.20 6.00 
1975 81.00 10.50 3.65 2.20 1.88 ... ., 7.00 
1976 97.80 10.30 4.86 3.32 3.2 1 -10.40 '.00 
1m 11 3.40 9.00 4.50 2.94 1.38 ·16.40 9.00 
1978 145.40 9.00 7.00 2.3 1 3.74 .24.80 10.00 
1979 170.90 '.50 6.30 9.08 1.62 -44.80 11.00 
1980 189.50 9.50 11.50 14.11 4.59 -64.20 12.00 
1981 224.10 9.50 10.40 1533 3.18 -102.40 13.00 
1982 241.30 10.50 11.00 25.52 6.48 -1l4.00 14.00 
1983 225.00 10.50 14.40 29.09 7.02 -81.10 IS .OO 
1984 211.30 10.SO 10.60 2431 19.44 -19.30 16.00 
1985 312.20 11.61 10.32 20.62 28.3S -88,90 11.00 
1986 350.80 11.50 10.40 20.48 16.10 -108.40 18.00 
1987 405.40 11.42 11 .80 55.49 21.8K · - -116.20 19.00 
1988 449.50 10.50 IS.30 24. 14 23.56 _122.00 20.00 
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Table B2.1 conlinltfd 
yd y Y' yd 
ECSm yf EOm ECSon ECSm 
197\ 181.62 76.10 181.63 0.14 161.96 181.62 
19n 187.02 19.90 202.37 0.73 166. ... 187.02 
1973 172.53 84.40 174.15 0.71 170.22 112.53 
1974 146.57 85.00 137.86 0.73 174.50 \46.57 
1975 171.60 84.10 152.83 0.15 178.89 171 .60 
1976 184.13 88.60 166.89 1.00 183.39 184.13 
1977 17233 91.90 176.64 1.00 188.01 112.33 
1978 184.99 95.70 191.06 1.00 184.99 
1979 179.14 98.10 195.54 1.00 191.59 179.14 
19., 182.32 100.00 189.50 1.00 202.57 182.]2 
1981 179.62 101.50 203.73 1.00 207.66 179.62 
1982 180.]7 102.50 205.11 1.00 212.89 ISO.37 
1983 163.61 105.20 \87.81 1.00 218.25 \63.61 
1984 178.60 110.00 222.91 1.00 223.74 178.60 
1985 184.50 113.40 239.23 1.00 229.37 \84.50 
1986 216.47 116.58 241.39 1.00 235.15 216.47 
1987 268.78 120.54 266.54 1.00 241.06 268.78 
1988 263.69 125.53 284.85 1.00 247. 13 263.69 
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